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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - India: Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction Project

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
India: Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 682.7  186.5
L/C Number:
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 465.0  161.53
Sector Board:
Urban Development
Cofinancing (US $M)
 217.7  25.22
Government of India
Board Approval Date
Closing Date
04/30/2008 12/31/2011
Housing construction (69%), General agriculture fishing and forestry sector (12%), Other social services (10%), General water sanitation and flood protection sector (9%)
Natural disaster management (33% - P) Rural services and infrastructure (17% - S) Participation and civic engagement (17% - S) Social safety nets (17% - S) Land administration and management (16% - S)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Tomoko Kato
Robert Mark Lacey Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

Original Objectives:
The development objective of the project stated in the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President (MRP, page 4) and in the original Development Credit Agreement (DCA, Schedule 2, page 20) was:

“to support the efforts of the governments of India, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry to revive livelihood and promote recovery in the tsunami-affected areas".

Revised Objectives:
At the Government’s request the project was restructured (Level 1) in August 2009. The revised development objectives, as stated in both the Project Restructuring Paper and the amended DCA, were:

“to assist the Borrower and the Project States to revive livelihood and promote recovery in the Tsunami Affected Areas in the short-term, and to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities to a range of natural hazards such as cyclone, storm surge, flood and tsunami over the long-term."

At the time of the restructuring, US$77.17 million of the IDA Credit had been disbursed, representing 47.8% of the amount disbursed at project closure.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

If yes, did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? Yes

Date of Board Approval: 08/13/2009

c. Components:

1: Housing Reconstruction (appraisal US$596.8 million; actual US$81.6 million). This component consisted of three sub-components: (a) provision of transit shelter as needed and upgrading of services in temporary shelter sites; (b) repair and reconstruction of existing houses, construction of new houses, and the necessary related services and community infrastructure; and (c) resettlement of families affected by the project.

2: Restoration of Livelihoods (appraisal US$36.4 million, actual US$11.81 million). The assistance to fisheries included: (a) restoration of damaged fisheries infrastructure, such as harbors, patrol boats, clearing bar mouth and estuaries to maintain estuarine habitats, and aquaculture infrastructure; and (b) re-establishment of safety-at-sea systems/services; and assistance to agriculture, horticulture and livestock; and (c) promotion of sustainable management of coastal land and water resources.

3: Public Buildings and Public Works (appraisal US$19.5 million; actual US$17.69 million). This component provided financing for small public works, such as repair, reconstruction and upgrading of damaged hospitals, public health centers/sub-centers, educational institutions, cyclone shelters and other public buildings, restoration of damaged river and drain banks, and plantation/replanting of mangroves and shelter belts in Tamil Nadu.

4: Technical Assistance and Training (appraisal US$111 million; actual US$2.15 million). This component financed: (a) technical assistance and capacity building for housing reconstruction; (b) preparation of social and environmental management plans in accordance with the Environmental and Social Management Framework; (c) community participation efforts to ensure involvement of the affected communities; (d) studies to assess the vulnerabilities and longer-term issues associated with coastal zone protection; (e) environmental studies on coastal water quality, ground water quality, pollution of tidal influenced water bodies in urban areas; and (f) capacity building among various stake holders and hazard risk management.

5: Implementation Support (appraisal US$19.0 million; actual US$11.0 million). This component financed the project management and incremental operating costs such as: (a) quality assurance and technical audits to ensure adequate quality of reconstruction works; (b) project monitoring and evaluation (M&E), including continuous social and environmental impact assessments as outlined in the environmental and social management framework; (c) project management and incremental operating costs; and (d) project financial audits.

Revised Component:

Tamil Nadu - At the time of the level 1 restructuring in 2009, a new component, Vulnerability Reduction of Coastal Communities (VRCC - Vulnerability Reduction Component for Tamil Nadu) was introduced and financed from the accumulated savings from the other components (US$136.4 million, ICR page 4). The new component included: a) emergency evacuation and early warning facilities (US$39.1 million); b) reconstruction of risk-prone houses to multi-disaster resistant standards (US$87.3 million); and c) technical assistance and implementation support (US$10.1 million). At the same time, and for Puducherry only, the Agriculture sub-component under the Livelihood component (2b) was removed from the project because the rehabilitation works were completed using Government of Puducherry’s own funds.

Puducherry - No specific activities were included to attain the long-term objectives in Puducherry.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost:

Project cost at completion was US$186.5 million, 27% of the appraisal estimate of US$682.7 million. During the first two years of project implementation, a significant amount of grant funding through NGOs and assistance from the private sector was mobilized by the Government of India, particularly for housing reconstruction (40,000 houses for Tamil Nadu), and this substituted for about US$220 million of the IDA Credit. In addition, housing reconstruction needs were significantly overestimated during the initial damage assessment (ICR page 6). However, some of the reduction in expenditure from the Credit was due to slow implementation and non-completion of expected reconstruction/rehabilitation targets before the project closed. Thus, in July 2009 the budget for housing reconstruction in Tamil Nadu was reduced from US$423.0 million to US$201.9 million, and US$136.4 million was allocated to the new Vulnerability Reduction Component for Tamil Nadu.

The IDA Credit was only one of several sources of post-disaster relief. NGOs played an important role in empowering communities to make them disaster resilient by mobilizing them and assisting to form self-help groups. In addition, other international organizations also assisted tsunami-affected communities with their specific organizational expertise: UN agencies with hazard risk management, health and education; the Asian Development Bank with micro-enterprise development; and the International Fund for Agricultural Development with livelihood support to fishing communities. Specific financial contributions of these other partners are not provided in the ICR.

The original Credit was for US$465.0 million. Over the life of the project this increased to US$473.5 million because of the appreciation against the US dollar of Special Drawing Rights in which the Credit was nominated. A total of US$304 million of the Credit was cancelled: in November US$69.0 million (US$67.6 million from Tamil Nadu and US$1.4 million from Puducherry) because it was determined that the project could not disburse this amount before closing; and, in December 2011, a further amount of US$235.0 million remained undisbursed at closure and was cancelled.

Borrower Contributions:
The original Borrower contribution was estimated to be US$ 217.7 million; the actual contribution was US$25.22 million, or 9% of the planned amount. This was mainly due to the mobilization of grant funds which substituted for Borrower financing.

The project’s original closing date was extended by three years (from April 30, 2008 to December 31, 2011) to accommodate the restructuring process. The total project period was 73 months, instead of the original plan of 36 months. A second request from the Government of India to extend the closing date further so that both state governments could complete the remaining work was not approved by the Bank.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
Original Objective - High
The tsunami of December 26, 2004 caused extensive damage in the Union Territory (UT) of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and along a 2,260 km stretch of coastline in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Union Territory Puducherry. An estimated 2.7 million people, especially in the fishing and agriculture communities, were affected by the disaster.

The project was requested by the Government of India, who asked the World Bank and other external partners to put together a joint team to undertake an assessment of the tsunami’s socioeconomic and environmental impact in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Puducherry. The project contributed to two of the three pillars of the 2004 Country Assistance Strategy. It supported improvement of government effectiveness through improved service delivery to the affected coastal communities, and it encouraged their active involvement in project implementation. It also contributed to the second pillar of the Strategy that focused on development of rural livelihoods. The project's objectives were also relevant to addressing the cross-cutting environmental and natural hazard issues as recognized in the Strategy.

The objectives of the project remain relevant to the Country Partnership Strategy for Fiscal Years 2009-2012 (Annex 7, page 7): “the disaster management agenda, especially post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation, includes a wide ranging and complex set of issues, which cannot be addressed through one project solely focusing on emergency response.” Under the “ensuring sustainable development” pillar, project objectives were relevant to assisting the most vulnerable people to adapt to climate change and natural disasters. The latest Country Partnership Strategy also emphasizes strengthening country systems to ensure close working partnership with government counterparts (including private sectors and donors) and strengthening citizen’s’ capacity to demand transparency and accountability.

Revised Objectives - High
The revised objectives expanded the scope of the project by adding long-term emergency risk management as well as preventive measures. The revised objectives were highly relevant based to the Borrower's need for longer-term emergency preventive measures, such as establishing early warning systems. It was relevant for the Bank to be engaged in the area of building resilience for the natural disasters based on its global knowledge and experiences.

b. Relevance of Design:
Original Objective- Modest:
The statement of project objectives and project description in the MRP and original DCA was straightforward and appropriate for tsunami emergency reconstruction operations. However, being an emergency project, design lacked a thorough Results Framework. The Framework consisted largely of outputs and lacked a chain of causal links between project inputs and the expected impacts on restoring livelihoods and promoting recovery in the tsunami-affected areas.

Revised Objective - Modest
The revised design, with a long-term goal of attaining the resilience among tsunami-affected communities were laid out clearly with an additional component, “Vulnerability Reduction of Coastal Communities.” The Project Paper of August 2009 notes that this new component was intended to support the construction of about 78 new evacuation shelters, to construct/improve about 150 km of evacuation routes, and to install early warning systems in villages within 1,000 meters of the High Tide Line in Tamil Nadu. The time frame to complete this additional component, which included the provision of technical assistance and implementation support was about 22 months; implementing a whole new disaster risk reduction management system within such a time frame was highly ambitious.
In addition, design overlooked an important aspect of longer-term post-disaster reconstruction project, namely the psychological support for the affected population who might have lost not only their housing, other assets and employment, but also their families and loved ones. Design included no activities related to human development aspects which are central to post-disaster recovery and restoration of livelihoods..

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

There were important differences in the degree of achievement of both the original and revised objectives in Tamil Nadu and in Puducherry. The capacity of project management units was the main cause of these differences (ICR page 15). Tamil Nadu showed some achievement in the area of urban housing construction, livelihood support including training on livelihood restoration, and rural housing with water and sanitation systems. On the other hand, Puducherry had completed the reconstruction of only 550 housing units out of a total of nearly 2,000 by the time of ICR preparation. Most of the fisheries-related activities in Puducherry were initiated but not completed. As a result, the project key objective of improving livelihood opportunities for potential beneficiaries was barely attained. Subsequently, Puducherry requested a follow-up project to complete most of the unfinished work, but the request was not approved by the Bank.

Original Objectives:

"To support the efforts of the governments of India, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry to revive livelihood and promote recovery in the tsunami-affected areas". Modest.

(a) Housing and related infrastructure construction and reconstruction
  • About 40,000 houses in Tamil Nadu and 4,303 houses in Puducherry (ICR page 52) were constructed/reconstructed with the support of NGOs and private sector. This was well short of the target number of about 140,000 damaged houses in both areas combined (MRP, page 4). While around 44,300 people benefitted from the housing reconstruction, there was no quality control from the Bank team.
  • The ICR provides a list of outputs, but lacks target values and clear output and outcome indicators (for infrastructure reconstruction, electricity connections, repairs of damaged dwellings etc.).

The main outputs delivered with the support of the IDA Credit were (ICR page 39):
Tamil Nadu
  • 4,526 ready-built tenements were purchased and installed and 3,948 were allotted to eligible beneficiaries.
  • 121 public buildings and facilities were repaired or reconstructed for 40,000 beneficiaries in 18 tsunami-affected towns. These included community halls, bus shelters, cremation sheds, shopping complexes, and library buildings. 71 health facilities (public health centers, Government hospitals, primary health centers, and health sub-centers), 112 veterinary hospitals, dispensaries, and district extension centers, and 33 Government high schools and higher secondary schools were built or rebuilt.
  • 31,855 km of roads and 4,257 km of drains, and water supply connection to 1,472 houses, and eight public buildings were built or reconstructed.
  • Electricity connections were installed for about 23,000 houses and 2,360 street light connections in 200 villages in 50 panchayats in eight tsunami affected coastal districts.
  • De-silting and strengthening of river banks was completed for 123 km of water ways in Nagapattinam District
  • Shelterbelts were planted for 4,478 ha (+900 ha for private lands) and mangrove plantations covered 2,162 ha.
  • On the All India Radio site, 3,600 tenements were completed with water supply and sewerage works.
  • At Okkiyum Thuraipakkam, newly built tenements were structurally completed in 2010, and infrastructure works (water supply, sewerage, roads and drains) were scheduled to be completed by December 2012. Of the 2,468 transit shelters,1,200 shelters were occupied by residents.
  • Of the planned Marina Reconstruction Schemes, 628 tenements were structurally completed at Nochinagar, and fitted out by June, 2012. At Nochi Kuppam construction of about 800 tenements did not commence as only 417 out of 780 occupants vacated and moved to the transit houses.
  • Sanitation infrastructure was rehabilitated. This included 67.85 km of collection systems, 3,594 manholes, 1,021 interceptors, 49 pump rooms with 116 pump sets and 47 treatment systems.
  • 300 houses for relocated families were completed by contracted constructors, and a further 550 houses were built/rebuilt through a beneficiary-driven approach. At project closing 1,200 houses were incomplete so that target achievement was 41%. There was a one-year delay in housing construction starts in Puducherry due to the need to establish land titles for the beneficiary-driven housing component (ICR page 9).

(b) Restoration of livelihoods
Tamil Nadu
  • Agriculture: 8,175 hectares of sand cast agricultural lands were reclaimed, and agriculture machinery and equipment and drip irrigation sets were supplied. Training programs and public awareness campaigns were conducted for 13,500 beneficiaries.
  • Horticulture: About 670 hectares of horticultural land was reclaimed with the participation of 169 self-help groups.
  • Animal Husbandry: Laboratory equipment for 18,000 livestock were purchased and distributed. 10,000 farmers were trained on animal rearing, animal feeding and management, and de-worming; and 80 community-based veterinary workers were trained on first aid, artificial insemination, vaccination and de-worming.
  • Forestry: 5,400 hectares of forest shelter belts and mangroves were established.
  • Fisheries: The following activities were initiated but had not been completed by project closure: reconstruction and modernization of fishing harbors; provision of permanent stability at river openings; fish landing centers and an ice plant.

  • Agriculture: The agriculture sub-component under the Livelihood component was removed at the time of restructuring since the Government of Puducherry managed to complete the activities with its own funding (ICR page 4).
  • Fisheries: According to the ICR (page 15), none of the planned activities (work shelters, fish markets, and fishing harbor) was completed. Planned fisheries training was dropped due to a delay in identifying appropriate consultants.

  • Housing and related infrastructure: as noted in Section 2d above, practically all the house building and residential reconstruction activity was not financed by the IDA Credit and was not subject to any form of quality control by the Bank; no information is available in the ICR regarding the cost or the quality of construction of these houses.
  • Agriculture: 90% of restored agricultural and horticultural land and reconstructed animal husbandry infrastructure in Tamil Nadu was being used by project closure, thereby achieving the targets. For Puducherry, no information is provided.
  • Fisheries: There were no outcomes recorded since the activities were incomplete at project closure.

Revised Objectives:
To assist the Borrower and the Project States to revive livelihood and promote recovery in the Tsunami Affected Areas in the short-term, and to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities to a range of natural hazards such as cyclone, storm surge, flood and tsunami over the long-term” Negligible.
Activities related to this objective took place only in Tamil Nadu.
  • 4,121 houses built to disaster-resistant standards had been completed by project closure compared to an original target (at restructuring) of 17,000 and a revised target (in June, 2010) of 14,370. According to information provided subsequently by the project team, about 12,000 disaster-resistant houses had been completed by mid-May, 2013, with the balance expected to be finished by December 2013.
  • Work on the planned multi-purpose evacuation shelters had not been started by project closure. The project team reports that it was commenced in May 2012, and is scheduled for completion under the follow-on Disaster Risk Reduction Project (as of mid-May, 2013, contracts for 28 shelters had been awarded, and the balance of 93 were at the tendering stage).
  • By project closure, only preparatory work had been carried out for evacuation routes and early warning system. 45 kilometers of evacuation routes were expected to be completed by September 2012 (ICR, page 30). According to the project team, the work on evacuation routes was "nearly complete" as of May, 2013. The bidding process for the early warning system is ongoing as of May, 2013, and a contract is expected to be awarded in June, 2013.
  • 29% of the target number of disaster-resistant houses were completed. None of the other disaster preparedness and community resilience activities had been taken beyond the early preparatory stage by project closure, so that there are no outcomes to report.

5. Efficiency:

As an emergency operation (processed under OP 08.50), an economic and financial analysis was not required at appraisal. Given the nature of the infrastructure works financed under the project, and also the fact that there was a major restructuring with reallocation of funds in 2009, an economic analysis could have been prepared before the Level 1 restructuring to determine the most cost-effective ways of using the amount still available under the IDA Credit. Moreover, an ex-post analysis of the efficiency with which project resources were used could have been carried out for the ICR.
There were major operational and administrative inefficiencies. There were substantial delays on civil works, many of which were not completed by project closing, and coordination among the agencies was poor. Even though the project duration was more than doubled, only 34% of the original commitment was disbursed.

Efficiency is assessed as negligible.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?
Point Value
ICR estimate:

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Original Objectives:
The relevance of project objectives was high, but the design relevance was modest. The objective of rebuilding houses was achieved to a modest extent, and reconstructing livelihood was achieved to a modest extent in Tamil Nadu, and to a negligible extent in Puducherry. Efficiency is rated negligible. The outcome rating against the original project objective is rated Unsatisfactory.

Revised Objectives:
The relevance of project objectives was high, but the design relevance was modest. The longer-term resilience activities did not take place before project closure, and efficacy is therefore rated as negligible. Efficiency is rated negligible. The outcome rating against the revised project objective is rated Unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating: Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The ICR provides no evidence of effective quality control over the greater part of housing construction and reconstruction, which was financed by sources other than the IDA Credit, nor of the existence of a clear funding scheme for operations and maintenance to ensure the sustainability of the constructed/reconstructed public buildings and infrastructure without. However, the project team subsequently informed IEG of the fact that the Governments of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Puducherry have continued investing in housing reconstruction and public works based on the design, financing, and implementation structure utilized in the project. In addition, a proposed follow-on project, which was successfully negotiated in May 2013 (the Tamil Nadu and Puducherry Coastal Disaster Risk Reduction Project), is intended to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities to a range of hydro-meteorological and geophysical hazards through the construction of resilient infrastructure, and the enhancement of livelihoods and risk management capacity of stakeholders. While still to be implemented, these efforts would appear likely to reduce the risks faced by the infrastructure constructed under the project under review. Firm evidence of adequate funding for maintenance is, however, lacking.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

  • Based on the joint assessment of the socio-economic and environmental impact of the tsunami, the Bank team worked closely with the Government of India and with other external partners to prepare the project in two months. According to the project team, at the request of the Government of India, the project focused solely on the short-term reconstruction of housing in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. Little attempt appears to have been made to situate the Bank more appropriately among the donors responding to the disaster in accordance with its comparative advantage in the area of longer-term disaster risk management.
  • Implementation arrangements were inadequate. The decision not to have a central project coordination unit for Tamil Nadu, where thirteen different implementing agencies would operate was inappropriate. In the case of Puducherry, there was no attempt to establish a solid institutional arrangement with necessary full-time staff to manage the emergency reconstruction process.
  • Design was over-complex for an emergency operation -- there were too many activities and implementing agencies.
  • Given the scope and complexity of the different activities planned, an implementation period of 36 months was over-ambitious.
  • The required time to obtain statutory clearance was not properly incorporated in the planning process, which delayed project implementation, especially for the fishery component.
  • The different characteristics -- administrative machinery, institutions, level of capacity and experience of project management (particularly of Bank projects) -- of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry were not taken into account. The possibility of putting the two areas together under a single project coordination was not fully considered.
  • The ICR describes the social tensions between those who benefitted from the housing reconstruction/upgrading and those who did not. While appraisal recognized the importance of grievance mechanisms, more attention should have been given to their practical application.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

  • The Bank undertook twelve supervision missions between November 2005 and July 2011
  • The fact that the Bank placed one of the team members in Chennai was not only appreciated by the Borrower but also had a positive impact on coordinating the various stakeholders and managing multi-sectoral issues. However, given the importance of rehabilitation of the fisheries sector, the absence of an appropriate expert for fishery activities for the first 4 years of the project was a notable shortcoming.
  • The Borrowers’ ICR (Annex 7 of ICR), as well as the ICR itself, report three major shortcomings of the Bank performance: (i) slow processing of the Level 1 restructuring of 2009 by the Bank team (which was not approved until two years and half after Government of India’s request submitted in 2007), which contributed to an insufficient implementation period after the restructuring. While the ICR gave as a reason “the implementation support appeared to have slackened” (page 19), the project team later explained that it was rather due to a long discussion on the proposed Output Based Disbursement mechanism, which would not comply with the Bank procurement procedures, and which was not, therefore, adopted; (ii) a delayed decision by the Bank to close the project, which appears to have been unexpected by the Borrower; and (iii) insufficient capacity building for the newly formed project unit for Puducherry, in particular with regard to fiduciary and safeguard issues.
  • The delay in carrying out the restructuring also meant that the opportunity of utilizing the Bank’s global expertise for longer-term disaster risk reduction and preparedness under the project was lost.
  • M&E design deficiencies, notably in the outcome indicators (see Section 10 below), and the lack of baseline data inherited from the preparation stage, were not adequately addressed.
  • Some safeguards compliance issues (see Section 11 below), especially regarding resettlement, could have been avoided if the Bank had provided for more adequate training to counterpart staff at earlier stage of project implementation.

  • Quality of Supervision Rating: Unsatisfactory

    Overall Bank Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

    9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

    a. Government Performance:
    The Governments of India, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry demonstrated their commitment and leadership in achieving project objectives during the preparation stage. In particular, the Government of India and of Tamil Nadu were engaged in: a) parallel-financing of reconstruction of 25,000 vulnerable houses; b) comprehensive preparatory activities; c) completion of beneficiary selection; and d) advance actions taken with respect to procurement of various outsourced resources (ICR page 20).
    With timely support given by NGOs, private sector as well as international donor community the Government of India treated this project as one of several emergency rehabilitation initiatives rather than as a stand-alone operation.
    Nevertheless, the Government of India could have clarified its objectives more clearly, and thought through the appropriate institutional arrangements at state level more thoroughly. The project closed with most works uncompleted as a result of constant implementation delays. Arrangements involving two states and fourteen implementing agencies were cumbersome and could have been strengthened through the establishment of an effective central coordination unit.
    The Government of Puducherry did not appoint a full time Project Director or other key staff to the project implementation unit, and this, together with high staff turnover, was a source of considerable implementation delay. According to the ICR (page 20), there was a lack of adequate attention from the Government to the activities of the unit.

    Government Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

    b. Implementing Agency Performance:

    Tamil Nadu
    The implementation agency was the Government of Tamil Nadu, which involved 13 line agencies/departments in project implementation. Of these, the ICR (page 21) rates the performance of seven agencies as satisfactory and that of two agencies as moderately satisfactory. Among the identified shortcomings were:

    • Lack of capacity to carry out the assigned activities such as preparation of technical design of sub-components (for example, the Forestry Department).
    • Inexperience in procurement which led to implementation delays (for example, the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board).
    • Absence of leadership and direction from the state government, resulting in weak coordination of planned activities.
    The Rural Development Department with its strong leadership managed a large number of contracts for the planned housing reconstruction. Similarly, the Departments of Animal Husbandry, Agriculture, Horticulture, Town Panchayats, and the Commission of Municipal Administration completed their activities on schedule.

    The newly established project implementation unit lacked experience and knowledge of project management, especially in the areas of procurement and statutory clearances, which caused implementation delays. The lack of full time staff, including the Project Director, led to difficulties in managing and coordinating multiple service consultant contracts, in particular for the fisheries component. Since the Government of Puducherry's focus was mainly on housing reconstruction, hardly any of the activities related to the objective of improving livelihood opportunities of potential beneficiaries were accomplished.

    Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

    Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

    10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

    a. M&E Design:
    When implementation started, the project did not have an adequate M&E framework or tools in place for monitoring progress in achieving the development objectives. The preliminary M&E framework developed in the original project design was not sufficiently detailed (ICR page 9 and 19): no baseline or target values were established. According to the project team, a results framework with the target value included in the ICR Data Sheet was not developed until August 2009. In January 2011, a Management Information System (MIS) was introduced with some outcome-based indicators. However, other outcome indicators were still missing, for example, those related to the training activities for the restoration of livelihoods.

    b. M&E Implementation:
    By the time a partially effective MIS was in place in January 2011, there was only one year left before project closure so that it came too late to be of much practical value.

    The issue of M&E quality was not revisited at the mid-term review on March 27, 2007. When the new longer-term disaster mitigation component was added in 2009, a more thorough revision, including a new set of key indicators (after discussion with implementing agencies and project management units) would have facilitated better coordination and smoother project implementation. As it was, the new component lacked outcome indicators that could have measured actual usage and functionality of the project outputs by the communities (though given that very few activities under the additional component were completed, this would have been of purely academic interest).

    The Puducherry project management unit had no M&E system or adequate monitoring capacity to manage the activities of multiple service consultants, and a Project Management Consultant was appointed to oversee the service consultants. The project team noted that Tamil Nadu was also assisted by the consultant..

    a. M&E Utilization:
    The ICR does not report on the use of M&E data and analysis to inform project activities or policy development.

    M&E Quality Rating: Negligible

    11. Other Issues:

    a. Safeguards:

    The project was classified as Category “B” for Environmental Assessment purposes. According to the Technical Annex (page 13) to the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, three safeguards policies were to be triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12), and Cultural Property (OP 4.11). The possible triggering of two further policies – Pest Management (OP 4.09) and Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10) was to be determined during implementation.

    Environmental Safeguards

    The ICR reports (page 9) that the Tamil Nadu Government prepared Environmental Assessment reports that were in full compliance with the Bank safeguard policies and statutory requirements. An Environmental Management Plan was completed. However, the ICR also reports (page 10) that the project experienced compliance problems related to construction safety and management; provision of basic facilities in the urban housing sub-project sites; and delays in the preparation of environmental assessment reports for sub-projects. In Puducherry, the implementing agency was not familiar with the safeguard requirements, and substantive support from the Bank team and consultants was required. The ICR also reported that it was difficult for the agency to comply with the policy on time.

    Social Safeguards

    Tamil Nadu

    According to the project team, the project was in compliance with OP 4.12 at the time of preparing the ICR, since all affected land owners in Tamil Nadu whose land had been acquired were paid compensation and the 100 families who were subject to physical displacement in Tamil Nadu were either provided alternative housing or expected to be so provided shortly thereafter in accordance with the Resettlement Action Plan.
    However, the ICR (page 9) reports mixed experience on land acquisition and the application of social safeguard polices. While land acquisition took place in what the ICR describes as a "timely and successful manner" to establish resettlement sites for tsunami-affected people, there was a case in Nagapattinam where the local authorities demolished the affected structures without offering compensation and assistance to the displaced families. The Government of Tamil Nadu was still in the process of paying the grant to the displaced families at project closure. In addition, there were families in temporary shelters who awaited resettlement to a permanent site (10 families in the All India Radio site and North Chennai).

    No information on safeguards compliance in Puducherry was reported in the ICR.

    Cultural Property (OP 4.11).

    The ICR does not report on compliance with this safeguards policy.

    Pest Management (OP 4.09)

    The Technical Annex states that the proposed livelihoods restoration program, which includes agriculture sector activities, may lead to the use of agricultural chemicals, including pesticides. However, there is no reference to pesticides or pest management in the ICR.

    Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)

    The Technical Annex does not specify why it was thought that this safeguards policy might be triggered and there is no reference to it in the ICR.

    The project team subsequently reported that neither OP 4.09 nor OP 4.10 were triggered.

    b. Fiduciary Compliance:

    Although the ICR does not report on any qualifications to audit reports, the project team reported that project management units in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry "diligently followed up" on obtaining responses on auditors' observations from the various implementing agencies. Issues were resolved and certification was obtained from the Comptroller & Auditor General.
    Tamil Nadu
    The ICR (page 11) reports that overall procurement and financial management were rated as marginally unsatisfactory in supervision reports. Delays in procurement were caused by: weak procurement capacity in implementing agencies, lack of eligible and interested bidders, and the scattered nature of the work. In the absence of an effective Management and Information System, the project management unit could not effectively oversee thirteen different agencies which had varied legal structures as well as a complex financial management arrangement as a whole.
    The Puducherry implementing agency had no previous experience in procurement policies or in financial management of Bank projects. This became a serious challenge in what was meant to be a fast-paced emergency operation, and it resulted in implementation delays.

    c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
    Gender: According to the ICR (page 15), new housing financed by the project introduced the joint title system for both men and women. Further, there were innovative gender sensitive approaches in the fishery infrastructure design and for grievance cells representation. Housing with toilets in the fishing communities was also perceived as an important factors leading to improved sanitation and hygiene. However, no evidence or data on actual impacts on women benefiting from these initiatives was provided in the ICR.

    On the negative side, the ICR reported that conflicts occurred between those who benefitted from the newly built or reconstructed disaster - resilient houses and those who did not: Consultation process among all the people who lived in the project area before project implementation (both possible beneficiaries with housing and non - beneficiaries) was insufficient or absent.

    d. Other:

    12. Ratings:

    IEG Review
    Reason for Disagreement/Comments
    Moderately Unsatisfactory
    For both Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, achievement of the original project objectives was modest, and that of the new objective added at restructuring was negligible. Efficiency was negligible.  
    Risk to Development Outcome:
    Negligible to Low
    There is no information in the ICR on the construction quality of the bulk of project-financed housing and no indication of clear technical or financial support for the operation and maintenance of project-supported infrastructure. However, further construction by the two governments using similar methods as in the project, and a proposed follow-up project supported by IDA would reduce the risks to development outcome, although firm evidence of adequate funding for maintenance is still lacking. 
    Bank Performance:
    Moderately Unsatisfactory
    There were major shortcomings in quality at entry and quality of supervision. 
    Borrower Performance:
    Moderately Unsatisfactory
    There were major shortcomings in both Government and implementing agency performance. 
    Quality of ICR:
    - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
    - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

    13. Lessons:
    The ICR offers a useful lesson of wide applicability:
    • Frequent and early reviews of the implementation arrangements for emergency projects can assist implementation: Emergency projects are generally based on a limited amount of data, information and knowledge of local institutions. To maximize the effectiveness of resources provided soon after the disaster, frequent reviews of implementation arrangements are needed as more and more data become available over time.

    IEG also adds the below lessons:

    Government partnerships with NGOs to address emergency reconstruction can provide a valuable complement to the Bank project: The Government of India successfully coordinated emergency assistance from NGOs, which partly substituted for the use of the IDA Credit. NGOs not only assisted in the rural housing reconstruction component, but also supported the formation of self-help groups at the grassroots level throughout the tsunami-affected coastal area.

    Technical assistance for training may be required during emergency operations: Even emergency projects can benefit from thorough training in strategic planning and procurement followed by frequent supervision and appropriate and timely technical guidance.

    Community mobilization through consultation process is essential: In order to mitigate possible friction between those who receive project benefits and those who do not, the Bank and the Borrower should engage with potential beneficiaries (both direct and indirect) to raise awareness of project goals and expected outcomes during the project preparation or initial implementation phase.

    The Bank’s comparative advantage lies in supporting sustainable emergency reconstruction initiatives and disaster management; other donors may have a comparative advantage in short term recovery assistance. In this project, such a shift in emphasis for the IDA Credit occurred at the restructuring; however, this took place too late to have a significant practical impact.

    14. Assessment Recommended?

    There were a number of emergency projects in India after the Tsunami. A cluster PPAR could reveal valuable lessons.

    15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

    The ICR provides a thorough account of changes in project objectives and a candid assessment of project implementation delays. However, it provides limited information on the effectiveness of donor coordination, the extent to which participatory processes were taken for the livelihood development, the impact of training provided for the livelihood development component, and the extent to which the infrastructure constructed or reconstructed was of quality and was cost effective. Most importantly, it is not clear if the shift of project direction following the restructuring provided the project with more positive outcomes by utilizing the housing-related Credit savings in an efficient and strategic manner. A summary of the cost implications of NGOs/private sector involvement and the series of restructuring for two states was missing in the ICR. There was no statement as to whether external project audits were qualified.

    a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

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