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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Road Sector Development Support Program Ii (rsdsp Ii-apl 2)


  
1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
12/09/2013   
Country:
Ethiopia
PROJ ID:
P082998
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Road Sector Development Support Program Ii (rsdsp Ii-apl 2)
Project Costs(US $M)
 255.90  603.23
L/C Number:
C3989
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 160.9  348.2
Sector Board:
Transport
Cofinancing (US $M)
   
Cofinanciers:
Board Approval Date
  09/22/2004
 
 
Closing Date
06/30/2010 06/30/2012
Sector(s):
Roads and highways (90%), Central government administration (9%), Sub-national government administration (1%)
Theme(s):
Infrastructure services for private sector development (50% - P) Rural services and infrastructure (25% - S) Other financial and private sector development (25% - S)
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Victoria Alexeeva
Kristin Hallberg Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
The statement of objectives in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) is "to assist the Recipient in increasing its road transport infrastructure and improving the reliability thereof, strengthening the capacity for road construction, management and maintenance and enhancing the financing program in relation there to in order to ensure sustainability, and creating conditions conducive to private sector participation in the road transport sector".

The statement of objectives in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) does not have one of the intermediate objectives on enhancing the financing program as compared to the PDO statement in the DCA as follows: "to increase the road transport infrastructure and improve its reliability, strengthen the capacity for road construction, management and maintenance, and create conditions conducive to private sector participation in the road transport sector". The first Additional Financing Agreement used the statement of objectives of the DCA, and the second Additional Financing Agreement used the PAD statement of objectives.

The project is the second stage of a four stage Adaptable Program Loan (APL 2) of the Road Program designed to support the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) of the Government of Ethiopia. The primary objective of the Road Program “is to restore and expand Ethiopia’s road network to reduce poverty and increase employment through promoting growth and access in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner” (PAD, page 2).

Two packages of Additional Financing (AF) were approved during the life of APL2, as follows:

  • In June 2006, the first AF in the amount of US$87.3 million was approved to help finance the disparity between the engineer’s estimate and the bids that was partly related to increased prices of fuel and bitumen between project conception and project effectiveness. Other possible factors could be the low level of contractor participation and reduced competition, according to the additional financing project paper.
  • In May 2010, the second AF in the amount of US$100 million was approved to help finance cost overruns, which were primarily due to changes in design/correction of design errors and associated price adjustments.

During the second AF, the following key indicators were revised:
(i) Road density increase from the original target value of 36.24 km/1000km2 to 45.7 km/1000km2.
(ii) Increased proportion of roads in good condition from 50% to 83%.
(iii) The indicators related to enabling of the operation of ERA District Maintenance Organizations (DMOs) as profit centers and increasing the share of domestic contractors in road maintenance were dropped. The scope of APL2 did not include periodic and routine maintenance and the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) was already reforming its approach to road maintenance.
(iv) The indicator was introduced to unbundle ERA into ERA regulatory entity and District Road Maintenance Contractors commercial enterprise.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? Yes

Date of Board Approval: 05/27/2010

c. Components:
Component 1: Upgrading of Federal Trunk and Link Roads (appraisal cost US$150 million; actual cost US$433.3 million). It consisted of: (a) Assela-Dodola-Goba and Shashemene - Dodola section (316 km) of the Nazareth-Dodola/Shashemene-Goba federal trunk road; (b) GobGob-Weldiya section (194 km) of the Woreta-Weldiya federal link road; (c) Shire-Adwa-Adiabun section (83 km) of the Adigrat- Shire federal link road, and (d) consultancy services for construction supervision of the road works, and implementation of the associated environmental, safety, and resettlement plans and adverse social impact mitigation.


Component 2: Construction of Federal Link and Regional Rural Roads (appraisal cost US$60.8 million; actual cost US$164.6 million). It consisted of: (a) the construction of Magna-Mechara section (119 km) of the Dera- Mechara federal link road to a high standard gravel road; (b) The upgrading of existing and construction of new sections of the Assosa/Sherkole-Guba regional road to a gravel road surface standard (137 km); and (c) consultancy services for construction supervision of the road works, and implementation of the associated environmental, safety, and resettlement plans and adverse social impact mitigation.

Component 3: Continued support to the Ethiopia Rural Travel and Transport Program (ERTTP) (appraisal cost US$2.05 million; actual cost US$2.99 million). The component focused on preparation of additional Wereda studies and augmentation of existing TA support.

Component 4: Continued support to ERA (ERA) to enhance its capacity to plan road network maintenance and improvements (appraisal cost US$1.60 million; actual cost US$1.61 million). The activities included (a) integrating Pavement Management System with Highway Development and Management Model 4 (HDM4); (b) refining ERA’s financial management and management information (MIS) systems; and (c) technology transfer to and training of ERA staff in the relevant fields to further enhance ERA’s capacity.

Component 5: Preparation of follow up operations in APL Stages 3 or 4 (appraisal cost US$0.69 million; actual cost US$0.8 million). This included feasibility of private sector participation in financing and implementation of road programs nationally as well as in Addis Ababa.

The construction of Shashemene-Dodola road section envisaged under Component 1 was fully financed by GoE at a cost of US$47 million compared to the appraised estimate of US$17.44 million.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project cost: Total project cost was US$603.2 million at closure, 57.6% higher than the appraisal estimate of US$255.9 million as a result of the factors mentioned in Section 2a above.

Financing: The World Bank Group contribution consisted of a credit in the amount of US$160.9 million and two packages of Additional Financing of US$87.3 million and US$100 million, totaling US$348.2 million at closure.

Borrower contribution: The Borrower planned contribution of US$95 million at appraisal increased to US$255.03 million by project closure as a result of cost overruns.

Dates: The project was extended by two years from the original closing date of June 30, 2010 to June 30, 2012 at the time of the first Additional Financing in June 2006. The extension was necessitated by the re-bidding of some of the roads due to the exceptionally high bid prices (between 25 and 201% above the engineering estimates) and a lack of competition observed during an earlier round of bidding.


3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
High.
The project development objectives were consistent with the focus on road infrastructure enhancement in the Government of Ethiopia's Road Sector Development Program (1997-2015). The objectives are also relevant to the World Bank Group's FY08-12 Country Strategy for Ethiopia at closure, which aimed at accelerating the level and productivity of investment in infrastructure in a sustainable manner that included strengthening of road sector institutions and domestic road construction industry. The objectives are also in line with the main priorities of the Country Strategy FY03-07 at appraisal and during implementation aimed at accelerating rural growth through the
provision of more effective infrastructure and infrastructure services in transport, among others.

b. Relevance of Design:
Substantial.
The statement of development objectives was clear. The project results framework indicated a clear causal chain between the activities financed by the project and the outputs and outcomes related to the attainment of the development objectives. For example, with regard to physical investments in road upgrade works (Component 1 and 2), the activities were expected to increase road density and proportion of roads in good condition. Such activities as integration of HDM4 model and improvement of financial management and management information (MIS) systems were expected to lead to strengthened capacity for road construction, management and maintenance.


4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :


As a number of outcome indicators were revised during project implementation, the achievement of objectives should be rated under both the original and revised targets constructing a weighted average based on the disbursement shares before and after the restructuring (2nd AF). In this case, as the ratings are the same against the original and revised targets, the weighted average is not formally presented.

A. Intermediate Objectives

Increased road transport infrastructure and improved reliability. Substantial.

Outputs
  • 534km of roads were upgraded as per revised target. The original target was 604km; the 70 km section of Shashemene-Dodola road was dropped from IDA financing and taken over by Government of Ethiopia at second Additional Financing. The road works on this section were completed in 2009.
  • 119 km of Federal link roads were constructed as per original target that has not been revised.
  • 137 km of Regional roads were constructed as per revised target, which represents 79% of the original target of 173km.

Outcomes
  • Road density across the Ethiopia classified network increased from 30.80 km/1000 km2 to 48.1 exceeding the revised target of 45.7 and the original target of 36.2.
  • The proportion of roads in good condition across the classified network of Ethiopia increased from 32% to 88%, exceeding the revised target of 83% and the original target of 50%.

The project's contribution to these observed outcomes was very small, however. APL2 represented less than one percent of Ethiopia’s classified road network. ERA had an annual road budget of US$1.5 billion whereas the average annual disbursement for the project was US$50-70 million. The rating is based mainly on output achievements.


Strengthened capacity for road construction, management and maintenance, and enhanced financing program. Modest.

Outputs
  • 45 Wereda Travel and Transport Plans and Wereda Integrated Development Plans were completed exceeding the target of 40, which was not revised. The Government of Ethiopia is in the process of implementation alongside 600 other Wereda plans.
  • Financial Management System was updated as planned per original target.
  • Pavement Management System was updated as planned per original target.
  • 60 ERA employees were trained as planned per original target.

Outcomes

The investments in pavement management systems, financial management systems and management information systems have provided support towards efforts to reform ERA. According to the ICR, the interviewed stakeholders observed that Bank processes and the experience of APL2 also contributed towards the current program by ERA to improve awareness of environmental and social safeguards among ERA staff and in the wider industry. As the ICR acknowledges, the time delays and project cost overruns under APL2 indicate that there is still some way to go in fully achieving this objective.

More conducive conditions created for private sector participation in the road transport sector. Negligible.

Outputs
  • The original target of enabling ERA District Maintenance Organizations (DMOs) to operate as profit centers by July 2005 and commercial centers by July 2006 was dropped during the 2nd AF as ERA was already reforming its approach to road maintenance. The revised target was unbundling ERA into ERA regulatory entity and District Road Maintenance Contractors commercial enterprise. The ICR does not provide much detail in this respect or the reforms.

Outcomes
  • The original targets of increasing the share (percentage) of periodic maintenance and routine maintenance (in value terms) contracted on a competitive basis to domestic contractors were dropped during the 2nd AF as APL 2 did not include periodic and routine maintenance. As the ICR reports, domestic consultants participated in joint venture partnerships with international consultants in APL2. However, as the ICR acknowledges the achievement of this objective cannot be attributed to APL2. There was no participation of local contractors on any of the road projects financed under APL2 except the 70 km Shashemene-Dodola road section, which was eventually financed by the GoE.

B. Primary Road Program Objectives

790km of upgraded roads were added under the project to restore and expand Ethiopia’s road network. It would be reasonable to assume that it would help promote growth and access in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner that would eventually lead to poverty reduction and increased employment. Stronger evidence on impact would be useful upon completion of the four planned stages of the Road Program.

5. Efficiency:

The ex-post economic rate of return (ERR) were carried out for three roads, for which actual traffic data were available. The ex-post ERR for the Assela-Dodola-Goba/ Shashemene-Dodola roads is estimated to be 15.7% as compared with 26.7% at appraisal, and the ex-post ERR for the Gobgob-Weldiya road is estimated to be 17.2% as compared with 23.8% at appraisal due to the lower actual traffic growth rate and relatively high construction costs. The ex-post ERR of the Shire-Adiabun road was 27.8% compared with 30.2% at appraisal as the increase in the upgrading costs was not compensated by the increase in the annual traffic growth rate. The weighted average of ERRs for three roads is provided below in Table a (the calculations were done as part of this ICR Review).


The HDM 3 model (in HDM Manager) was used for the analysis. It was assumed that a minimum amount of maintenance of the existing road would be carried out (a “do minimum case”). The economic analysis was based on benefits to road traffic (in terms of savings in vehicle operating cost and road maintenance costs) compared with the costs of rehabilitation/upgrading and maintenance.

The project had an implementation delay of two years involving substantial cost overruns. The actual costs were 236% of the appraised estimates. The reasons included the disparity between the engineer’s estimate and the bids as well as changes in design/correction of design errors and associated price adjustments. The bids were up to 200% higher than the Engineer's cost estimate, and four contracts received single bids of 150% higher. The ICR says that the differences in the Engineer’s cost estimate and bids received from contractors may have been averted with rigorous project risk management and value engineering to get a better understanding of potential sources of cost increase and contingency requirements (page 6). The changes in design were allegedly necessary to take account of increased traffic compared to estimates during the design stage of the Assela-Dodola-Goba and Gob Gob-Gashena road projects. In addition, increased quantities of various work items (such as changes in urban and town sections) were alleged to have contributed to the cost increases. According to the ICR, the need for the second additional financing to cover these costs could have been avoided with better project management. The details of traffic growth and its impact on design of the project roads should have been taken into consideration and concluded during project appraisal (page 7).

The project could have made a more significant impact if the project costs were better managed at project preparation. Efficiency is assessed as modest.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:


Rate Available?
Point Value
Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal:
Yes
27%
59%
ICR estimate:
Yes
19%
72%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

The project’s development objective was highly relevant to the challenges faced by the road sector in Ethiopia. The design relevance was substantial. 790km of upgraded roads were added under the project to restore and expand Ethiopia’s road network contributing to an increased road density and proportion of roads in good condition. There was, however, only modest achievement of the project’s institutional objectives; the evidence of conducive conditions created for private sector participation through the project was negligible. The project could have made a more significant impact if the project costs had been better managed at project preparation. The actual costs were 236% of the appraisal rendering efficiency rating as modest. Outcome is assessed as moderately unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The GoE is committed to growth of the road sector. For the 2013/2014 fiscal year, out of the total budget of 154.9 billion birr ($8.3 billion), its expenditure on roads will amount to 29 billion birr (as per data subsequently received from the project team).

The ICR identifies the provision of funding to maintain the condition of the infrastructure as one of the main challenges in the future (ICR, page 14). According to the information received from the project team, the GoE's commitment to road maintenance is evidenced by the new asset management directorate equipped with data collection equipment for monitoring road conditions; the directorate is headed by a director who is at the same level as other directors for planning and implementation. In addition, the Road Fund Office established at the start of project demonstrates the commitment of the Government to ensure sustainability of the assets through regular maintenance. At the time of the ICR Review (November, 2013), most of the maintenance operations were being financed by the Road Fund that had been receiving a dedicated maintenance budget.

There are risks of the management ability of ERA in Road Asset Management, Engineering Project Management, and extracting value for money from engagements with the private sector (ICR, page 14). As the ICR reports, "in order to support the sustainability of the investments made through the APL (and more broadly the RSDP), the pavement management and asset decision support systems need to be exploited more fully to support maintenance management of the entire road network" (page 18). This means that use of software (such as HDM4) should be part of a broader context addressing processes, procedures, culture, values and technological enablers. ERA needs to reconcile short-term priorities focused on upgrading roads and the long-term plans for whole life asset management. For this to be possible ERA needs clear focused asset management plans and better inventory of road assets. As the ICR acknowledges, addressing the above risks hinges on ERA being able to attract, train and retain high quality staff (ICR, page 14). According to the information subsequently received form the project team, on July 1, 2013 GoE increased the salaries of ERA staff in the range of 20-60% demonstrating ERA's interest to keep dedicated and highly motivated staff who are responsible for an annual budget of $1.5 billion.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
The rationale for Bank’s involvement in APL2 was the continuation of support to the Government of Ethiopia's Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) provided through APL1 and the subsequent stages (i.e. APL 3 and APL 4). The overall aim of RSDP is to restore the essential road network and create adequate capacity in the road sector. APL2 was responsive to the needs of the GoE to significantly increase investment

in road infrastructure as a means to create conditions conducive to economic growth. At the time of preparation for APL2, the World Bank was also providing road sector reform assistance in the region.

The cost increases in APL2 and the need for additional financing can be traced to project preparation, quality of engineering design and construction risk management at project preparation stage. Initially, Bank support to RSDP was designed as a three stage Adaptable Program Loan (APL). However, the funding ceiling for stage one (APL1) could not accommodate the identified scope. As a result, stage one was divided into two phases - a grant and loan portion respectively. This led to a four stage APL with APL2 covering the five roads that could not be funded under APL1. The engineering design and feasibility studies for the respective roads had been undertaken as part of APL1. Hence in preparation for APL2, the projects prepared in June 2003 under APL1 were carried forward to APL2 in August 2004. Although a Quality at Entry review carried out in July 2003 (as part of APL1) rated the project’s technical soundness as satisfactory, it became clear during implementation that the project costs in APL2 could have been controlled if the engineering designs had been advanced to a point where reliable cost estimates were obtained.

The need for the second additional financing could have been avoided with better project management (ICR, page 7). Insufficient engineering design led to costly changes and modifications during construction. Several of the interviews during the ICR mission observed that while the Bank provided ample advice on addressing environmental, social, procurement and financial management safeguards, there was limited engineering advice during project preparation. The ICR asserts that part of the value-added by the Bank should have been the potential to draw on global experience in best practice of engineering design and project management. This would have led to more robust engineering designs and hence avoided the cost overruns.

The differences in the Engineer’s cost estimate and bids received from contractors may have been averted with rigorous project risk management and value engineering to get a better understanding of potential sources of cost increase and contingency requirements. Such a course of action would have led to review and updating of the Client’s cost and budget estimates in line with optimal engineering designs and prevailing market rates for key construction materials.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:
According to the ICR, the Bank supervision was regular.

The interviews during the ICR mission also confirmed that towards the latter part of the project, the Bank provided support in procurement and technical engineering aspects of the project due to new recruitment of appropriate Bank staff. This also led to improved response times for issues relating to the second additional financing and requirements for ‘no objection’.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:
The provision of adequate road infrastructure is seen as central to the development ambitions of Ethiopia and as such the various phases of the RSDP have continued to receive increasing support from the GoE. This commitment has given the development partners an anchor to provide support when needed. The GoE still remains the greatest contributor to the road infrastructure development program (70% of the road budget was funded by the GoE between 1997 and 2011). The Government was responsive to project needs and fulfilled their obligations relating to covenants and agreements. This included provision of extra funding to cover the cost overruns (150 percent more than was anticipated at appraisal). The GoE also ended up funding the 70 km Shashemene-Dodola road.

To derive the maximum benefits from the investment in the sector, the Government needs to continue the same commitment towards maintenance of the road assets and strengthening ERA and providing competitive remuneration to attract and retain high caliber staff.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:
Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) was the executing agency for APL2. The institution has developed considerably since the formulation of the RSDP. However, the experience in both APL1 and APL2 demonstrate the need to strengthen technical and managerial capability of ERA.

At an operational level, ERA was ultimately responsible for supervision of the road projects. In general, all projects in APL2 were characterized by cost overruns, costly design changes, delays in schedule, issues with quality of work and engagement with consultants and contractors. The experience demonstrates that there is still scope for ERA to improve in areas of project and design management, construction risk management, value engineering and asset management. The challenges of high staff turn-over should be addressed as well.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
The key indicators included baseline data and measurable targets set at appraisal (PAD Annex 3; ICR- Section F of the Datasheet). However, the achievement of several key indicators could not be attributed to APL2. For example, the first and second indicators focused on increasing road density and percentage of roads in good condition across the entire 54,000 km of classified road network under ERA. This indicator is useful for measuring the progress of the entire RSDP. It is difficult to attribute improvements in such indicators to APL2, which is less than one percent of Ethiopia’s classified road network. ERA has an annual road budget of US$1.5 billion whereas the average annual disbursement for APL2 was US$50-70 million. Consequently, while it is possible to argue that APL2 contributed towards improvement in overall road density and condition of ERA’s classified network, it is not realistic to attribute such improvements to APL2. The same can be said of the indicators related to participation of domestic contractors in routine and periodic maintenance as APL2 did not have any maintenance or participation of domestic contractors.

The ICR suggests a number of indicators that could have been used to measure outcome at the project level , i.e., reduction in travel time, improvement in riding quality of project roads and savings in vehicle operating costs.

b. M&E Implementation:
The data required to produce the indicators was readily available. At the start of the project, the baseline for chosen indicators was established and the indicators were tracked throughout the project. ERA supplied the relevant data and Bank followed through on the progress through regular supervision missions.

a. M&E Utilization:
The M&E system was used to inform management decisions during the course of implementation, in particular during the second Additional Financing when the results framework was revised.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
This was a Category “A” project that triggered two safeguards policies – OP4.01 Environmental Assessment, and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement.

Environmental Assessment and Management: The ICR reports that the project closed with moderately satisfactory rating for environment compliance. For the most part, overall safeguards compliance and compliance with environmental safeguards was rated satisfactory. However in June 2008, a number of issues relating to workers health and safety, and environmental protection begun to be highlighted in the implementation status and results report. It was only in October 2009 that safeguards compliance issues were reflected in the respective ISR ratings. Several environmental and social safeguards issues persisted till the end of APL2 that included protection of cut slopes and safety measures at work. The ICR mission confirmed that the implementing agency had started taking steps to address these issues. These included reinforcing of the Environment Monitoring Unit and more recently an industry wide training on environmental and social issues.

Involuntary Resettlement: The ICR only reports that "overall safeguards compliance...was rated Satisfactory" (page 9). No other details are provided with respect to OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement triggered by the project.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
Procurement: In April 2004, the World Bank carried out a procurement assessment of the capacity of the implementing agency to carry out procurement actions in compliance with World Bank requirements. As a result of this assessment, additional staff was recruited to support the procurement function and several training sessions were held to address the shortfalls. However, the quality of the client’s engineering designs affected the cost estimates and procurement of the projects. Also, the bid evaluation and contracts award stage were faced with challenges of limited competition. The lowest evaluated bids were much higher than the engineer’s cost estimates and the client eventually rejected four of the bids and chose to re-tender the contracts as the received bids were much higher than both the budget and the Engineer’s cost estimates.

During project implementation, one of the contractors, as well as a shareholder of a second contractor were debarred. These decisions did not influence the completion of the works. However, the final variation orders for both contracts were not cleared for Bank-financing. At the time some funds associated with these variation orders were already disbursed. Government of Ethiopia was required to refund the ineligible payments associated with contract amendments that were not approved by the Bank. According to the information subsequently obtained from the project team, the refund was completed.

Financial management. "ERA has complied with the financial management covenants with the exception of the delays in submission of the entity audit reports" (ICR, page 9). ERA received support from several donor organizations to implement financial management improvement in various areas such as internal controls, auditing, accounting, flow of funds, reporting and monitoring. Reportedly, the project might have benefitted from these efforts in addition to the country’s discipline in executing budget and compliance with the government’s regulations for projects. According to the subsequently received information from the project team, there were two types of external audits: the project audit and the entity audit. For fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the project audit was unqualified but the entity audit was qualified. As of the time of this Review (July 2013), the team confirmed that the issues leading to the qualification are being addressed, although the pace of resolving the issues is very slow.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:



12. Ratings:

ICR
IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
There was only modest achievement of the project’s institutional objectives; the evidence of conducive conditions created for private sector participation through the project was negligible. The project could have made a more significant impact if the project costs had been better managed at project preparation. The actual costs were 236% of the appraisal. 
Risk to Development Outcome:
Moderate
Moderate
 
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
The ICR Review agrees with the ICR on the component ratings. The overall rating depends on the rating for Outcome, which is in the unsatisfactory range. 
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
The ICR Review agrees with the ICR on the component ratings. The overall rating depends on the rating for Outcome, which is in the unsatisfactory range. 
Quality of ICR:
 
Satisfactory
 
NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
The ICR has identified a number of lessons, of which the most important are listed below with some adaptation:
  • The focus on technical engineering input is important during project preparation. More resources should be allocated for technical design review and focus on risk management and value engineering of projects during preparation. Detailed review of engineering designs for new projects and cost estimates could help avoid cost overruns and delays in implementation.
  • A stronger focus is needed on improving cost effectiveness by better analysis of the reasons for high costs and understanding the reasons for cost variations. The cost overruns in APL2 and issues with delays and quality could have been alleviated and should have been highlighted in earlier projects.
  • Strategic focus on infrastructure asset management is of paramount importance for the sustainability of investments. The pavement management and asset decision support systems need to be exploited more fully to support maintenance management of the entire road network. This means that use of software (such as HDM4) should be part of a broader context addressing processes, procedures, culture, values and technological enablers.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is concise and outcome-oriented. The quality of evidence is adequate. It fairly evaluates the attribution of project's achievements towards outcome as well as provides a thorough analysis of considerable cost overruns experienced under the project. No details, however, are provided with respect to OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement triggered by the project.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

(ICRR-Rev6INV-Jun-2011)
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