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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Coral Reef Rehabilitation And Management Program Phase Ii

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
Coral Reef Rehabilitation And Management Program Phase Ii
Project Costs(US $M)
 74.3  66.9
L/C Number:
C3910, L4740
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 57.1  53.9
Sector Board:
Agriculture and Rural Development
Cofinancing (US $M)
 7.50  7.50
Board Approval Date
Closing Date
12/31/2009 12/31/2011
Other social services (35%), Sub-national government administration (30%), General agriculture fishing and forestry sector (15%), Micro- and SME finance (12%), General education sector (8%)
Other environment and natural resources management (29% - P) Biodiversity (29% - P) Rural non-farm income generation (14% - S) Participation and civic engagement (14% - S) Decentralization (14% - S)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Keith Robert A. Oblitas
Ridley Nelson Christopher David Nelson IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

    The project under review - the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project - Phase II - was the second and last phase of a 15 year Adjustable Program Loan - the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project Adjustable Program Loan. The objectives of both the 15 year overall program and of the project are provided below:

    The long-term objectives of the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP) Adjustable Program Loan (APL) were to:
    “Establish viable, operational and institutionalized coral reef management systems in priority coral reef sites in Indonesia.”
    (Source PAD)

    The Objectives of the Indonesia Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project – Phase II (COREMAP –II) were to:

    “Enhance the welfare of coastal communities through the establishment of viable coral reef management systems consisting of a program aimed at empowering and supporting coastal communities to co-manage, in a sustainable manner, the use of coral reefs and associated ecosystem resources.”

    Source: Development Credit Agreement. The Objectives in the Loan Agreement and the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund Grant Agreement are identical to the DCA.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

c. Components:

A. Institutional Strengthening
Estimated cost (base costs without contingencies) at Appraisal - $16.6 million. Actual cost $17.9 million.

Enhancing Government institutional responsiveness to meet the needs of coastal communities for collaborative management of marine reserves and protected areas, including: (i) program coordination, M&E and training; (ii) coral reef research and monitoring; and (iii) legal, policy and strategy assistance; in order to strengthen institutions and develop policies for decentralizing management of coral reefs.

B. Community Based and Collaborative Management
Estimated cost (base costs without contingencies) at Appraisal - $41.6 million. Actual cost $35.4 million.
Legal, technical and financial assistance to coastal communities and local administrations in seven Districts to prepare management plans and subsequently co-manage coral reefs and increase incomes. Activities include: training and provision of technical assistance to communities for forming village institutions, similar assistance to District staff, District and village preparation of co-management plans, establishment of marine sanctuaries and collaborative surveillance and enforcement, village revolving funds for supporting livelihood enhancement activities, block grants for village improvements, pilot decommissioning of destructive fishing gear, and support for forming District institutional structures for assisting village activities, enforcement, and co-management.

C. Public Awareness, Education and Sea Partnership
Estimated cost (base costs without contingencies) at Appraisal - $11.7 million. Actual cost $13.6 million.
Increasing societal awareness of the benefits of coral reef ecosystem conservation and sustainable use, including: a public awareness campaign; dissemination of educational materials for schools and the media; and inclusion of coral reef conservation in school curricula. Also, a Partnership Program to: deploy specialist consultants; support coral reef conservation by universities including seconding of academics in districts, provision of scholarships, and promotion of research; expanding existing field training programs; and logos, information sheets and other materials for awareness building.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

The Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project – Phase II (COREMAP-II) was the second tranche of a three phase Adaptable Program Loan (APL). COREMAP-II was approved on May 25, 2004. There were no changes during project implementation in the project’s Objectives, nor any significant changes in the components or monitorable indicators. Total project costs estimated at appraisal were $74.3 million. At completion, actual costs were $66.9 million (10 percent below the appraisal estimate). The project received external financing of: $33.2 million from IBRD; an IDA Credit of $23.9 million equivalent; and a Global Environment Facility Trust Fund Grant of $7.5 million. The borrower’s planned contribution was $10.9 million, and at completion was $8.4 million direct financing, plus an unspecified amount of additional financing (type of activities financed by the additional financing not specified in the ICR). During implementation, $3 million of the IBRD Loan was cancelled. At project completion, all three sources of external financing had been fully disbursed.

The project’s intended closure date was December 31, 2009, a planned implementation period of 5 years and 7 months. The final closing date was two years later – on December 31, 2011, resulting in an implementation period of just over 7 years.

There were two second order restructurings. The first one, approved in October 2009, was an extension of the project period by one year, intended as an interim measure pending a more detailed review of actions appropriate after delays in procurement, disbursement and Government funding. The second restructuring extended the project period by an additional year accompanied by the following: the $3 million cancellation of the IBRD Loan referred to above; and adjustments following the recommendations of the mid-term-review in some of the monitorable indicators. The substantive changes were to adjust two indicators reflecting growth of coral coverage and reef fish catch which were unrealistic.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

The project’s objectives responded to a need, recognized in both the Bank’s and Government’s strategy, to address the rapid decline of Indonesia’s coral reef ecosystems, a precious natural resource and the main source of income of the numerous fishing villages, amongst the poorest communities in the country, that depend on the reef for their main source of livelihood. Indonesia’s five million hectares of coral reefs are about half of the total reef area in East Asia, and 18 percent of Global reef area. They are part of the “Coral Triangle” which supports one of the most diverse marine ecosystems in the World. However, about 65 percent of Indonesia’s reefs are threatened (ecologically damaged or in process of being damaged), primarily from destructive fishing practices.

The Indonesia Country Partnership Strategy - FY09-12 (July 2008) includes emphasis on poverty alleviation through improved governance, better service delivery to the poor, supporting Government’s decentralization program, and protecting the environment. Government has considered the management of the coral reef ecosystems as a national priority since the mid-1990s and this provided, and still provides, the context within which the COREMAP APL was conceived. Notably, conservation and improved welfare are recognized as mutually dependent, communities should be empowered to better themselves, and Government should provide a partnership of services, technical assistance and access to funds wherein the communities can develop. The Relevance of the Project’s Objectives was High.

b. Relevance of Design:

The Results Framework (PAD Annex 3) bridges between objectives, components, outputs and outcome, and is reflected in the Monitorable Indicators chosen. In most respects the project’s design was well tailored to achieve the objectives. All the needs at Government level, from the relevant central institutions to decentralized district administrations, were provided for. A large program at community and reef site levels formed the bulk of the project, and a public awareness program was included, reflecting that conservation requires support from a diverse stakeholder community.

The multiple actions in each component, the multiple institutions, the still limited experience with Government/community co-management, and the project’s decentralized approach made for a complex project. On the other hand, the project’s comprehensive approach – recognizing that the environment and welfare were linked, and that public awareness also needed to improve - was better than environmental management by fiat. Perhaps the number of sites could have been reduced, but this would not have altered the largely necessary complexity of the operational model determined by the project’s co-management and decentralized approach – both strategically in line with Indonesia's long-term development strategy.

The choice of an Adaptable Program Loan to finance the COREMAP program was sound. Given the immensity of the coral reefs, the need to build institutions and capacity, and the new ways of interacting with communities, it would take time to introduce and build the program. Continuity was required, as well as flexibility in implementation modalities. For instance, COREMAP-II put considerably more emphasis on decentralization, empowerment and co-management than did COREMAP-I.

The main weakness in the project’s design was the Alternative Income Generation program, a pilot exercise for creation of employment opportunities outside the fisheries sector so that participants could leave the sector. The program's detailed implementation modalities were not worked out, and the funds provided to the villages were insufficient. Nevertheless, in most other respects, the project’s design was a well-tuned base for advancing the project’s objectives, and the project’s Relevance of Design was Substantial.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

COREMAP II’s objectives contained three elements: (i) establishing a viable management system for the coral reefs through empowering and supporting coastal communities to co-manage the reefs; (ii) sustaining the coastal reef ecosystem; and (iii) enhancing the welfare of the coastal communities. The project’s efficacy will be reviewed by these three elements:

1. Establishing a viable management system for the coral reefs through empowering and supporting coastal communities to co-manage the reefs.

Decentralized and legally codified coral reef co-management systems were established in all seven project districts. These included no-take zones (areas where fishing is not allowed) in each area amounting to 70,000 ha covering 15 percent of the project managed areas (a target of 10 percent was set at appraisal). The ICR reports that “within locally managed marine protected areas, local stakeholders were fully involved in the planning and management of the no-take zones." Coral Reef Management Plans for approval by the District Governments, were established with 358 communities, of which 251 were approved by project closure. (The appraisal target for Management Plans was 291 communities.). District laws and regulations enabling co-management were enacted in all seven of the project districts.

Responsibilities of the communities and the various Government services involved were in essence the following: The communities were the hands-on operators. They played the primary role in management and surveillance of their coastal water resources and their no-take zones. For management and coordination purposes each community had a Community Management Unit, and various democratic processes and sub-committees facilitated participation as well as inclusion of minority groups. Surveillance was done by roster shared between community members, and communications were made using radio communication systems. Each District had a collaborative surveillance and enforcement system, linked to the community institutions. Locally based offices of a number of agencies provided support, amongst them, the Ministry of Forests, the police, navy and the courts.

The co-management system had significant impact. Infringements of park rules (illegal and destructive fishing practices) recorded by park rangers decreased from 2,200 infringements in 2005 to 880 infringements in 2010, of which 70 percent of the cases were prosecuted successfully. The Task Team has also advised IEG that the extensive role that villagers have played in coastal management under the project has raised national visibility of the co-management approach in ecological management; and of the achievements possible through community empowerment.

About 70 percent of the operating costs for maintaining the COREMAP II program have been absorbed into the regular budgets of the Districts, a more assured source of financing than if expenditures need annual approvals.

In summary, COREMAP II has established a functioning co-management system involving close collaboration between government agencies and communities, and there is evidence from the reduced number of infringements that the local community surveillance supported by the Government authorities has reduced illegal and destructive fishing practices. The Efficacy of Establishing a viable management system for the coral reefs through empowering and supporting coastal communities to co-manage the reefs was Substantial.

(2) Sustaining the coastal reef ecosystem

There are reasonable grounds to conclude a general improvement. The likely most reliable data are the measurements from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences which, using permanent plots for annual measurement, estimated that coral cover increased by 17 percent in the project period, with only one District showing negative growth. (Control plots outside the no-take zones were not established.) Another indicator is the proportion of sample sites where improvement in coral cover was noted - on six of the seven project sites coral cover increased. (Data is from the ICR, plus additional survey material from the Institute of Sciences provided to IEG by the Task Team.)

An attempt was made to monitor trends in fish population, but, as commented on in the ICR, results are too inconsistent to be used with confidence. Also, it may be too early for increasing coral cover to significantly influence the fish population. Nevertheless, fish population would be expected to rise as the coral habitat develops, and this would be consistent with the continuing interest shown by most communities in surveillance of their no-take zones. Also, in a 2011 survey by the Coral Reef Information and Training Center, 84 percent of respondents were found to perceive that the project had benefitted them

Summarizing, in a relatively short period (most no-take zones were not established until after the second year of the project) coral coverage increased significantly for the bulk of sample sites. Impact on fisheries is not yet known, but stock can be expected to increase with an improving coral reef ecosystem. The project’s Efficacy in sustaining the coastal reef ecosystem was Substantial.

(3) Enhancing the Welfare of the Coastal Communities.

This was to be mainly through the eventual increased revenues from the greater fish catch resulting from the more productive coastal ecosystem, and from additional livelihoods created through the Alternative Income Generation scheme.

Time series data in the ICR from the Socio-economic benefit M&E surveys conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences in 2008 and 2011, show that, for participating community members, inflation adjusted income increased by 21 percent over the 2008-2011 period. But the robustness of this finding is reduced by the absence of control groups sampled to assess changes in the without project situation. Nevertheless, increased incomes would be consistent with the results of a survey also conducted by the Institute of Sciences which found that 84 percent of community members considered that the project was beneficial to them.

The Alternative Income Generating scheme was used by all of the project communities, more than targeted at appraisal, and supported at least several small businesses in each community. But the limited funding provisions under the scheme (a total of about $5,500 per community over a period of five years) proved inadequate to finance investments that could spur significant alternative incomes; rather, earnings from the grants tended to be only supplemental to the earnings from fishing; thus not enough to cause families to move out of the fisheries sector. On the contrary, 40 percent of recipients used their grants to buy fishing equipment. Movement out of the sector is a strategic need if a finite resource is to provide improving incomes for those remaining.

A fund providing village social infrastructure grants of about $1,100 per village for creating community assets such as toilets, wells, small surveillance boats and boundary markers was also created. Such investments would have had some positive impact on welfare, but not enough to have made a significant difference.

Overall, the project has been beneficial for the participating communities as concerns incomes from fishing. But the alternative income and the village infrastructure grants have had only minor impact and the size of the income gains from the fisheries sector itself is likely to be lower than assessed in the survey findings which have not taken account of without project changes. The Efficacy of the objective to Enhance the Welfare of the Coastal Communities was Modest.

5. Efficiency:

Economic rates of return were estimated in the ICR for each project site, but, given the difficulty measuring changes in the fish population at project sites (section 4), the estimates were based on the supposition that overall district data would be broadly representative of the situation at the project sites. The calculation was based on scaling down, in proportion to a project site's share of coral reef in its ocean area, the district's entire landings, thus including fish caught further out to sea as well as from the coral reefs. Nevertheless, established and improving coral reefs can be expected to generally provide a more productive ecosystem for fish stock, hence benefits are likely, especially given the ready participation of stakeholders.

With the important caveat above, most sites appear to have been economically viable. COREMAP II’s economic rate of return is estimated to be 21 percent, which includes benefits from improved fisheries, local products derived from sustainable coral reef activities, and tourism, but does not include global biodiversity and coastal conservation benefits. The ERR varies between sites - two sites have ERRs of 13 percent, one site has an ERR of 8 percent, and the remaining sites have ERRs of 20 to 22 percent - the main influencing factor for the variations being the degree of success in reducing illegal fishing.

The evidence suggests that the project was cost-effective in several respects. Actual project costs were 10 percent less than the appraisal estimate, while the number of villages participating exceeded appraisal targets by 20 percent, and no-take zones were established on 15 percent of the project managed areas as compared with 10 percent targeted at appraisal. But the project was inefficient in the speed of implementation, closing two years after the appraisal estimate. Nevertheless, almost all of the delay was due to start-up problems as the Districts took on procurement and funding as part of the decentralization process. (Disbursements were negligible in the first 12 months after Board approval, but increased to $5.5 million in the second year, building thereafter to about $10 million per annum in subsequent years. Once fully underway, implementation was expeditious, especially considering the complexity of the project, piloting the new co-management and decentralized approach and a number of scientific innovations. Also, the extended project period contributed to physical targets (the number of villages and area of no-take zones - refer above) being exceeded.

In conclusion, the rate of implementation was inefficient, due primarily to the slow start, and the project required an extra two years to complete (although this helped enable exceeding physical targets in some cases). But it was cost effective, and, while there is a methodological question, the project's ERR of 21 percent is consistent with the interest expressed by stakeholders to participate in the project. For a project intended to pioneer a new approach for subsequent scale-up (underway under the third phase of the COREMAP APL), the project's cost effectiveness, the benefits from conservation of corals to provide an improved habitat for fish, and the project's likely economic viablity, on balance outweigh the project's inefficient initial implementation. Hence, overall, the Project’s Efficiency was Substantial.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?
Point Value
ICR estimate:

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Project Objectives were highly Relevant to the Bank’s and Indonesia’s strategies to address the decline in the country’s vast coral reef resources, of importance both nationally and globally due to its environmental significance. The project’s institutional and technical Design provided a largely satisfactory blueprint for the complex interrelationships between village communities and Government that a co-managed approach to reef management would require, although design of income generating schemes was weak and the Districts were not ready at the outset of the project to handle decentralized procurement.

The project's Efficacy was mixed. It was successful in establishing a co-managed conservation system for coral reefs (the first element of the objectives). The coastal communities were enabled to set up no-take zones and a surveillance system. In turn, on the environmental front (the second element) there is preliminary evidence that coral coverage is improving. For the third element (improving welfare) results were modest. Incomes from improved fish stocks outside the no-take zones may have improved, but the evidence is not robust. And a key element of the project, the endeavor to provide opportunities for villagers to earn alternative incomes and abandon their fishing practices, failed.

The project’s Efficiency was substantial on balance - although implementation was two years longer than intended, COREMAP-II was cost-effective and economically viable, and the decentralization/co-management model established by the project provides a base for the significant scale-up underway in COREMAP's last phase.

Taking account of the project’s relevance, efficacy and efficiency combined, COREMAP-II’s Outcome was Moderately Satisfactory. There were moderate weaknesses.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The most consequential risk is whether the villages will be able to continue to manage their coral reef conservation activities. This will require socially cohesive and motivated communities for management of their reefs and fishing activities, and to deter illegal fishers. A likely essential stimulus, would be that their activities provide significant benefits from the extra fish catch outside the no-take zones. The results so far, judging from the willingness of communities to participate and their positive views of the conservation program, suggest that there may be sufficient income gains to stimulate continued and collective conservation. However, it will take several more years of experience to determine whether this may be so.

Another risk is whether the so-far strong support system provided by local governments will continue. Continued technical support by the extension services and scientific community will be needed, as will local services such as the police and judiciary, the local arms of various government agencies, and local government officials and politicians. There will also need to be continued Government funding of such activities. For the medium-term at any rate, the third phase of COREMAP, now underway, could provide the continued support needed to mitigate these risks.

Risk to Development Outcome is Significant

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

The project was strategically important, although it was complex, involving three levels of administration (Central Government, District Government and its decentralized staff; and the villages), and several Government departments. This, however, was largely unavoidable given the decisions to decentralize; for project implementation to be within the structures and responsibilities of existing government institutions; and for communities and government to co-manage the project. Designing a workable model for piloting co-management and decentralization of coral reef conservation was a significant achievement.

There were two principal shortcomings. First, the design of the Alternative Income Generation program, while a small element of the project (less than 3 percent of project costs) did not provide a viable model for replication – funds per beneficiary were insufficient for them to be able to invest in a business with higher earnings than their existing incomes from fishing (Section 4). Second, the Bank took insufficient account of the significant steps required to get the project underway. The main difficulties were the complexities of Indonesian administration, financing and procurement processes that emerged under the new decentralization program. These complications required much more implementation time than anticipated. Nevertheless, it might have been foreseen that the Districts had little capacity to handle procurement and funding, and to allow for this in determining the scope and duration of the project and in provision of major procurement and financial management training from or before the outset. Nevertheless, much credit must go to the Bank for the sound conceptual base of the project and for designing an innovative and largely successful pilot for co-managing coral reef conservation. Balancing these strengths and weaknesses, the overall Quality at Entry was Moderately Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

In the first two years of the project, progress resolving the various administrative and financing difficulties that the project was encountering was slow, although this might be expected given that the decentralization now involved procurement, funding and counterpart funding by the Districts, which had no familiarity with such procedures. The supervision team progressively found ways to improve this situation, agreeing with Government on a project - financed consultancy to provided assistance in procurement to the Districts. The Bank team also intensified its own procurement assistance, including training the consultancy firm in Bank procedures.

The supervision team was generally proactive, especially from the Mid Term Review when adjustments were made in the project's administrative and technical features which helped speed up the pace of implementation. The team maintained a close association with staff from other units needed to provide operational support (procurement, financial, safeguards) and maintained links with specialists in environmental, community organization and other fields. Nevertheless, solutions to the weak design and performance of the Alternative Income Generation scheme were not found. The Quality of Supervision was Moderately Satisfactory.

Taking account of both the quality at entry and of supervision, the Bank’s Overall Performance was Moderately Satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

Government made coral reef management a strategic priority, playing a proactive role, supported by the President, in Indonesia’s coral triangle initiatives with its allied countries - The COREMAP APL was seen as the country’s principal vehicle for conserving its reefs and biodiversity. The high level of government interest provided a conducive environment to resolve constraints and facilitate coordination between the agencies involved. There was one significant problem due to the national budgeting system – the lengthy processes involved, especially with decentralized funding, contributed to the implementation delays in the first 18 months of the project. However, this issue was a general problem across all government agencies. Given that in other respects Government provided generally good political and administrative support to the project, Government Performance was Moderately Satisfactory.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The Ministry for Marine Affairs and Fisheries, which included a management unit for the project, was responsible for coordination. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences, provided technical expertise, and the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, provided support for capacity building. Direct implementation was through the provincial and district Governments, local extension workers, local government services such as the police and judiciary, and the implementers themselves - the villages. Linkages between the various layers of this structure – in particular the interphase of the communities with the local services, and extension workers – became progressively more effective as the project proceeded. The District administrations initially lacked capability in procurement, but capacity improved over time. As against the generally successful performance of the decentralized structures, one of the central agencies performed weakly - the Directorate General of Forest Protection was much less successful than the other agencies in finding ways to navigate through the national budget processes, delaying its part of project activities. This brings Performance of the Implementing Agencies down to Moderately Satisfactory.

Taking account of the performance of both the Government and Implementing Agencies, the overall Performance of the Borrower was Moderately Satisfactory.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

The choice of Monitorable Indicators for the objective to introduce effective co-management of coral reefs – including agreed local regulations, establishment of no-take zones, preparation and implementation of management plans, and introducing surveillance and prosecution of illegal fishing practices – provided the means for a good assessment of managerial performance. Indicators for the welfare sub-objective covered income changes, although the degree to which changes were due to fish catch, the alternative income scheme or other influences was not differentiated. For the objective to sustain the coral reef ecosystem, changes in coral coverage and the fish population were good indicators in principle, but measurement was restricted to time-series in the no-take zones, and there were no control plots outside the zones.

b. M&E Implementation:

The Indonesian Academy of Sciences was responsible for monitoring scientific data, and other data was monitored by the Districts and overseen and collated by the National Coordination Unit. In the first years of the project, the system functioned poorly as district administrations were slow in submitting data and the coordination unit was overwhelmed by the collation task. A radical improvement took place in 2011, with help from FAO and the Bank. New project progress formats, and a web-based information system greatly improved the quality and timeliness of monitoring, and a next phase is planned with data on a GIS platform, and easily available to the public.

a. M&E Utilization:

M&E data was used to inform supervision missions and project management, and some project activities were adjusted to reflect findings. But the improvements in the M&E system introduced in 2011 came too late in the project to have much impact as a management tool.

The overall Quality of M&E was Modest.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:

The project was classified Environmental Category B, and triggered the following safeguards: Environmental Assessment (OP4.01); Natural Habitats (OP4.04); and Indigenous Peoples (OP 7.60). The Environmental and Social Impact Management Framework was adopted for screening community sub-projects, including infrastructure and income generating activities, and the village committees used a consultative process to prepare management plans. The ICR advises that any use of a villager’s land for construction was done with voluntary consent.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

Procurement. Making the Districts responsible for procurement was a major change from previous procurement practices, and required extensive procurement training. The initial unfamiliarity resulted in significant delays in the first two years of the project. Procurement was also delayed by late provision of District budgets by the center, constraining counterpart funds that the Districts now had to provide, and making procurement planning difficult. To bolster the training, technical assistance and screening for procurement that the Districts needed, a consulting firm was hired, which progressively improved and expedited procurement processes. Technical support for procurement was further strengthened after the Mid-Term-Review. A Bank procurement team worked with the National Coordination Unit, and, together with intensified training of project personnel, helped to improve compliance and further speed up procurement processes. This was one of the factors influencing the acceleration of project implementation in the second half of the project period.

Financial Management. Financial reporting was delayed in the first years of the project, but improved from 2010 after an updated financial management manual was issued and further financial management training provided to village committees. Efforts were also made to resolve backlogs and follow up on audit findings. Audit reports were consistently provided to the Bank on time. (The ICR does not indicate whether any fiduciary issues were found by the audits.)

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:

12. Ratings:

IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of ICR:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

1. Coral reef management needs pairing of welfare with conservation.

Communities participated enthusiastically as they perceived fish catch outside the no-take zones increasing, resulting from the improving ecology and habitat in their no-take zones. Thus, there were direct and financial incentives for conservation of the reefs.

2. Co-management by communities and Government together can be a generally successful model for coral reef management.

Local decisions to desist from destructive fishing practices, and hands-on surveillance against outside intruders, could only be done by the local communities directly involved; and the police and judiciary handled arraignment and prosecution. Various technical and financial services, were also provided by the Government.

3. An Alternative Income Generating scheme needs to be large enough to make an impact on incomes and to achieve its alternative occupation goal.

The project’s alternative income grants of $5,500 per community, spread over five years amongst all of the families requesting grants, were too small to provide sufficient seed capital to establish a viable business. Hence, rather than drawing fishing families out of fishing, it only provided the means for some supplemental income, of which about 40 percent of the investments were on more fishing equipment.

4. A decentralized approach, using existing government institutions to provide services in their mandates, can be a workable model for coral reef conservation.

The project was necessarily complex. Co-management with communities required involvement of an array of institutions from central Government to districts, local officials, and village communities. But arrangements were within the existing mandates of the institutions, and the multi-faceted approach (from public awareness, training, scholarships, conservation science, to major community outreach) brought in activities that complemented each other, most of them necessary for success of the other project actions. Thus, in this instance, a complex project design likely provided a better result than a simpler design.

5. A project’s managerial, financing, procurement, and administrative processes should be understood and in place by project start-up.

A substantial part of the 12 to 18 months delay before the project got effectively underway was due to unfamiliarity with basic implementation and procurement processes, especially with procurement decentralized to District levels.

14. Assessment Recommended?

The project is an example of a decentralized co-management approach to coastal and marine conservation which was broadly successful but encountered a number of instructive issues in its design and implementation. A review, possibly in company with several other coastal and marine conservation projects, would provide useful learning for the significant portfolio of Bank and GEF projects that cover ecological and biodiversity conservation in the coastal and marine environments. Additionally, the experience of the Alternative Income Grants, would provide lessons for other projects promoting non-fishing/off-farm employment.

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is informative, thorough, analytical and candid. The discussion is learning oriented, and looks for causes and effects. The breakdown in the Efficacy section of the project’s objectives into their core elements (IEG has used the same breakdown) provides a focused framework for a sharper discussion based on the objectives rather than components. Where data reliability is questionable, the report discusses this, evaluating what data is most reliable and what conclusions can be made. The economic analysis interlinks the results and performance differences between sites to discuss implementation issues, although some sensitivity analysis would have been helpful.

More background discussion of the APL program as a whole, and brief description of the first and third tranches and changes and lessons as the program developed would have put the ICR’s assessment of the objectives and design of COREMAP II in broader context. Also, there could have been more discussion of achievements and lessons from the critically important new directions – co-management and decentralization – that the project introduced. Finally, as procurement in the new decentralized administration, particularly procurement by the districts, had an important bearing on the pace of project implementation, more detailed discussion of procurement issues and how these were handled would have been illuminating for other decentralized projects.
Nevertheless, in its main features the report is Satisfactory and in most respects is an instructive example for other ICRs.
(NB. Documentation recording of the ICR was incomplete. It does not appear in WBDocs under the ICR category except in the form of an early half complete draft version.)

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

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