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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Emergency Recovery And Disaster Management

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
Emergency Recovery And Disaster Management
Project Costs(US $M)
 12  17.8
L/C Number:
CH143, CH353
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 12  17.8
Sector Board:
Urban Development
Cofinancing (US $M)
 0  0
Board Approval Date
Closing Date
12/31/2008 12/31/2011
Other social services (50%), Central government administration (30%), Flood protection (10%), Housing construction (10%)
Natural disaster management (40% - P) Water resource management (20% - S) Participation and civic engagement (20% - S) Administrative and civil service reform (20% - S)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Kavita Mathur
Roy Gilbert Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

The project objectives from the Schedule 2 of the Development Credit Agreement (p. 22) and the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President (p. 4) were to support the Recipient in:

(a) rehabilitating areas affected by the recent adverse natural disasters;

(b) strengthening its capacity to manage natural disaster risks and better respond to emergencies resulting from adverse natural events; and

(c) reducing the vulnerability of communities through risk identification and risk mitigation activities.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

c. Components:
Component 1 - Reconstruction and Risk Reduction in the Areas Recently Affected by
Floods (appraisal cost US$ 2.5 million, actual cost US$ 3.9 million). This component would support the reconstruction in areas affected by recent floods based on needs identified by the Government's recovery plan and the activities implemented with the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) funds. This would consist of rehabilitation of drainage systems, public buildings (including schools and clinics), and community centers.

Component 2: Institutional Strengthening for the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) and the Permanent Secretariat for Risk and Disaster Management (SPGRD) (appraisal cost US$ 3.5 million, actual cost US$ 3.5 million). This component included funding for: (i) institutional and technical support for the implementation of the National Plan for Risk and Disaster Management, including the establishment of support structures and units for the DPC and SPGRD; support for the preparation of training manuals, management of rehabilitation operations; treatment of victims; management of debris; dealing with displaced persons; early warning systems; search and rescue; first aid; communication systems; disaster mitigation project planning; and private sector involvement; (ii) environmental assessment study for natural disaster vulnerability; (iii) rehabilitation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) of the DPC; and (iv) strengthening management systems within DPC.

Component 3 - Local Risk Management (appraisal cost US$ 5.5 million, actual cost US$ 10.4 million). Under this component the project would support the development and mitigation activities at the local level in areas highly vulnerable to natural disasters. The project would assist in creation of new committees and/or strengthening of existing ones to support the design and implementation of vulnerability reduction activities at the local level. These committees would work in coordination with community councils (with the assistance of DPC representatives in the departments) to first prepare local risk and vulnerability maps and identify possible risk reduction activities (early warning systems, retention walls, terracing, drainage works, pilot reforestation projects, shelter retrofitting, etc.).This component would assist the DPC to create or reactivate local emergency committees and train them in risk and disaster management.

Project Restructuring.

Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the Government of Haiti requested project restructuring and following revisions were made to project components:

(i) a reallocation among categories of disbursement to cover existing and projected category expense overruns; and

(ii) the elimination of one minor sub-component related to the installation of a national communication system to coordinate the operations between the national and regional levels; and,

This was a Level 2 restructuring approved by the Country Director.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost and Financing: The project was financed by a grant. There were no co-financiers. The actual total project cost was US$ 17.8 million (XDR 12.56 million) compared to the appraisal estimate of US$ 12 million (XDR 8.0 million). Additional Financing of US$ 7.4 million (XDR 4.7 million) was approved on January 31, 2008, to scale up investments in Component 1 and Component 3 after the tropical storm Noel hit Haiti on October 27, 2007 and caused severe flooding which resulted in significant loss of life and damage to Haiti's infrastructure. XDR 0.126 million was cancelled.

Borrower Contribution: None planned

Dates: The original closing date was extended by two years, from December 31, 2008 to December 31, 2010 to complete works financed under the Additional Financing which was approved after the tropical Storm Noel hit Haiti on October 27, 2007. Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the closing date was further extended by one year until December 31, 2011.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
Rated substantial.
In 2004, Haiti was hit by two severe storms - flash floods and landslides in Belle-Anse and Fonds Verrettes (May) which affected more than 100,000 people and claimed more than 1000 lives. Storm Jeanne caused flash floods affecting 300,000 people in the region between Cap Haitien, Port-de-Paix and Gonaives (September). More than 3,000 people died as a result of the flooding.

At the time of approval, the project objectives were fully aligned with the IDA Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the period 2005-06. The TSS focused on (i) delivery of critical basic services and job creation; and, (ii) restoring credibility in institutions through reforms that promoted longer-term economic governance and institutional development. By supporting the Government to rehabilitate areas affected by the May and September 2004 floods and to support committees at the local level, the project was consistent with these two key objectives. Also, the TSS aimed to reduce vulnerability to future disasters at the local level through working with the communities. Communities are critical in identifying risks and mitigating them. The community involvement will ensure local ownership, build local institutions and generate employment.

The objectives continued to be relevant to the current Interim Strategy Note, which highlight reducing Haiti's vulnerability to disasters and increasing its resilience to shocks.

b. Relevance of Design:
Rated substantial.
Although the project was prepared as an emergency project, the project design did not just focus on reconstruction and rehabilitation. The project addressed institutional strengthening for the DPC and SPGRD and local risk management to address the country's high vulnerability to natural disasters throughout its territory.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

(a) Rehabilitating areas affected by the recent adverse natural disasters: rated substantial.
  • In Fonds Verrettes, the project assisted in rehabilitation of 6,500 m of unpaved road; reconstruction of 70 roof tops and 140 water tanks, construction of 30 concrete doorsteps, creation of 6 seed nurseries and implantation of lawns;
  • Embankment protection works were carried out on river Mapou (works included gabions for overall 80 m on the banks of river Mapou; maintenance of riverbed for 200 m upstream and downstream; concreting of the bridge platform);
  • Rehabilitation of ford on river Saint Antoine (construction of a culvert with 3 openings 12 m long and 6.40 m wide;
  • Construction of protection wall for StÚnio Vincent road in Jeremie (works included construction of a wall (base 1.20 m, top 0.70 m, 2.80 m average height); laying 400 m3 of mill run from river, laying of 150 m2 of road pavement, and elevation of a parapet of 160 m);
  • Construction of 12m long culvert crossing National Route 3 on the right side of river Blanche and construction of a retaining wall (11 m high and 12 m wide);
  • Cleaning of 1,000 m of canal and laying of sand bags in the riverbeds of the city watershed that caused frequent floods in the town;
  • Maintenance of urban drainage canals to improve rainwater runoff in Anse Ó Veau (works included cleaning of 1,000 m of canal and laying of sand bags in the riverbeds of the city watershed causing frequent floods in the town);
  • Construction of a 400 m long flood protection wall for the lower town of Anse a Veau;
  • Bank protection works on rivers Momance and Serpent (construction of 850m3 of gabions);
  • River flood protection for the neighborhood of Damassin (works included construction of a concrete canal (216 m) and joint of 480 m2 in concrete);
  • Rehabilitation of shelter in the town of Corail (floor area 600 m2 );
  • Rehabilitation of four national schools destroyed by the tropical storm Noel; and
  • Construction of an Emergency Operation Center/evacuation shelters in Tabarre, St. Marc and Gonaives. One of these emergency operation centers is fully functional and was tested during a simulation exercise.
  • The ICR reports (p. 17) that at the time of project closing some works remained uncompleted and some structures had been destroyed by flooding events, which implies a poor planning and implementation process. For example, the National DPC Office rehabilitated under the project was heavily damaged by the January 2010 earthquake and a bridge built in the South East Department was destroyed by an outburst of the river.

(b) Strengthening the Recipient's capacity to manage natural disaster risks and better respond to emergencies resulting from adverse natural events: achievement rated modest.
  • The project financed the acquisition of Information Technology equipment/software and vehicles to facilitate disaster management response and coordination activities.
  • The National Emergency Response Plan was updated and 18 emergency operation centers were built and equipped at the communal level, providing adequate facilities for the operation of Communal Civil Protection Committees (CCPCs). The emergency response capacity of CCPCs and DPC was tested through national disaster simulation exercises and during the 2011 hurricane season, showing that the capacity of DPC‘s to mobilize resources and disseminate warnings has improved.
  • The project assisted the Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management (SPGRD) in creating/strengthening three Thematic Committees: (i) Thematic Committee Public Awareness and Reduction; (ii) Thematic Committee on Building Norms; and (iii) Thematic Committee on Risk and Environment. However, only two thematic committees (Education and Public Awareness, and Building Norms) were operational at project closing. The ICR reports (p. 18) that the Public Awareness and Reduction Committee played a key role in mobilizing resources and coordinating the efforts of many partners in launching disaster risk awareness campaigns in Haiti. Also, the Building Norms Committee was successful in developing seismic resistant building norms and standards.
  • The ICR reports (p. 18) that despite all the training activities and studies, the management, administrative and technical capacity of DPC remains weak. The DPC was not elevated to a General Directorate (which was outside of the control of the project) and does not have adequate staffing. Its coordination capacity has improved, but is not yet at a satisfactory level. At appraisal, the Government had intended to increase the status and capacity of the DPC by transforming it into a General Directorate. This was important as it would provide DPC with increased autonomy and scope for action. The organization's role was expected to reach beyond providing disaster assistance by setting up an active program to plan for and mitigate the impact of adverse natural events. The SPGRD continues to have a very low profile.

(c) Reducing the vulnerability of communities through risk identification and risk mitigation activities: achievement rated substantial.

About 76 Communal Civil Protection Committees (CCPCs) were established covering more than half of Haiti's 144 municipalities. These committees implemented 130 small disaster mitigation works based on community based disaster risk assessment. The ICR does not give examples of these small disaster mitigation works.

The ICR is candid in noting that without a proper baseline, it is difficult to measure the progress made in the preparedness of local communities to respond to disasters. It further states that although no formal survey was conducted at the end of the project, field visits were carried out in five provinces covering 17 committees. This represented 22 percent of all committees established and/or strengthened by the project activities. These field visits showed that: (i) all the committees interviewed had an emergency response plan and had organized preventive evacuations of population during the past 3 to 4 years (ranging from 50 to 500 families at a time); and, (ii) without providing details all the committees interviewed reported that, in one way or another, their vulnerability to flooding has been reduced due to the small mitigation works.

Also, many committees played a crucial role in receiving and assisting displaced people from the capital after the January 2010 earthquake, facilitating the delivery to them of humanitarian assistance from the international community.

5. Efficiency:

No ex-post economic or financial analysis was carried out. The local risk mitigation activities were selected through a participatory process, involving community based disaster risk assessment, designed to ensure that the chosen activities helped in reducing as much as possible potential losses caused by adverse natural events by maximizing the number of beneficiaries and the value of the social and economic assets protected. Local risk mitigation activities used local labor and materials when available. The ICR notes (p. 19) that per capita investment by direct beneficiary about US$ 7.7, probably much lower than the potential per capita losses of life and property.

The project encountered three year delay see section 2d above.

Efficiency is rated substantial.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?
Point Value
ICR estimate:

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Note: since the project underwent level 2 restructuring which is approved by the Country Director, the project outcome rating is not weighted by the disbursement amount before and after restructuring.

The project development objectives remained highly relevant throughout the entire life of the project. Two of the three objectives were substantially achieved. The project contributed to expanding the network of CCPCs and reducing the vulnerability of communities to flooding through its 130 small disaster mitigation works. It strengthened the local disaster response capacity by building and equipping 21 Emergency Operation Centers and by putting this capacity to the test through simulation exercises.

The project did not succeed, however, in significantly strengthening the management, administrative and technical capacity of DPC. This was in large part the result of insufficient budget and staffing. Also, shortcomings were identified in the planning and completion of the rehabilitation works. The project efficiency was substantial.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

  1. Political instability, as illustrated by frequent changes in government have not been conducive to consistency in policy decision making. Although the Government recognizes the importance of Disaster Risk Management and of reducing Haiti's vulnerability to disasters through prevention, preparation and greater resilience, the decisions needed to institutionalize a response to these concerns were not taken by Government during the life of the project. These would have included the development of a legal framework for the National Disaster Risk Management System and the proper provision of authority, resources and staffing to the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) , by elevating it to the status of a General Directorate.
  2. The continued lack of financial sustainability and the weak institutional capacity of the DPC could jeopardize the outcomes of the project, should donor financing or support be interrupted.
  3. As the Communal Civil Protection Committees (CCPCs) do not have a legal status and they do not receive annual budget allocations from the Government, there is a high risk that the CCPCs may not be able to continue to provide emergency preparedness and response services at the local level once the ongoing disaster risk mitigation activities of development partners come to an end.
  4. There is a high risk that the works constructed under the project will not be resilient to extreme events. For example, the National Directorate of Civil Protection Office rehabilitated under the project was heavily damaged by the January 2010 earthquake and a bridge built in the South East Department was destroyed by an outburst of the river. The ICR reports (p. 17) that at the time of project closing some works remained incomplete and some structures had been destroyed by flooding events, which implies a poor planning and implementation process.

    a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
In 2002, the World Bank Task Force on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) called for a new approach to assisting the most marginalized and fragile states in non-accrual status. The LICUS re-engagement grant package aimed to help kick start initial reforms and the quick delivery of critical basic services. The project was prepared in the aftermath of a political conflict and two major flood events. The project was the first IDA operation following the arrears clearance. The project was processed on a fast-track basis within four months. This ensured an adequate response to the existing emergency.

The project design identified a number of risks: (i) delays in capacity building; (ii) inadequate government funding; (iii) lack of understanding of the project by NGOs; and (ii) delays in the Government approval of the change of DPC to a General Directorate. The risks assessment was satisfactory. However, the risk- particularly the inadequate government support to the DPC and the delays in the DPCs institutional change should have been rated high.

The project design was forward thinking i.e. it did not just focus on reconstruction and rehabilitation, but included interventions that aimed at strengthening community engagement and capacity to be prepared for and respond to disasters.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

The Bank undertook regular supervision missions - on average of two missions per year until task management moved from headquarters to the field for the latter part of the project. The field-based supervision aided effective implementation and disbursement. Bottlenecks and challenges were flagged and addressed in a timely manner. For example, the project team provided training in Bank procedures which, in turn, proved instrumental for building the necessary capacity to implement the project.

The ICR notes (p. 23) that although there were three project task team leaders (TTL), this did not adversely affect the project's supervision efficiency or implementation. The first TTL remained involved as the Regional Coordinator for the Disaster Risk Management in the region and the third TTL had been part of the project team since 2005.

Although the project team made an effort to strengthen the Results Framework by introducing intermediate outcome indicators and trying to incorporate baseline and target values, the indicators still remained focused on outputs instead of outcomes. The main shortcoming of supervision was weak monitoring of indicators. The ISRs show that the PDO indicators were not monitored consistently - only one of the three PDO outcome indicators was monitored during the entire six years implementation period.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

During project design, the project team agreed with the Government on the need to upgrade the DPC to the status of a Directorate General (with budgetary and planning autonomy) for the project to be successful. For largely political reasons, the Government chose not to pursue this course, and instead maintained the status quo of DPC at the level of Directorate, keeping it deprived of its ability to exert control over its own programming, budget or strategic direction.

Moreover, the Government failed to implement the recommendations of the Institutional Analysis of the DPC that called for specific courses of action in the short, medium and long-term. Consequently, DPC remained without a qualified cadre of technical and administrative civil servants to effectively fulfill its mandate.

Government Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

There were two implementing agencies: the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) through the Project Coordination Unit (UCP/DPC) had the overall responsibility for the implementation of the project and Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Program through its Project Coordination Unit (UCP/BMPAD) was responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the project.

The decision to split the implementing responsibilities between the DPC and BMPAD resulted in unclear roles and responsibilities of the two agencies during the early stages of the project. There were no explicit policies and protocols for inter-UCPs communication and coordination. The ICR reports nevertheless (p. 10) that over time, adequate working arrangements between the two UCPs was developed.

DPC’s continuing lack of budgetary and planning autonomy noted above had a negative effect on project implementation. While DPC was responsible for the day to day implementation of the project, the processing of consultant contracts and payment authorizations was done by the Ministry of Interior. This resulted in delays in the implementation and low disbursement rates especially under component 2. The lack of funds limited the number of field visits. The staff and training program were not sufficient by themselves in improving DPC's capacity.

During the course of the implementation of the project, BMPAD became involved in four other Bank projects. As a result, the Project Coordination Unit of BMPAD became increasingly overstretched. This contributed to inefficient execution of procurement processes (see Section 11 b below). BMPAD faced difficulties in performing technical audits of the work financed by the project to ensure it complied with all the technical and fiduciary requirements and safeguards. In some cases this resulted in sub-standard design, tardy execution. The ICR does not provide examples of these.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
The design of M&E was weak. The project did not include a full-fledged results framework as projects processed under OP/BP 8.50 were not required to provide a comprehensive M&E framework). Baselines were not defined or measured and targets were not established against which progress could be assessed. There were no formal M&E arrangements in place.

b. M&E Implementation:

During implementation, the project team made an effort to strengthen the Results Framework by introducing intermediate outcome indicators and trying to incorporate baseline and target values. The intermediate outcome indicators were officially introduced in the 2008 at the time of Additional Financing. However, the indicators still remained focused on outputs instead of outcomes.

The project implementation monitoring was done through: (i) progress reports; and (ii) supervision/field trips. The progress reports were produced by the UCP/DPC and sent to the Bank every six months. The reports included progress under the three components, procurement, the unaudited interim financial management reports; and priority actions.

Through supervision/field visits, the values of the indicators were recorded every six months in the ISRs. These reports show that the PDO indicators were not monitored consistently: only one of the three PDO outcome indicators was monitored during the entire six-year implementation period.

a. M&E Utilization:
The project team did not develop M&E tools which would have allowed identifying bottlenecks, addressing issues of non-compliance, and undertaking corrective measures during implementation. It is not clear how the project team used the collected data. In this spirit, the ICR reports (p. 14) that the project could have benefitted from the establishment of a Management Information System.

M&E Quality Rating: Negligible

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
At appraisal, no potentially major adverse environmental or social issues were identified. The project was assigned Environmental Category "B". Two safeguards were nevertheless triggered: OP 4.04 Natural Habitats and OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. The project was processed under OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery Assistance) and was exempt from producing an Environmental Assessment report prior to appraisal. A regional environmental assessment (REA) was planned, but according to the Project Team, not carried out. A project specific environment/social management framework/plan was prepared, however. According to the project paper (p. 5), the Additional Financing did not trigger any new safeguard policies.
The ICR informs (p. 15) that "during implementation, there were no reports on adverse impacts on the environment and field visits to numerous work sites did not raise any flags. However, proper documentation on the compliance with environmental safeguards was lacking - the required completion of the environmental impact assessment checklist for all civil works had not been systematically applied."

The ICR does not comment on compliance with involuntary resettlement safeguards. According to the project team, at preparation the project team was overly cautious. The project was not envisaged as becoming a large-scale infrastructure operation that would be likely to result in resettlement. During implementation, no involuntary resettlement was reported.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
Financial management
Supervision missions monitored compliance with the financial management during implementation. Also, the project team conducted three "financial management" specific missions.

Annual financial audits of the project were completed and submitted to the Bank on time every year except for 2009. The delay associated with the submission of this audit was due to the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The Bank agreed to extend the submission deadline for the FY2009 audit.

The ICR notes (p. 15) that every audit was unqualified. Even without formal qualifications, however, the audit firm did raise a number of issues about projects financial management. According to the ICR, the relevant issues, that are not specified, were dealt with in a timely fashion through the preparation and execution of agreed upon post-audit action plans that addressed the Bank's recommendations.

Every audit was submitted on time except for the audit covering FY2009.


Initially, the procurement of goods, services and works for the project proved challenging―the Bank's policies and procedures were not well understood by the Borrower and the Bank had a limited understanding of the national context and constraints, especially the limited capacity of national private sector to carry out works.

To strengthen the capacity to effectively prepare procurement packages and submit complete and acceptable evaluation, the project team conducted procurement workshops in Haiti and trained the project's procurement specialists in Washington. Furthermore, the development of an electronic filling and archive system allowed for the fast and effective production of supporting documents as required by the project team.

Poor contract management was the most significant project weakness. The ICR reports that, too often, the project team had to seek exceptions from the Bank's Latin American and the Caribbean Procurement Team for no-cost closing-date extensions for contracts that had expired. Furthermore, due to the irregular technical supervision of works (see Section 2.2), change orders were often submitted at the last minute sometimes without the required supporting documentation.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
The project was the first disaster mitigation operation in Haiti and it created conditions to attract more donor interest and funding to support the National Disaster Risk Management System. The Project Coordination Unit and the Directorate of Civil Protection offered office space to accommodate the project implementation units of the EU and IDB projects and therefore created the conditions for improved donor coordination and alignment. Shortly after the launch of the project, the European Union (EU) approved the Local Risk Management Project (Euro 6 million). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved the National Early Warning System Project ($US 7 million).

d. Other:

12. Ratings:

IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of ICR:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

Adapted from the ICR:
  • Early establishment of a baseline is important to measure progress and impact. Emergency projects would benefit from a well prepared results framework with realistic and measurable indicators.
  • Although the high risk of natural disasters requires a constant high level of preparedness, it is important to develop effective long-term preventive measures. Therefore, while it is important to give immediate attention to the short-term risks, there is a need for more investment in long-term disaster prevention and mitigation.
  • Strong ownership and leadership of the municipal government as well as the inclusion of civil society is critical for successful local response. The project experience showed that the response committees which included members from civil society as well as municipal government performed better and were most dynamic.
  • In some communes the implementing NGOs faced difficulties meeting the need of the committees to strengthen their capacity because of lack of certified trainers. Therefore, a large pool of trainers is essential to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the local committees.

14. Assessment Recommended?


15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is candid and analytical in explaining the project experience. It provides the necessary information to assess the project’s performance. The ICR is internally consistent and the quality of evidence is good. The presentation, format and coverage was consistent with Bank guidelines. The lessons are drawn from the project experience.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

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