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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Aceh Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (irff)


  
1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
04/30/2014   
Country:
Indonesia
PROJ ID:
P101785
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Aceh Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (irff)
Project Costs(US $M)
 291.00  241.27
L/C Number:
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 100.00  121.77
Sector Board:
Urban Development
Cofinancing (US $M)
   
Cofinanciers:
Board Approval Date
  12/11/2006
 
 
Closing Date
06/30/2012 12/31/2012
Sector(s):
General water sanitation and flood protection sector (34%), Roads and highways (33%), Ports waterways and shipping (33%)
Theme(s):
Other urban development (100% - P)
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Peter Nigel Freeman
Roy Gilbert Christopher David Nelson IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
To reconstruct/rehabilitate strategic infrastructure and extend key infrastructure services of adequate quality standards that meet the needs of communities where infrastructure was impacted by the tsunami of 2004 and the subsequent earthquake (Grant Agreement - GA p.5).

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? Yes

Date of Board Approval: 08/13/2010

c. Components:

Component 1 - Financing of Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Investments (Appraisal estimate US$ 288.00 million; Completion US$ 239.80)
To finance individual infrastructure reconstruction sub-projects in 12 local governments. Each individual infrastructure sub-project was to be co-financed by the dedicated Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTF), according to a 70:30 ratio. This component was to provide resources for civil works and goods in sub-projects in roads, ports, water and sanitation, drainage, flood control, coastal protection and the restoration of major irrigation canals.

Component 2 - Targeted Support to Infrastructure Sub-project Planning, Design, Supervision, and Implementation Oversight
(Appraisal estimate US$3.00 million; Completion US$1.48 million).
This component was aimed at (i) strengthening the ability of the Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh and Sabang local governments to improve the provision of infrastructure in their respective jurisdictions by providing technical experts to assist them in planning and sub-project identification, sub-project design, document submission, procurement, safeguards compliance, implementation, construction supervision, and monitoring (US$2 million); (ii) supporting performance and financial audit (over and above external audit) of the project financial statements (US$0.6 million); and (iii) providing technical assistance for transition to a post-BRR timeframe and institutional arrangements beyond April 2009, including extension of technical assistance provided under the Infrastructure Enabling Program (IREP), and capacity building and infrastructure asset maintenance programs for local and provincial governments (US$0.4 million). IREP was to support the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency's (BRR) strategy for infrastructure reconstruction by providing high quality technical assistance services in infrastructure program management, planning, design, construction management, quality management and program monitoring. Although the ICR (p.31) advises that only US$ 1.48 million out of US$ 3 million was disbursed, it does not give a breakdown as to how much was spent on each of the three sub-components above, but it does note that unspent funds were reallocated to component 1.

Revised Components.
Additional Financing in the amount of US$36.7 million, scaled up these two components by including the following activities:
Reconstruction of a major section of the west coast national road (49 km.) between the key cities of Calang and Meulaboh, including the Kuala Bubon Bridge and related waterway ecological and environmental restoration. The road, bridge and local ecosystems had been severely impacted by the tsunami and the subsequent earthquake. The estimated cost of the physical works was US$ 33.8 million.
Engineering services for the design reviews and implementation supervision of the West Coast Road, and program management. The estimated cost of these activities was US$2.9 million.

The actual cost for each of the revised components above is unclear from Annex 2 of the ICR, but in total amounted to US$ 28.73 million.

In addition, the project was amended in January 2008 to modify and expand the area in which disaster affected communities and infrastructure were eligible for sub-project financing. It also allowed the flexibility to include additional kabupatens (districts) upon written agreement with the Bank.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The original project cost was US$ 291,00. In August 2010 an amount of US$ 36.70 million in additional financing was approved to cover additional works on the west coast in a redefined wider project area. In 2008 the Borrower's contribution was reduced by US$ 71.50 million because of the amendment to the defined area eligible for grant financing. This meant that the total amount of funds available for the project was US$ 256.20 million At completion the final cost was US$ 241.27 million and US$ 14.93 million was cancelled.
Financing: The originally estimated multi-donor trust fund grant contribution was estimated to be US$100.00 million. In 2010 additional financing of US$ 36.70 million was approved. The final disbursed amount was US$121.77 million reflecting unexpectedly favorable contract prices.
Borrower Contribution: The Borrower contributed US$ 119.50 million at completion. This was US$ 71.50 million less than indicated at appraisal because of the amendment to the defined area covered that was eligible for grant financing. (Amendment No 1 "Review of the Project Area," January 7, 2008).
Dates: The project closing date was extended three times, by a total of 30 months (from June 30, 2010 to December 31, 2012). These extensions were required partly because of slow initial progress in implementing the original project activities, but predominantly by the need to allow for the new road and bridge rehabilitation and reconstruction activities financed by additional financing approved in August 2010.


3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
High

The tsunami of December 26, 2004 and subsequent earthquake killed or left missing more than 230,000 people, and the five year reconstruction and development program for Aceh and Nias at an estimated cost of US$ 9 billion became a top priority for the Government of Indonesia (GOI) . There was a huge response from the international community and the GOI created a dedicated agency the Bureau for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi) for Aceh and Nias (BRR) to lead the recovery efforts to rebuild local infrastructure and to help ensure the infrastructure works longer term sustainability. The project objective was thus highly relevant to the development priorities of Indonesia at the time. The development of large-scale infrastructure was a pillar of the Bank engagement as outlined in the FY2008-2012 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). This document recognized the need to strengthen the accountability and capacity of institutions to deliver better infrastructure outcomes. It also recognized the role the Bank could play in helping to reduce Indonesia’s vulnerability to future natural disasters. According to the most recent CPS (FY2013-2015), although the Bank's office in Aceh was to be closed. because the disaster response was expected be completed by the end of 2012, infrastructure improvements would continue to be a priority, but with an emphasis on improved connectivity.

b. Relevance of Design:
Substantial
The project's results framework linked the various outputs to the outcomes sought by the project. For example, the infrastructure construction program was strategically prioritized based on developed selection criteria that included an economic and financial assessment. In addition community inputs were sought. The quality was assured through the appointment of qualified international design consultants overseen by IREP. Planning and design aspects were covered by a sound technical approach that ensured a progressively increasing proportion of sub-projects were managed locally. The design called for BRR to augment its capacity to carry out monitoring and evaluation (M&E) functions with the introduction of a computerized monitoring information system (MIS) and an appropriate results framework. More flexibility could have been built in at the outset, however, since later the geographic scope and sub-project eligibility criteria had to be modified to better target resources where they were most needed and effective.


4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

The objective of the Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility was to reconstruct/rehabilitate strategic infrastructure and extend key infrastructure services of adequate quality standards that meet the needs of communities where infrastructure was impacted by the tsunami of 2004 and the subsequent earthquake. Substantial

In total, 56 infrastructure sub-projects were constructed covering ports, water supply, flood management and sea defenses, national, provincial and district roads and one large bridge. Four sub-projects were terminated during implementation due to contractor nonperformance and one more because of security concerns. Nevertheless, all five were completed after different firms were hired.

More than 5.2 million people residing in the project area benefitted from the improvements and the project infrastructure was of a better standard than what had existed before (ICR page 18). Benefits cited (but with supporting data in only one case) were an improvement in connectivity and mobility, increased port activity and a 20 percent increase during the project implementation period in local production of palm oil and cloves. Other benefits were the development of new businesses including shops, hotels and public service facilities, improvements in solid waste management, and an improved and cleaner water supply.

The target values set for various performance indicators were generally met. Of the PDO indicators 12 of the 13 were fully met, but the adequacy of local district maintenance provision was only partially met, see section 7). These included preparation of sound technical designs, appropriate financial and safeguard measures, a progressively increasing proportion of projects managed by local and provincial staff, and the adoption of asset management strategies. A new indicator was added under additional financing for the restored road and bridge sections from Calang to Meulaboh. This was to reduce travel time from two hours to under one hour. Following the reconstruction of the Kuala Bubon Bridge a detour of 20 km. was eliminated saving on vehicle operating costs. A stakeholder workshop report (ICR, Annex 4, page 44) concluded that this project's reconstruction approach could be used as a template for dealing with future natural disasters in the sub-region and elsewhere. In the TTL interview it was mentioned that the approach had been used in Haiti.

Several initiatives were taken to maximize the local government involvement in the sub-projects in the post-BRR era. These efforts included local government capacity assessments and gap analysis, in-depth training in procurement, safeguards, anti-corruption support as well as in quality assurance, planning, budgeting, asset management strategies and construction supervision. The gap analysis refers to supplementary works using residual funding in order to better meet the needs of the beneficiaries in selected sub-projects where a gap has been identified (usually access roads).

The redevelopment did not just rebuild the impacted infrastructure, the works transformed Aceh and Nias into much better and more efficient places to live compared with the situation prevailing before the disaster. The overall improvement of the people's quality of life was recorded in a “Route to Recovery” booklet, which anecdotally summarizes the feedback from interviews with people who benefitted directly from over 20 sub-projects. An example is the New Town Access Road, south of Banda Aceh, which has attracted considerable economic activity since its restoration in the form of shops, restaurants, a petrol station and the arrival of tourists. Meanwhile, the construction of storm drains has eliminated the hazard of mosquitos bringing dengue fever. In the Bireuen district the sub-projects have not only made good the tsunami damage, but also the neglect due to three years of armed conflict between government forces and the Free Aceh Movement.

Overall, by project closure the physical accomplishments in terms of restoration of damaged infrastructures were substabtial, and on-the-job training helped build local capacity.

5. Efficiency:

Modest

Although this was a post disaster project it was not an emergency recovery loan (ERL), but a specific investment grant. While it was not possible to calculate an ERR at appraisal, because the details of the sub-projects were unknown at that stage, there were apparently selection criteria developed later that included economic and financial analysis for each sub-project. On the basis of these results and other criteria the final selection was made. This would have been an appropriate point to gather this information and to use it in due course to compare with the ERRs achieved on completion (a completion ERR or other measure is required even for ERLs). Nevertheless, it is noted that the reconstruction contract bidding procedures were consistent with the industry practice in Indonesia. Although it had been anticipated that costs could be inflated by the fact that Aceh and Nias would be difficult work areas due to the extensive damage, the influence of the various relief agencies and the mobilization of BRR contributed to supporting a healthy and competitive market and bids were realistic and lower than anticipated. The World Bank mission in Indonesia established a sub-office in Aceh from which it was able to better undertake its role as coordinator and lead partner agency for the MDTF to simplify and increase the efficiency of the donor's contributions to reconstruction and support the BRR as needed. While the project closing date was extended by six months this was mostly to accommodate an additional project unforeseen at appraisal. On the whole, this was fairly efficient, with the work completed within the budget.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:


Rate Available?
Point Value
Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal:
No
%
%
ICR estimate:
No
%
%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Based on the high relevance of objectives, substantial relevance of design, substantial achievement of the objective, but modest efficiency the overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory, reflecting moderate shortcomings in the efficiency sub-rating.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The IREP (technical assistance support) program enabled the design and construction of good quality disaster resilient infrastructure. The majority of sub-projects were managed at the national and provincial levels, where sector experiences in other projects have shown there is sufficient financial capacity to maintain them with adequate budgetary resources. For such sub-projects (i.e., national roads, ports and regional roads), maintenance funds are an integral part of the traditional Indonesian fiscal budgeting system.

Under the project, local government capacity assessments recommended a focus on institutional development at that level, through an improvement of existing systems and human resource development. In-depth training and workshops were organized for local governments to that effect and substantial training was also provided by various international organizations and NGOs. These efforts have already lessened the risk to the development outcome, but have not necessarily built lasting institutional capacity (ICR page 21). The main risk for local decentralized infrastructure, is insufficient funding for future operations and maintenance. On the other hand, according to the TTL, there are signs that the local authorities are keen to keep up the standards of their local infrastructure which is in better shape than before the disaster.

Since this is an earthquake prone area, project assets, including the strategic sub-projects like the Kuala Bubon Bridge and the seaports, are still exposed to earthquakes and thus were apparently explicitly designed to be resilient to further possible damage in the future (no examples were given in the ICR, however), helping to reduce the risk to the project's development outcome.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

The Bank team designed the program in an effective and flexible manner. For example, the review of the pre-screened sub-projects was done by means of appropriately defined eligibility criteria, which included interaction with the potential beneficiaries. This enabled the timely identification and final selection of the most relevant assets to be funded by the Bank. Provision was also made for supplementary funds for additions to sub-projects in anticipation that local communities might request features not identified up front which would enhance the sub-project objective. The simplicity of the two component design was a contributory factor to the eventual positive results of this project, aided by an arrangement that most technical, supervisory, and program management tasks were to be covered by this project. The opening of a temporary Bank office in Aceh also contributed significantly to the accomplishments of the project and to ensuring effective coordination with both the GOI and the MDTF, according to many stakeholders.

Although the initial cost estimates were on the high side (26 percent more than needed) this was largely due to the uncertainty in budgeting for the works in the devastated areas and was reduced to about six percent after the Borrower contribution was reduced following the redefining of the project area to be supported. Most risks were identified in preparation including the time constraints to deliver the program quickly, the geographic spread, sector diversity, and the scale of the program to be delivered. Nevertheless, a risk that was identified, that arguably could have received more attention was the appraisal of the inadequate implementation capacity of BRR, local government and the local construction contractors. The expectations in terms of such capacity were likely overestimated as illustrated by the initial delays. M&E design could have been improved had more thought been given to the indicators. Nevertheless, in IEG's assessment the quality at entry was satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

Project implementation benefitted from the presence of oversight from many donors and was greatly enhanced by the World Bank's opening of a coordinating office in Aceh. Taking into account the high profile of the disaster and the relief effort, the teams were experienced and well-balanced. At a seminar held after the project was concluded the stakeholders agreed that the project was a good model of partnership between the Bank, the GOI and the MDTF. While at least two formal missions were made each year, these were supplemented by many routine TTL supervision visits (with specialists when required) with additional supervision visits from the Bank's local Bandah Aceh and Jakarta offices. This ensured effective hands-on oversight of the project with a strong emphasis on implementation quality, including technical designs, and on trying to ensure adequate and candid financial management reporting, timely and accurate supervision reports, resolution of resettlement issues and, rigorous Aide-memoir follow up. For example, in June 2009 the supervision mission picked up that less than a third of the payments had been verified and took steps to ensure that all payment requests were verified by a financial management specialist prior to submission to the Treasury Office. The teams had a positive influence in the difficult implementation of the post-BRR institutional requirements with Ministries of Public Works, Planning and Finance and effectively coordinated other donors’ involvement in Aceh Province. The difficulties lay in ensuring there was sufficient local capacity to take over the sub-projects and to ensure that proper maintenance arrangements were in place. To this end each sub-project was handed over only after a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed agreeing to appropriate arrangements (ICR p16). In IEG's view the quality of supervision was satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

The GOI (Finance, Public Works and Planning) were committed, cooperative and effective in taking decisive action in a timely manner, in particular with regard to the Bank recommendations on implementation activities, including channeling the budget allocation and preparing sufficient yearly budget allocations. Given the special circumstances, BRR was apparently granted strong authority which enabled it to avoid much bureaucracy (the ICR does not give examples). However, in order to avoid duplication BRR was wound down before the project ended and responsibility was returned to the line ministries. The GOI ensured there was a framework for adequate collaboration with the affected communities and ensured that an early screening of the priority sub-projects would take place to avoid unnecessary delays. In addition the GOI was strongly supportive of the opening of a Bank local office in Bandah Aceh. It also played a key role in matching donor pledges for infrastructure works appropriately with sector needs.

Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

BRR performed reasonably effectively for the most part, and in four years was able to channel and manage not only the resources of this project and IREP, but grant financing totaling more than $6 billion (funded by all donors including the MDTF) for a wide range of other Aceh reconstruction projects (ICR page 24). The management of safeguard policies was satisfactory. Reporting through the stand-alone computerized management information system (MIS) did not go as well as planned, however, and eventually BRR developed its own system.

Disbursement delays, partly because of a less than satisfactory MIS, led to slow payments and dissatisfaction by local contractors. At one stage there were conflicting reports on progress in many sub-projects, which delayed payments, (the ICR could have given more detail on this problem). With a special initiative from the Bank and GOI all pending disbursement requests under the project were cleared by the Bank prior to the final disbursement date, but this issue was prevalent for much of the project implementation. The slowdown of the implementation of this project became evident following the closure of BRR as planned and the subsequent hand-over of the implementation to the line ministry. The MOUs for asset transfers to local governments from BRR should have included environmental maintenance. Detailed implementation was managed through a number of PIUs which at times were difficult to coordinate, requiring additional support from the Bank task team.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

The project design incorporated indicators linked to the development objectives. These indicators were mostly measurable qualitatively rather than quantitatively, and in several cases such indicators were merely inputs and did not measure outcomes. Examples are that the project should have indicators (normally a given in any project) and that projects should have good designs and adequate supervision (also normal practice). For the additional financing (e.g. for the West Coast road) the changes in their values such as time savings could be attributed to project interventions. Because of the importance of M&E in project implementation and assessing outcomes, and shortcomings in the capacity of BRR to undertake this function, the design called for the implementation project manager to ensure additional support to carry out the M&E functions. The design also called for the development of a computerized Monitoring Information System (MIS) to facilitate the monitoring of outcome indicators as well as routine project implementation and financial management for both IREP and this project. The MIS aspect, however, deserved more thought since in the event it could not be implemented successfully.

b. M&E Implementation:

The implementation project manager produced regular M&E reports (according to the ICR page 11), which were also used in the Semi Annual Reports that compiled data and were confirmed by the quality assurance staff. In addition, the PMUs for the two grants, (TF057657 and TF098082) developed a monthly portfolio review for regular monitoring of the progress of all sub-projects under this project. It also updated the performance indicators matrices for both IREP and this project as required. Efforts to develop a stand-alone computerized MIS were not successful, however, and the system was never used as the focal database for the program. Development of the system took longer than anticipated, and in the end BRR developed its own system which made the originally planned system redundant and unnecessary (ICR page 12). The shortcomings and delays associated with the original MIS system did not significantly hinder monitoring of the key performance indicators, many of which were qualitative in nature.

a. M&E Utilization:

The data and information gathered from the field were compiled and sent to the design consultants who then reviewed the sub-projects. In some cases this led to revisions in technical designs or investment priorities to ensure the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of investments. For example, for a few roads projects this information showed that the underlying soil or adjacent slopes were less stable than anticipated originally. As a result of this feedback, timely steps could be taken to strengthen the road shoulders mitigating the likelihood and impact of potential landslides. To maximize the value of BRR’s MIS, it was connected to GOI's Planning Department (Bappenas) MIS which enabled sharing of the project information at the central level, increasing the usefulness of the data for planning purposes.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
The project was classified as Environmental Category A. At appraisal it triggered safeguards for the environment (BP 4.01), involuntary resettlement (BP 4.12) and indigenous peoples (OP 4.10). Environmental safeguard management appears toi have been satisfactory, due to the significant involvement of Bank supervision teams in environmental safeguard management, focusing on resource extraction impacts (such as sourcing of sand, gravel and other quarry material) and construction impacts (excavation, fuel spills, noise and dust management, obstruction to drainage, pollution and sedimentation of water courses). Construction environment action plans (CEAPs) ensured timely attention to potential environmental impacts. Bank staff based in Banda Aceh and Jakarta supplemented regular supervision missions through periodic field visits. According to the Borrower's ICR (page 52) because of the unfamiliarity of planting shade trees, many of the new trees died through lack of watering. MOUs for asset transfers to local governments should have included environmental maintenance.

Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plans were prepared for sub-projects involving land acquisition identified prior to construction. These sub-projects acquired land from nearly 66 people. Land was acquired through negotiations and by cash compensation at or above the market price. Two road sub-projects also obtained land by way of a donation from the adjacent beneficiaries. The Calong-Meulaboh road improved under additional financing affected some 1,313 people due to widening the right of way and the re-alignment of the road to comply with national standards). Nevertheless, the resettlement issues were concluded appropriately (according to the ICR page 13) mainly due to the proactive involvement and commitment of the local authorities at the provincial and district levels. Although no costs were provided in the ICR, the TTL provided a figure of IDR 21.74 billion (about US$ 18.7 million) in compensation paid. No issues were raised in respect of indigenous peoples, which had been triggered as a precautionary measure. Addressing gender considerations was achieved through direct solicitation of inputs from women’s groups during early review of proposed project designs and through focus group discussions.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

The procurement plan was fully implemented and all services were acquired in accordance with Bank guidelines. Procurement was generally adequate with direct support from the Bank and the project's procurement phase was completed in 18 months. However, this speed may have compromised some learning opportunities for local government because it later affected the transition from BRR to the local authorities. The local authorities lacked the required capacity in this area. Procurement for the additional financing proved relatively complicated and resulted in some delays before the bid evaluation report could be cleared (ICR p. 27). External audits with unqualified findings were conducted annually to the satisfaction of the Bank (ICR page 14). Although financial management was compliant with bank procedures, processing was tardy. The issuing of budget documents, payment verifications and especially interim financial reports was subject to delays. These slow payments caused frustration for many local contractors. A low disbursement rate also resulted in special efforts having to be made to remove the backlog prior to the end of disbursement date. There was in addition an outstanding refund of an excess payment which had not been settled at the time of the IEG meeting with the TTL.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
None

d. Other:



12. Ratings:

ICR
IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Based on the high relevance of objectives, substantial relevance of design, substantial achievement of the objective, but modest efficiency the overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory, reflecting moderate shortcomings in the efficiency sub-rating.  
Risk to Development Outcome:
Moderate
Moderate
 
Bank Performance:
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
 
Borrower Performance:
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Disbursement delays, partly because of a less than satisfactory MIS, led to slow payments and dissatisfaction by local contractors. The MOUs for asset transfers to local governments from BRR should have included environmental maintenance. Detailed implementation was managed through a number of PIUs which at times were difficult to coordinate, requiring additional support from the Bank task team. 
Quality of ICR:
 
Unsatisfactory
 
NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
  • In a project responding to a major disaster with multiple donors and stakeholders, project design should be kept as simple as possible to accommodate weak local capacity and consideration should be given to a two pronged approach; the first to finance the infrastructure sub-projects, and the second to fund capacity building. Ideally there should also be a supporting donor local coordination office.
  • When local government administrations with limited capacity are involved, it is essential to ensure they are able to take responsibility, as far as possible, to manage their assets, and to help them mobilize sufficient financial resources in their administrations for the funding of essential maintenance activities for the new infrastructure established.
  • Construction Environment Action Plan (CEAP) implementation could be improved in a number of ways. The training of contractors in CEAP implementation is an important step in getting CEAPs adopted more readily. MOUs for asset transfers from the implementing agency to local governments should include environmental maintenance.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

Overall the ICR is fairly candid in presenting the manner in which the response to the disaster was tackled. The before and after project photographs in Attachment I of the ICR also provide useful visual evidence of some of the positive impacts of the sub-projects. A significant issue, however, is that efficiency is covered too superficially. While it is understood that it was not possible to calculate an ERR at appraisal, because the details of the sub-projects were unknown at that stage, there were selection criteria developed during implementation that included economic and financial analysis for each sub-project. This information could have been used and compared with the ERRs achieved on completion. If no further analyses were made at completion, and/or the data were unavailable, the ICR should have explained the reasons for this. In addition the M&E section could have been more critical about the choice of PDO indicators, several of which were not outcomes, but outputs. Evidence was needed in a number of places to back up statements made in the text. For example, although it was claimed that many people residing in the project area were economically better off than before the disaster, some hard evidence in support of this contention would have made the point more convincing. Similarly, more information as to how strategic sub-projects were made more resilient to future events and examples of how BRR's strengthened authority was able to "avoid much bureaucracy" would have been helpful. The ICR text was not always easy to follow and could also have been checked more thoroughly for typographical errors and an unnecessary tendency to use subjective phrases to over-elaborate the positive picture such as "extremely cooperative", "very effective", "well-conceived" and many others. There is no clear statement in Annex 2 (or elsewhere in the report) for the reader to determine exactly how much of the MDTF additional finance (and Borrower funds) was expended on each of the components added later comprising the west coast infrastructure and related engineering services.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Unsatisfactory

(ICRR-Rev6INV-Jun-2011)
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