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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - A.p. Emerg. Cyclone


  
1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
03/19/2004   
PROJ ID:
P049301
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
A.p. Emerg. Cyclone
Project Costs(US $M)
 219.96  174.89
Country:
India
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 150.0  121.36
Sector, Major Sect.:
Irrigation & drainage, General public administration sector, Other social services, Power, Roads & highways,
Agriculture fishing and forestry; Law and justice and public administration; Health and other social services; Energy and mining; Transportation
Cofinancing (US $M)
   
L/C Number:
C2950; L4156      
   
Board Approval (FY)
  97
Partners involved
 
Closing Date
07/31/2000 07/31/2003
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Silke Heuser
Ronald S. Parker Alain A. Barbu OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The Andhra Pradesh (AP) Hazard Mitigation and Emergency Cyclone Recovery Project was a response to heavy rains, floods and cyclones occurring between June and December 1996, with a devastating cyclone hitting the coastal area on November 6. During that period, a total of 1,689 people died and economic loss was estimated at US$2 billion.

The project’s objectives were to: (i) assist GOAP in preparing and implementing a long-term hazard management program in high-risk areas with enhanced community participation; (ii) restore public infrastructure according to hazard-resistant criteria for infrastructure siting, construction and quality control so that such infrastructure can withstand future disasters; and (iii) enhance the capacity of GOI / India Meteorological Department (IMD) in early cyclone warning.

b. Components
1) Hazard Management Program (US$48.7 million): GOAP was to conduct cyclone and flood management studies that were expected to lead to a disaster management plan. It was also to conduct hazard mapping and purchase communications and information technology to better inform and evacuate people before a cyclone; and it was to set up a Vulnerability Reduction Fund (VRF) to finance community-driven hazard reduction activities. GOI was also to enhance IMD’s early cyclone warning capacity on the east coast of India through the provision of Doppler Weather Radars.
2) Infrastructure Restoration (US$156.7 million): Electric power facilities, irrigation drains, flood banks, roads, bridges and public buildings were to be constructed or repaired to withstand wind speeds of more than 200 km/h. Mitigation measures were to include watershed management, tree shelter-belt plantations and cyclone shelters.
3) Technical Assistance (US$14.6 million): Besides financing consultants, training and equipment, TA was to fund the costs of project management.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
Parallel financing of about US$30 million from NABARD and US$30 million from the Power Finance Corporation covered additional irrigation, work on rural roads, and the restoration of electrical facilities. The depreciation of the Indian rupee led to US$9 million of the credit and US$20 million of the loan being unused. Other factors reduced the project’s cost as well, so that the actual expenditures under the Hazard Management component came to about 9 percent of the loan amount, compared to an estimated 22 percent. This was due to the fact that coastal mapping was done by a government agency instead of international consultants, and that the Doppler Weather Radar System was not procured. Expenditures for TA, however, increased to 189 % of appraisal estimates due to a project extension of three years.


3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

1) Hazard Management Program: After delays, cyclone and flood management studies were completed, yet no time was left to integrate them into a disaster management plan. The community disaster awareness program did not advance past an initial assessment; and, thus far, only one community-driven disaster activity has received funding from the VRF. GOI did install 10 high wind speed recorders and 100 digital cyclone warning systems along the east coast to improve early cyclone warnings. The purchase of three Doppler Weather Radars, however, had to be stopped due to improper procurement.
2) Infrastructure Restoration: Electricity lines and substations were improved to withstand wind speeds of up to 200 km/h. Plus, the communication system was enhanced by establishing VHF communications and satellite-based VSAT systems to coordinate disaster relief and transmit early warnings to communities. Drains were enlarged and dredged to prevent flooding; and 19 flood embankments were repaired. A total of 1,189 km of roads and 59 bridges were reconstructed, connecting vulnerable areas to nodal centers for post-disaster relief. Eight hundred public buildings were repaired, especially schools and health centers. Through self-help watershed management, 822 check dams and 711 percolation tanks were constructed along with soil moisture conservation works on 7,810 ha and horticultural plantations on 7,546 ha. Last but not least, 82 cyclone shelters were constructed and more than 5,000 ha of casuarinas, palmyras and mangroves were planted along the shore to buffer cyclones and tidal waves.
3) Technical Assistance: A disaster management team to implement hazard mitigation activities was financed. Consulting was provided to check design and construction criteria and to assure work quality. Field offices received real-time weather data through state-of-the-art equipment; and high level modeling computers were installed through which cyclone forecasting models could be interlinked and run in real time. River and rain gauges with attached satellites were established throughout the state; and necessary budget provisions have been made for their maintenance.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

Once integrated into one model, the two mitigation studies will increase the lead time of cyclone forecasting from 6-12 hours to about 48 hours. Electricity supply was made more reliable. The State Electricity Board also promoted higher standards across other ongoing works and institutionalized the O&M of power facilities. The drainage system was improved and productivity on 645,000 ha of land increased. The improved drainage system now protects three towns and 42 villages with a total population of about 300,000 from floods. In addition, the project provided improved roads and bridges to provide more reliable all-weather access to the hinterlands for 155 coastal villages.

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

While the objectives of infrastructure restoration and technical assistance were substantially met, the first and most important objective, namely to prepare and implement a long-term disaster mitigation program with increased community involvement in high-risk areas of AP, was not fully achieved. This was mainly due to a lack of Borrower commitment, Bank staff inputs not being persuasive, and because GOI did not want to disclose geographical data for security reasons. Continuous delays were experienced in most components. Adequate maintenance is still an issue with roads and bridges, as well as with the drainage system. No provisions were made to maintain cyclone shelters, with their quality also being impaired by inadequate location and lack of water supply and sanitation facilities.
Social safeguard: The original project agreement excluded any work on roads, bridges and flood banks involving resettlement because of perceived lack of time to address the issues. However, as resettlement was unavoidable, an amendment to the agreement was made to enable GOAP to undertake those works. GOAP generally delivered compensation and entitlements to the Project-Affected Persons, including squatters. It failed, however, to carry out a resettlement impact assessment study.
Environmental safeguard: Although the project was classified as an Environmental Category B project, which did not require a full environmental assessment, procedures for environmental screening and assessment were agreed upon by the Borrower and the Bank. Yet, during implementation, neither the initial agreed-upon environmental brief nor an environmental screening took place. Had they been done, major problems could have been foreseen and avoided. A newly constructed bridge in a wildlife sanctuary violated environmental protection criteria and had to be stopped for five months; and planting eucalyptus trees had to be suspended because it adversely affected the ground water table.

6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
UnsatisfactoryUnsatisfactory
Institutional Dev.:
SubstantialSubstantial
Sustainability:
LikelyLikely
Bank Performance:
UnsatisfactoryUnsatisfactory
Borrower Perf.:
UnsatisfactoryUnsatisfactory
Quality of ICR:
Satisfactory

7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

1) Combining long-term disaster mitigation activities into a three-year emergency reconstruction project proved to be unrealistic. As a result, some of the disaster mitigation activities were not completed within the expected time frame. Long-term disaster mitigation requires a longer period of time, extensive capacity building and, most importantly, strong ownership on the Borrower's part for successful mainstreaming into state-wide developmental efforts.
2)Greater involvement of local Bank staff towards the end of the project produced more continuous, hands-on supervision, as well as more timely follow-up in resolving project implementation issues.

8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

          Why?  The project experience generated interesting lessons that should inform the ongoing OED review of Bank experience in the post-disaster context.

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR provides a detailed description of the project’s achievements and shortcomings.

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