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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Senegal Sanitation- Supporting Access To On-site Sanitation Services Through Oba Scheme In Senegal


  
1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
09/19/2013   
Country:
Senegal
PROJ ID:
P102478
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Senegal Sanitation- Supporting Access To On-site Sanitation Services Through Oba Scheme In Senegal
Project Costs(US $M)
 7.32  6.35
L/C Number:
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 0  0
Sector Board:
Water
Cofinancing (US $M)
 5.86  5.12
Cofinanciers:
DFID, DGIS
Board Approval Date
  07/06/2007
 
 
Closing Date
02/28/2010 12/31/2011
Sector(s):
Sanitation (100%)
Theme(s):
Urban services and housing for the poor (100% - P)
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Kavita Mathur
Judyth L. Twigg Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
This Project was financed by The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA). There is no Loan or Credit Agreement. The Project Development Objective (PDO) according to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is "to increase access to on-site sanitation for households living in the Dakar region in a sustainable manner" (p. 6). This is the PDO that will be used for the purpose of this review.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No

c. Components:
There were two components:

Component A: Output-based subsidies for the construction of on-site sanitation facilities (Estimated Cost: US$5.5m, Actual Cost: US$4.88m)

This component was to include works, technical studies and supervision, social intermediation, and costs and fees of the implementing agencies. Originally, this component aimed to provide access to sanitation facilities for 15,100 households living in five target municipalities in the Dakar region (assuming nine persons per household, this would equal 135,900 beneficiaries). It was revised during a restructuring to provide access for 12,100 households living in the Dakar region (assuming nine-person households, this is 108,900 beneficiaries).

Component B: Monitoring and evaluation, audits, and monitoring of environmental and social impact (Estimated Cost: US$0.26m, Actual Cost: US$0.23m)

This component aimed to establish an effective monitoring and evaluation system, audit, and environmental and social follow-up of the output-based aid program (OBA). This was not modified during the restructuring, except for a budget reallocation.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project Cost. The final total project cost of US$6.35m was US$0.97m less than the total cost at appraisal of US$7.32m. This was mainly due to less money spent on works in Component A after the restructuring changed the target from 15,100 sanitation facilities to 12,100 sanitation facilities. The cost at appraisal excluded US$100,000 that was for Bank/GPOBA supervision. The actual cost was the total of the two components (US$5.11m) plus household contributions and Government support (US$1.23m), which rounds to the total actual cost of US$6.35m.


Financing. This Project was funded by the Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), which is a multi-donor partnership administered by the World Bank. The project was financed 50% by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and 50% by the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). The World Bank manages the GPOBA but does not necessarily finance it, according to the Project Team.

Borrower Contribution. The Borrower financed US$1.23m, or 19% of total project costs. This consisted of household contributions and government support. In a GPOBA project, beneficiaries must pay their full contribution (20% of total cost) before work can even begin. In this project, the implementing agency made door-to-door visits to raise potential beneficiaries' awareness of the different types of sanitation facilities being offered. Households that wished to join the project made contributions to the implementing agency and were provided with receipts. These households were then visited by the main contractor to determine which type of sanitation facility could be built. Following a project restructuring in 2010, the Government contributed US$200,000 to ease the burden on beneficiaries having difficulty paying their contributions.

Dates. The closing date of the project was extended nearly two years from 02/28/2010 to 12/31/2011. This was done during the only restructuring on 02/25/2010. At that time, only 7% of the originally planned facilities had been completed due partly to the economic crisis and floods in the targeted area. This restructuring changed targets, expanded the geographic coverage of the project, expanded the number and type of facilities offered, and strengthened behavior change activities to stimulate demand for the facilities.


3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
The most recent Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Senegal is for the period FY07-FY10. One of the three pillars in the CAS is rural and urban synergies. Improving quality of life through "improved access to water and sanitation" (CAS, p. vii) is included as part of this pillar. One of Senegal's Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is access to improved sanitation. For the urban population, the 2015 goal is 78%. According to the MDG Strategic Document, more than a third of the Dakar region did not have access to proper sanitation (PAD, p. 3).

At the time of project appraisal, although on-site sanitation had traditionally not been considered an acceptable alternative to sewerage (due to previously existing regulations), on-site sanitation was deemed suitable for areas with low population density due to prohibitive costs for conventional sewerage (PAD, p. 3). In addition, the larger water usage required for conventional sewerage was not affordable for poor households whereas on-site sanitation requires low water consumption (PAD, p. 3). According to the Beneficiary Survey conducted during the project, 49% of households in the project area did not have access to an adequate sanitation system (ICR, p. 39).

The objective of this project remains highly relevant.

Relevance of Objectives is High.

b. Relevance of Design:

The design was modestly relevant to the objectives of the project. Subsidizing construction of on-site sanitation facilities would logically lead to an increase in access to on-site sanitation for households. Since the sanitation facilities are on-site and based on demand, they should improve access.

Sustainability was to be ensured through subsidies, affordability of maintenance, and demand-driven user contributions. The only maintenance cost is excreta removal for half of the total facilities. Otherwise the regular maintenance involves washing facilities and unblocking pipes. A program is being initiated in the project area including US$10.8m from the Gates Foundation to reduce the cost of sludge removal for private individuals (ICR, p. 22).

The statement of objectives did not mention poverty, though the PAD mentions up front that the project was targeted to "Poor household of five relatively poor municipalities" (p. 1). There was self-targeting involved since, according to the PAD, "Usually better-off households already have financed some type of sanitation facility on their own. Indeed, access to water and sanitation solutions is one of the indicators that define poverty." (p. 15). At project completion, the average monthly income of household beneficiaries was US$557.

Behavior change to stimulate demand for on-site sanitation was not included in the initial design of the project, but was implemented later when the project was extended and restructured in February 2010. A communications campaign, including television and radio ads, was to be included and was implemented later after restructuring.

Another shortcoming was the principle of full payment of the beneficiary's contribution before work could begin (a basic principle of the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid), which slowed down project implementation.

Relevance of Design is Modest.


4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

Increase access to on-site sanitation for households living in the Dakar region in a sustainable manner is rated Substantial.

Outputs

11,495 on-site sanitation facilities were built, 95% of the revised target of 12,100 (the original target was 15,100). The demand for washing facility/soakaway pits was higher than expected, and ultimately 53% of the facilities built were of this type. These are the more low-cost facilities. The remaining facilities built were divided into pour-flush toilets with showers or soakaway pits (32%), septic tanks (7%), and condominium sanitation (7%).


67% of the facilities built were located in areas not originally included in the project intervention area, due to flooding in the original intervention areas (ICR, p. 5: "Redeployment of the project in other areas of the Dakar region well suited to the construction of on-site facilities and not faced with flooding issues." Local surveys were conducted by women's associations to ascertain interest for improved sanitation services. Additionally, the original "targeted intervention areas were home to the poorest populations, fulfilling one of the basic GPOBA principles" (ICR, p. 17). It is unclear if the areas to which the project was redeployed also reached poor populations.

Outcomes

On-site sanitation:103,450 persons were provided with improved access to on-site sanitation in the Dakar region (assuming nine persons per household), 95% of the revised target of 108,900 (the original target for on-site facilities was 135,900). If the average number of persons per household is assumed at 12, rather than 9, the revised target was exceeded.

Sustainability: The National Sanitation Agency of Senegal (ONAS) is expected to continue to provide the subsidy to cover household contributions (PAD, p. 60). Households need to maintain the facilities that have been built and empty their intercepting tanks, which the ICR describes as low-effort and low-cost for most of the types of facilities built under the project (p. 21). For condominium-type sewerage systems, representing 6% of those financed by the project, the system is managed and operated by ONAS. Due to financial difficulties, ONAS "has not yet deployed sufficient resources to operate the facilities optimally" (ICR, p. 22).

It is not completely clear from the ICR that building on-site sanitation necessarily led to use of those facilities, though the Project Team later noted that surveys conducted after the project revealed that 94.1% of the beneficiaries were using their facilities. Outcome indicators on results from improved access (for example, time savings, reduction in waterborne diseases) would have been useful. The beneficiary survey did note some indicators of this sort, but attribution is an issue. The survey reported that 56.3% of the beneficiaries cited a reduction in their health expenses related to hygiene, and 76.8% said the acquisition of sanitation facilities had improved their living conditions. There were baseline figures for some waterborne diseases (malaria 27%, diarrheal disease 23.3%, cholera 34.4%), but no data at project completion (ICR, p. 44). This lack of outcome data brings down the efficacy rating.

The average subsidy per facility was US$45.4 per capita in 2011. The target was US$54 per capita, which is the subsidy limit according to GPOBA project principles. Since the actual value was lower, 119% of the end-of-project target was achieved. If the average household size is assumed to be 12 persons rather than 9, the average subsidy falls to US$34 per person. Why it is desirable to have a lower subsidy is not explained in the ICR. The Region provided the following explanation - the subsidy per capita limit was initially agreed with GPOBA at project design stage and included in the result framework as a key performance indicator for the project. It was determined on the basis of the GPOBA grant amount, the estimated unit costs of the proposed sanitation facilities and the target number of beneficiaries. The final subsidy ratio is calculated at the end of the project and represents the average subsidy per capita really granted to the project beneficiaries at various rates depending on the sanitation technology option they applied for. The lower average subsidy (US$45.4 per capita) compared with the initial subsidy limit (US$54 per capita) is not linked to the project pro-poor agenda; all the project beneficiaries are poor households. This performance is rather due to the cumulative effect of (i) a favorable combination in the choice by the population of the technology options which are subsidized at different rates, and (ii) efficient procurement which resulted in cost savings in the sanitation works.

The average monthly income of household beneficiaries was US$557 at project completion (Gross National Income per capita in Senegal according to the Atlas method is US$1,070) (ICR, p. 44). The Beneficiary Survey reported that 49% of beneficiaries lacked access to adequate sanitation prior to the project.

5. Efficiency:

The PAD calculated an economic internal rate of return (EIRR), but the ICR did not. The economic analysis in the PAD was based on the IDA-financed program, the on-site Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Communities in Dakar (PAQPUD), which ended in 2005. PAQPUD was the on-site sanitation sub-component of the Senegal Long Term Water Sector Project (2001-2009, SDR 98m). The analysis in the PAD was undertaken for 18,507 on-site household facilities. The Project had an economic Net Present Value (NPV) of US$3.34m and an EIRR assuming a 12% discount rate. All the benefits that accrued from the Project were health benefits, valued by calculating direct patient treatments costs saved and adult working days gained as a result of reduced diarrhea.

The ICR did not calculate an ERR since "the availability of data on pre-project benefits was uncertain and the post-project benefits could not be accurately determined without sufficient perspective given the recent completion of the sanitation facilities" (p. 35). This refers to the delay in project implementation, which led to nearly one-third of the project facilities being constructed in the last three months of the Project. This delay was partly attributed to severe floods in 2007 and 2008 in the project intervention areas. If there had been no delay, it is possible that construction could have been finished at less cost earlier.

The ICR did conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis that assessed unit costs per person and per household in order to show that the technological choices in the Project were the most effective in economic terms. This analysis showed that the subsidies needed to build individual or condominium sanitation facilities were 2 and 2.5 times lower, respectively, than those required for building a waterborne sewerage system type. The economic analysis in the ICR discusses the contributions of the financing sources (the GPOBA providing 80% of financing, and the households the rest) and the annual sanitation user fees per household. The conclusion is that an individual with an on-site sanitation facility will pay US$4.27 in user fees for waste removal from his septic tank. Of this, US$0.27 is to subsidize the sewerage system to which he/she does not have access. Meanwhile, "an individual who is connected to the sewerage system will pay only US$0.27 in user fees for a service from which he will actually benefit" (ICR, p. 36). Based on this analysis, in order to have more equitable access to sanitation services, the subsidy for on-site sanitation should be increased to the same level as that provided for the sewerage system, and the tariff structure for the sanitation component should be revised commensurate with the type of sanitation facility possessed "to ensure that users actually pay for the service being provided to them" (ICR, p. 37).

The financial analysis discusses the two main sanitation choices provided by the project: on-site sanitation and connections to existing condominium systems. The six types of on-site sanitation services have different costs, ranging from US$101 for a septic tank to US$40 for a washing facility/soakaway pit (which had the most demand). Condominium sanitation has a unit cost per person of US$103. There is information in the ICR on how many of each type of sanitation facility was ultimately built, but this is not included in the financial analysis discussion. A more thorough financial analysis in the ICR should have been possible, given the information available.


Efficiency is Modest.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:


Rate Available?
Point Value
Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal:
Yes
20%
100%
ICR estimate:
No
%
%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Based on High Relevance of Objectives, Modest Relevance of Design, Substantial achievement of the project's objective, and Modest Efficiency, the overall Outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory. The project's objective remains highly relevant to Senegal's Millennium Development Goals and to Bank strategy. The project was modestly well designed to achieved its objective. The project achieved targets for increased access to on-site sanitation, and the combination of minimal maintenance costs and the continued provision of subsidies makes sustainability likely. The project did not include enough evidence on outcomes to demonstrate achievement of the objectives. Design was hampered by the rigid guidelines of GPOBA (full payment by beneficiaries before work could begin). Efficiency was Modest, impacted by implementation delays and insufficient financial analysis in the ICR.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The sanitation facilities have been built according to a simple design and need only regular maintenance to last over 10 years. Maintenance involves no expense other than excreta removal costs for 50% of the facilities. Three sludge treatment facilities operated by the implementing agency serve to remove waste from septic tanks. The Gates Foundation has provided US$10.8 m to reduce the cost of sludge removal for poor households in Dakar.

Flooding is not an issue since areas subject to flooding were deemed ineligible to receive individual sanitation facilities. Other technologies, such as connections to condominium systems, were advised for these areas. There is, however, more maintenance required for the 800 households (6% of project beneficiaries) connected to existing condominium sewerage systems. Currently, due to financial constraints, the implementing agency (National Sanitation Agency of Senegal) has not yet deployed sufficient resources to empty the intercepting tanks of the condominiums. This could be a threat to the maintenance of the condominium sewerage systems.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
Much of the project design is based on an earlier project, referenced in Section 5 above (Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Communities of Dakar or PAQPUD, P041528), which was rated Highly Satisfactory in the ICR and Satisfactory in the IEG review of the ICR. PAQPUD came to an end at the time this project was being appraised. This Project was designed as a continuation of PAQPUD "in order to meet some of the demand left unsatisfied by PAQPUD" (ICR, p. 6). Instead of conducting a household survey to assess the capacity and willingness of households to pay for sanitation services, the Project adopted the same household contribution levels as those used under PAQPUD. This presented a problem within the GPOBA framework in which beneficiaries must pay their full contribution before the work gets underway. This resulted in delays in project implementation and necessitated a project restructuring (objective did not change) to address this issue in 2010. Since this Project used the GPOBA framework, household surveys to assess capacity to pay in full prior to the implementation of civil works may have resulted in more timely implementation. The GPOBA procedures were complex and not suited to rapid project implementation, which resulted in nearly one-third of the project facilities being constructed in the last three months of the Project, though floods were also a factor in the delay. There seemed to be an over-reliance on PAQPUD in designing this project.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:
According to the ICR, "the supervision component was perhaps underestimated" (p. 23) due to heavy reliance on the prior experience of PAQPUD. PAQPUD, however, had much simpler implementation arrangements than this Project, which was under the GPOBA framework. The financial package of the Project was complex and required close supervision. Project supervision in the field (a Task Team Leader based in the region and the Dakar office) was necessary for close monitoring of project activities. After project restructuring, there was much closer supervision and project monitoring that led to nearly achieving project output targets despite delays in implementation. The implementation of the project improved after restructuring, though one-third of project facilities were rushed through construction in the final three months). The ICR does not state whether environmental and social plans were fully implemented and whether there was compliance with safeguard policies. Also, the ICR does not state whether the project overall complied with the Bank's fiduciary policies. The project was not restructured for nearly two years even though only 7% of the originally planned facilities had been completed by 2010.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:
Although the Government did not request a restructuring in a timely fashion, the Government did contribute a US$200,000 grant to ease the burden on beneficiaries having difficulty paying their contributions. Effective monitoring of the Project from central Government departments was affected by the shifting of sanitation from ministry to ministry due to administrative boundary changes.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:
The National Sanitation Agency of Senegal (ONAS) had contracting authority for the Project. Implementation was subcontracted to the Public Works Implementing Agency (AGETIP).


AGETIP effectively used local survey data to determine how to spread the project into new geographic areas. However, it did not anticipate major procurement delays due to the introduction of a new procurement code, resulting in nearly one-third of the facilities being constructed in the last three months of the Project. This made it difficult to calculate an ERR at completion (see Section 5 above) that could be compared with the ERR calculated at appraisal.

ONAS did not give enough priority to sanitation. Although ONAS has created a department for on-site sanitation, it needs to be strengthened and given greater visibility (ICR, p. 16). Also, it is not able to manage the condominium sanitation systems efficiently due to its current financial situation. The ICR (p. 24) recommends that ONAS boost the visibility of its sanitation department and hire staff trained under PAQPUD and GPOBA on a permanent basis.

According to the ICR (p. 15), "the project's complex financial management system, particularly aspects related to the budget, accounting, fluidity of funds, financial reporting, and internal controls improved throughout the project, becoming satisfactory in the final months of the project." The ICR does not state whether the project overall complied with the Bank's fiduciary policies.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
Instead of a standard Bank Project Appraisal Document (PAD), this Project had a GPOBA Project Commitment/Appraisal Document that was structured slightly differently than a standard PAD. There is no Results Framework in this appraisal document, but these is a discussion of results monitoring and a list of monitoring indicators to be tracked. The project's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework was designed to monitor contributions paid, sanitation facilities built, and payments made. To determine how many facilities should be built, the Project followed the Output-Based Aid Framework. Employees of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) made door-to-door visits in the target area to raise potential beneficiaries' awareness of the different types of sanitation facilities offered. They collected contributions from those households joining the Project and provided them with receipts. The contractor then visited participating households to determine what type of facility could actually be built at each site. These facilities were then built and payments were monitored.

The main PDO indicator was the number of persons with improved access to sanitation in the Dakar region. There were two intermediate outcome indicators: number of on-site sanitation facilities built and average subsidy per facility. The M&E framework also included indicators that went beyond the scope of the project's objective, including indicators related to waterborne diseases, other health benefits, time savings, financial savings, and impact on women and girls.

b. M&E Implementation:
It was not possible to know the daily status of contributions paid and facilities built because this information was only produced at bi-monthly meetings. This led to delays in invoicing and in payments. This was addressed by providing mobile telephones to field workers to permit daily monitoring of progress. The payment system was quite complex but a spreadsheet was developed to provide detailed tracking of outputs. On the positive side, the compensation for NGOs/CBOs and construction companies was tied to achievement of objectives and their compensation depended on meeting those objectives. Following project restructuring, bimonthly meetings and systematic reporting improved and provided closer monitoring of contributions collected and sanitation facilities built.

Not all the indicators mentioned in the PAD were monitored. Indicators related to waterborne diseases, other health benefits, and time savings were not reported in the ICR. There were only some baseline data on waterborne diseases but no data reported at project completion.

a. M&E Utilization:
M&E system data were used to reduce the number of errors by verifying reported information. The availability of specific data (broken down by area and type of facility) resulted in more focused and targeted interventions and communication campaigns.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
The Project triggered OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and was classified Category B (potentially adverse environmental impacts). An Environmental and Social Assessment and plan was prepared and found to be in compliance with the Bank's safeguards policies. The project's environmental and social auditor noted the positive impact of the project on beneficiary populations' living conditions and lower health expenses related to diseases caused by poor hygiene. The auditor assessed compliance with national environmental laws and regulations. The ICR does not state whether the environmental and social plans were fully implemented, but it does note that "the dearth of personnel with environmental qualifications capable of ensuring the proper application of the social and environmental clauses incorporated into the bidding documents and the contracts for the construction of the facilities limited the effectiveness and the efficiency of the social and environmental safeguard measures adopted to protect the environment during construction of the facilities" (p. 58).

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
Financial Management. The Project had a complex financial management system, but financial reporting improved during project implementation. Under an Output-Based Aid approach (OBA), Financial Monitoring Reports must also include up-to-date lists of facilities to be constructed and certified lists of installed facilities. Final audit reports on the sanitation facilities were delayed due to delays in providing the list of facilities built. A locally recruited individual consultant was subcontracted to audit the facilities built so as to not cause delay in project implementation. According to the ICR (p. 15), "the project's complex financial management system, particularly aspects related to the budget, accounting, fluidity of funds, financial reporting, and internal controls improved throughout the project, becoming satisfactory in the final months of the project." The ICR does not state whether the project overall complied with the Bank's fiduciary policies.
Disbursement. The OBA approach is designed to ensure the efficient use of funds to needy populations by linking outcomes to disbursements. The disbursement rate was low until the final months of the Project due to difficulties in completing sanitation facilities. Project disbursements were facilitated by the World Bank disbursement department located in the region in Johannesburg.
Procurement. AGETIP handled procurement under the supervision of ONAS. As indicated in Section 9b above, AGETIP did not adequately anticipate major procurement delays due to the introduction of a new procurement code, partly to blame for nearly one-third of the facilities being constructed in the last three months of the Project.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
According to the Beneficiary Survey, 56.3% of the beneficiaries saw a reduction in health expenses for diseases related to poor hygiene, while 41% of beneficiaries saw no change in their health care costs (ICR, p. 42). The Beneficiary Survey also reports that 76.8% of the beneficiaries said the acquisition of sanitation facilities lightened the workload of women, reduced the mosquito population, and led to lower waste removal costs (ICR, p. 42).

d. Other:



12. Ratings:

ICR
IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
The project did not include enough evidence on outcomes to demonstrate achievement of the objectives. Efficiency was impacted by implementation delays and insufficient economic and financial analysis in the ICR (which could have been done, based on the sanitation facility construction data provided). 
Risk to Development Outcome:
Moderate
Moderate
 
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
There was over-reliance on PAQPUD design and inadequate analysis to establish if GPOBA was the best approach. The ICR does not state whether environmental and social plans were fully implemented and whether there was compliance with safeguard policies. Also, the ICR does not state whether the project overall complied with the Bank's fiduciary policies. The project was not restructured for nearly two years even though only 7% of the originally planned facilities had been completed by 2010.  
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
 
Quality of ICR:
 
Unsatisfactory
 
NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
The following lessons are derived from those presented in the ICR (pp. 25-26):

  • Full payment principles can be too rigid. GPOBA principle of full payment of the beneficiary's contribution before work begins was too rigid for this project. The ICR reports that the project discouraged participation by the most underprivileged (p. 25).
  • There is a permanent need for ongoing hygiene-related awareness raising. In this project, the percentage of financing for soft inputs (studies, supervision, social engineering) was underestimated and had to be increased during the project.
  • Where possible, obstacles to rapid project implementation should be promptly identified and removed. The payment schedules mandated by the GPOBA approach were overly complex. The Project Team took a long time to grow familiar with the method of invoicing (p. 26).

14. Assessment Recommended?

Yes
Why?
To verify the ratings and document lessons learned.

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR explains how the project was implemented and how obstacles to achievement of the objective were dealt with through the restructuring. However, there are some major shortcomings: (i) there is no calculation of an Economic Rate of Return, unlike the PAD which did calculate one. This was explained in the ICR by pointing out that nearly one-third of the project facilities were constructed in the last three months due to implementation delays and floods in 2007 and 2008. Information available in other parts of the ICR (such as the specific types of sanitation facilities built) should have been brought into the efficiency discussion; (ii) the ICR does not state whether the project's environmental and social plans were successfully implemented, and therefore whether there was compliance with safeguard policies; (iii) the discussion of whether the project reached the poor population (one of the OBA principles) was inconsistent; (iv) the ICR reports the lower than expected subsidy as a success, but it is unclear why this is so; (v) indicators mentioned in the PAD on waterborne diseases, health savings and time savings are not reported in the ICR; and (vi) the ICR does not state whether the project overall complied with the Bank's fiduciary policies.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Unsatisfactory

(ICRR-Rev6INV-Jun-2011)
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