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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Third Phase Of The Road Development Program


  
1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
01/25/2013   
Country:
Uganda
PROJ ID:
P074079
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Third Phase Of The Road Development Program
Project Costs(US $M)
 133.0  239.3
L/C Number:
C3976, CH122
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 107.6  116.4
Sector Board:
Transport
Cofinancing (US $M)
   
Cofinanciers:
Board Approval Date
  09/02/2004
 
 
Closing Date
12/31/2009 10/31/2011
Sector(s):
Roads and highways (100%)
Theme(s):
Rural services and infrastructure (40% - P) Other urban development (20% - S) Infrastructure services for private sector development (20% - S) Administrative and civil service reform (20% - S)
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Kavita Mathur
Judyth L. Twigg Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
This project was the third phase of the three-phased Road Development Program Adaptable Program Loan.

The first phase (P002970) was approved on June 29, 1999 for US$90 million and closed on June 30, 2008. The objectives of the first phase were to improve access to rural areas and economically productive areas and to gradually build up road sector planning and management capability (PAD p. 3).

The second phase (P065436) was approved on July 3, 2001 for US$64.5 million and closed on June 30, 2008. The objectives of the second phase were to to improve access to rural areas and economically productive areas and to progressively continue build up sustainable road sector planning, design and program management capability, as well as road safety management (PAD p. 6) .

The project development objectives of the third phase as stated in the Credit Agreement (p. 14) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD p. 5) were "to improve access to rural areas and economically productive areas and to build up sustainable road sector planning, design and program management capability including road safety management."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No

c. Components:
Original Components
Component 1: Civil works for upgrading, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the following national roads (appraisal estimate US$113.4 million, actual cost US$224.0 million):


    (i) Upgrading of about 125 km of the Soroti-Lira road to paved (bitumen) standards (appraisal estimate US$47.0 million, actual cost US$103.5 million);

    (ii) Upgrading of about 68 km of the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenz road (appraisal estimate US$31.2 million, actual cost US$57.7 million);

    (iii) Rehabilitation and re-graveling of about 91 km on Atiak-Moyo road (appraisal estimate US$10.9 million, actual cost US$8.9 million); and

    (iv) Reconstruction and upgrading of the 57 km Busega-Mityana road (appraisal estimate US$24.3 million, actual cost US$53.9 million).


Component 2: Civil works for building construction (appraisal estimate US$7.5 million, actual cost US$0.0 million). Construction of headquarters building for the Ministry of Works and Transport (MOWT) and the Road Authority.

Component 3: Roads construction supervision services (appraisal estimate US$5.4 million, actual cost US$9.5 million). Supervision services for roads referred to in Component 1.

Component 4: Detailed design of about 300km of upgrading of district gravel roads and reclassifying to national road standards (appraisal estimate US$1.6 million, actual cost US$1.0 million). Consultant services for the execution of full feasibility studies on the upgrading of 300 km of district gravel roads.

Component 5: Feasibility studies and selected design of about 600km for upgrading of priority national roads (appraisal estimate US$2.0 million, actual cost US$2.5 million).

Component 6: Institutional support and establishment of the Road Authority (appraisal estimate US$3.1 million, actual cost US$2.2 million).

Revised Components

As part of a November 11, 2009 restructuring, some of the components were dropped primarily due to the high bids received on the civil works contracts, reallocation of credit proceeds and extension of the closing date. The project development objective remained unchanged as agreement was reached with the Government of Uganda (GoU) that it would finance the components that were dropped. Key indicators were not revised.

Component 1:

(a) The Zirobwe-Wobulenzi (23km) was dropped from the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe-Wobulenzi road;

(b) The reconstruction of the Busega-Mityana road (57km) was dropped from the credit, but funded by the Government.

(c) The rehabilitation and re-graveling of Atiak-Moyo road (91km) was dropped. The scope of work was reduced to only design. The civil works were to be funded by the Government.

Component 2: Civil works for construction of the Uganda National Roads Authority headquarters building were dropped.

Component 3: The supervision services under Component 1 were dropped, and the Government committed to finance the corresponding consultancy services.

Component 4: Detailed designs on total length of roads were slightly increased to 312 km from the planned 300 km.

Component 5: Feasibility studies and engineering designs were reduced from 600 km to 300 km.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project Cost and Financing: The final project cost at completion was US$239 million against the appraisal estimate of US$133 million, an increase of 80 percent. The global economic situation affected the prices of inputs, leading to an increase in actual project cost. The price of a barrel of oil was US$43.03 at appraisal in August 2004. The price in November 2006, 28 days prior to opening of bids, was US$58.48, a 26 percent increase from the cost at appraisal. During the implementation of the civil works contracts, the price of a barrel of oil continued an upward trend with a peak of US$133.90 in July 2008. The average price during the execution of the civil works contracts was US$77.35, which is 32.3 percent above the price 28 days prior to bid opening or 80 percent above the price at appraisal.

The actual IDA credit/grant was SDR 73.2 (US$116.4 million equivalent), compared to the appraisal amount of SDR 72.8 (US$107.6 million equivalent).

Borrower Contribution was US$122.9 million against the appraisal commitment of US$25.4 million.

Dates: The project was restructured three times.

  • An April 25, 2007 restructuring amend the Credit to 100 percent financing by IDA because of a lack of counterpart funding from the Government.
  • At a November 11, 2009 restructuring some of the components were dropped, primarily due to the high bids received on the civil works contracts. Also, the closing date was extended by 22 months from December 31, 2009 to October 31, 2011 due to delays experienced in procuring the civil works contracts.
  • A January 12, 2011 restructuring reallocated funds in Category 3 (unallocated) to Categories 1 and 2 (works and services) so as to complete the remaining civil works contract for upgrading Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road and the related supervision consultancy services; and to drop the requirement for completion of environmental and social assessment of the Busega-Mityana road that was dropped from Component 3 of the project.


3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
Relevance of objectives: High. The development objective remains highly relevant to the current Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the period FY2011-2015. It is fully aligned with the first and second strategic objectives of the CAS (CAS pp. 27, 32, 34) i.e. "promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth" and "enhance public infrastructure." It is pertinent to the CAS outcome of improved inter-connectivity for regional integration, and the CAS outcome of improved access to and quality of roads.

The project is consistent with country priorities. It is in line with the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), which has two components: (i) a National Transport Master Plan (issued in November 2008) to be implemented by Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) (ICR p. 3), and (ii) the Ten-Year District, Urban, and Community Access Roads Investment Plan (PAD p. 9). The PAD does not provide the dates.

b. Relevance of Design:
Relevance of design: Modest.
The PAD includes a clear statement of objectives. However, the project components did not fully support the achievement of the objectives. The components were focused on the civil works for upgrading, rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads, but the road safety aspect was not addressed adequately as part of planned project activities.


4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

The objective to improve the access to rural areas and economically productive areas was substantially achieved. The ICR (p. 15) reports that the upgraded roads service rural parts of the country that have high levels of agricultural productivity.

Outputs
  • About 152 km of national gravel roads were upgraded to paved (bitumen) to meet national road Class II standard of width 6.0 meter and 1.5 meter shoulders (pedestrian walkways) compared to the appraisal target of 178 km. On the Soroti-Lira road, 123 km was upgraded compared to 125 km estimated at appraisal. For the Gayaza- Zirobwe road, 29 km was upgraded compared to 53 km estimated at appraisal.
  • Only 15 km of the 72 km (original target) of damaged paved roads was reconstructed and widened to Class I (national roads standard). The revised target of 15 km was met.
  • The average traffic growth for the four sections of the upgraded roads ranged from 11 percent to 16 percent.

The Busega-Mityana road and bridges on the Atiak-Moyo road were financed by the Government. According to the Project Team, the Busega-Mityana road rehabilitation has been completed and the road has been opened to traffic. On the seven bridges and ferry landings on Atiak Moyo road, six bridges have been completed but the approaches have not yet been reinstated. By the time of the writing of the ICR, the work was ongoing but with delays.

Outcomes
  • The average travel time by bus on the 123 km Soroti-Lira Road was reduced from 140 minutes (baseline) to 100 minutes at project closure.
  • The Vehicle Operating Cost (VOC) on Soroti-Lira road was reduced by 53% from 0.46 US$/vehicle km to 0.22.


The objective to build up sustainable road sector planning, design and program management capability including road safety management was modestly achieved.
Outputs
  • Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) was established. The Uganda National Roads Authority Bill was approved by Parliament on May 24, 2006, Board of Directors appointed on January 22, 2007, Executive Director appointed on October 31, 2007 and key positions filled by June 30, 2008. UNRA became functional on July 1, 2008.
  • The project supported the preparation and launching of the National Transport Master Plan (NTMP). The ICR (p. 3) reports that the NTMP is being used as a guiding principle for making decisions relating to planning and development of transport projects in the country and in the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area.
  • A financial management system and internal audit function was established.
  • Detailed design for upgrading of 300 km of district roads reclassified to national (bitumen) standard was prepared.
  • The project provided training to Road Agency Formation Unit (RAFU ) staff in the application of road planning tools, specifically the Roads Economic Decision (RED) model and the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM4), to enable the staff to analyze data and use it for planning. Software licenses were also provided for the HDM4.
  • Detailed design and tender documents were prepared for the two high priority roads, totaling 222 km. According to the project team the two roads were: (i) the Gulu-Atiak-Nimule road and (ii) the Vurra-Arua-Oraba road. These two roads connecting South Sudan and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) qualified for the detailed design as they are on international corridors and their traffic volumes were much higher compared to the rest of the roads on the government's list.
  • Data collection on 10,000 km of national roads was completed.

The ICR does not provide evidence on improvement in road safety management. According to the Project Team, under the Second Road Development Program Project, Engineering Design Manuals and Specifications were prepared for: (i) traffic signs, (ii) road safety vision, and (iii) safety at road works. At design, the PAD did not have a specific set of activities for road safety, but the project simply implemented the recommendations from the manuals prepared under the second project to ensure that roads were constructed with enhanced road safety features.

5. Efficiency:

At project appraisal, an economic analysis for investment on each of the project roads was carried out using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM4). The consolidated Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was above 12 percent.
At project completion, the ERR was re-evaluated for the two roads that were upgradedthe Soroti-Lira and Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe roads.The ERR for the Soroti-Lira road was 15.6% compared to 21.3% at appraisal.

The ERR for the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe road was 55.4% compared to 27.5% at appraisal. The annual daily traffic at project completion far exceeded the projected traffic at appraisal. The average traffic increased by is 8.16 percent at completion compared to the projected traffic growth rate of 5 percent at appraisal. For some categories of vehicles such as heavy trucks, vehicle traffic, which was not expected to increase, more than doubled in volume. The ICR (p. 33) reports that the scope of work of the completed project was substantially different from the scope work at appraisal. Among others, factors resulting from dualizations of the carriageway, relocations of utilities, and provision of pedestrian walkways are some of the additions to the original scope of work that contributed to higher ERRs.

The final project cost at completion was US$239 million against the appraisal estimate of US$133 million, an increase of 80 percent. The global economic situation affected the prices of inputs leading to an increase in actual project cost. The price of a barrel of oil was US$43.03 at appraisal in August 2004. The price in November 2006, 28 days prior to opening of bids, was US$58.48, a 26 percent increase from the cost at appraisal. During the implementation of the civil works contracts, the price of a barrel of oil continued an upward trend with a peak of US$133.90 in July 2008. The average price during the execution of the civil works contracts was US$77.35, which is 32.3 percent above the price 28 days prior to bid opening or 80 percent above the price at appraisal.

During the early years of implementation, there were issues relating to procurement (see section 9b below). After a long dialogue with the Borrower, the Directorate of Procurement was created and procurement improved substantially.

The Bank conducted regular supervision missions focusing on the quality and progress of works throughout the project implementation period. Issues that emerged during implementation were attended to efficiently and promptly.

Overall, efficiency is rated substantial.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:


Rate Available?
Point Value
Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal:
Yes
23.8%
59%
ICR estimate:
Yes
29.4%
67%

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

Based on high relevance of objectives, modest relevance of design, substantial achievement of one of the project’s development objectives and modest achievement of the other, and substantial efficiency, the project’s outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. The project’s development objectives remained highly relevant to the Bank Country Assistance Strategy and were consistent with country priorities. However, design relevance was rated modest as it failed to take into the road safety aspect. The project improved access to rural areas and economically productive areas and resulted in the reduction of average travel time and vehicle operating costs, and traffic growth. It assisted in building road sector planning, design and program management capability. However, road safety management was not improved.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

At project closing both the Uganda National Roads Authority and the Road Fund were operational. The Uganda National Roads Authority had taken over the maintenance on national roads from the Ministry of Works and Transport. Both Uganda National Roads Authority and the Road Fund have continued to build their capacities. However, Uganda National Roads Authority has not been able to retain high quality staff. The institutional support risk is moderate.

The technical risk is substantial as the Uganda National Roads Authority has not yet adopted the Output and Performance Based Road Contracting approach for road maintenance.

The Road Fund has yet to implement the principles of the second generation Road Fund. This has been hampered by the Uganda Revenue Authority Act which does not provide for direct transfer of funds to the Road Fund. Instead, the funds are channeled through the consolidated fund of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development and passed to the Road Fund through the budget cycle. The funds are insufficient to meet maintenance requirements. The financial risk is moderate.

The risk to the development outcome is considered moderate.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
The project was the third phase of an Adaptable Program Loan (APL). It was part of the Government of Uganda Roads Sector Development Program (RSDP). The Bank applied the knowledge and experience gained from the Road Maintenance Initiative in Africa to help support the preparation of the APL. The Road Maintenance Initiative (started in 1990) is one of the central components of the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program, a joint undertaking of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and several Development Agencies coordinated by the World Bank.

For this third phase, a series of information-sharing and consultation meetings took place with the donor community during project preparation. The safeguards were adequately identified. The project's monitoring and evaluation framework included no baseline data. The road safety aspect of the project development objective was not addressed as part of the project's planned activities, nor was it captured under the indicators. The other indicators were adequate (see section 10 below).

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:
The Bank conducted regular supervision missions focusing on the quality and progress of works throughout the project implementation period. Issues that emerged during implementation were attended to efficiently and promptly. The Bank assisted in transition from the Road Agency Formation Unit to the Uganda National Roads Authority through technical assistance. According to the Project Team, Uganda National Roads Authority lacked technical capacity in contracts management and interpretation of the Contract Price Adjustment formula in the contracts. In order to address the problem, the Bank conducted a workshop in July 2011 and the feedback was that the course was beneficial to Uganda National Roads Authority staff. The ICR (p. 20) reports that the Bank was responsive in recognizing the problems that arose and in providing space and time for their resolution. The actions taken by the Bank to resolve implementation bottlenecks were adequate. A full time environmental specialist within the Uganda National Roads Authority monitored the activities on the road projects in liaison with National Environmental Management Authority. The Bank supervision team found no adverse environmental matters. Environmental safeguards implementation was rated satisfactory (ICR p. 14). However, evidence of compliance with the resettlement safeguard and procurement policies is insufficient. Compensation for many project-affected persons was pending.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:
At appraisal, the Government counterpart funding was 20 percent of the civil works component and 10 percent of the consultant services component. At the request of Government, the Credit was amended on April 25, 2007 to provide for 100 percent financing of the civil works and consultant services because of a lack of counterpart funding from the Government. When bids were opened for the first three civil works contracts, the total sum of the contracts was 43 percent over and above the available funds for this category of expenditure on the Credit/Grant. The Government committed additional financing to meet the shortfall for the three contracts that were signed. Although it experienced problems in meeting its counterpart funding obligations during the earlier stages of the project implementation, the Government was later able to contribute additional funding to enable some of the components that had been dropped from the program due inadequate funds, e.g., the reconstruction of Busega-Mityana road.

The Government was committed to the implementation of the institutional reforms. The Uganda National Roads Authority became fully operational in July 2008. The Government also established a Road Fund to enhance financial sustainability of road maintenance. The Road Fund Bill was passed by the Cabinet on May 17, 2007 and was approved by the Parliament on June 19, 2008, and the Road Fund became operational on July 1, 2009. However, the Road Fund has yet to implement the principles of the second generation Road Fund. The Uganda Revenue Authority Act does not provide for direct transfer of funds to the Road Fund. Instead, the funds are channeled through the consolidated fund of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development and passed to the Road Fund through the budget cycle.

Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:
The Road Agency Formation Unit was responsible for implementing the first half of the project. The newly created autonomous Road Authority took over on July 1, 2008. With the transfer of responsibilities from Road Agency Formation Unit to Uganda National Roads Authority, some of the accountability mechanisms and fiduciary controls were temporarily impaired. There was a weakness in Uganda National Roads Authority’s procurement capacity. The Uganda National Roads Authority did not have a qualified procurement and technical staff leading to long procurement cycles of up to 32 and 42 months between pre-qualification and contract signature, and inadequate attention to contract management. After a long dialogue the Directorate of Procurement was created and the procurement functions were split into: (i) works and services and (ii) goods. According to the project team, the creation of the Directorate of Procurement resulted in the reduction of the procurement cycle. Also, no procurement related complaints have been received for the last two years. According to the ICR, regarding land acquisition and right-of-way, "payment of compensation for properties has continued to cause project implementation problems..." (page 22). The RAP completion report for the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe stretch (p. 2) reports that "A number of complaints were raised and resolved to expedite acquisition of the right of way as the contractor was already on site. However, many complaints are still pending and are to be settled under injurious affection." According to the ICR, the Implementing Agency "did not handle, in a timely manner, cases of delayed compensation of project affected persons, leading to delayed site hand-over, which resulted in delays in completion of the civil works contracts" (page 13).

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
The Project Appraisal Document included a number of outputs and the following performance indicators: (i) reduction in travel time compared to baseline, (ii) reduction in vehicle operating costs on national roads compared to baseline; and (iii) increasing volume of transport of agricultural, commercial and industrial goods nationally in all seasons. However, no baseline data were provided for the performance indicators since the previous phases of the program did not include data collection on the national roads network.

The road safety aspect was not properly addressed as part of the indicators.

The PAD (pp. 36-39) included a data collection strategy to monitor the performance indicators. The Road Agency Formation Unit was responsible for M&E.

b. M&E Implementation:
During implementation, data were collected for the entire national roads network. The baseline data was collected and the first two performance indicators were monitored. For the third indicator, detailed data on the project area freight traffic generation by traffic mode and commodity type were not collected. Moreover, the performance indicators were not modified to take into account the project's restructuring and extension. The ICR (p. 15) notes that given the long time period elapsed at initial stages, i.e. the time of preparation and the unprecedented procurement delays, it would have been better to consider a review of the performance indicators, so as to realistically reflect the changes and new developments.

a. M&E Utilization:
The ICR does not provide information on M&E utilization.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
The following two safeguards were triggered: Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement. The project was classified as a Category B project with no potential impact on wildlife or national parks All roads included in the credit were existing roads and no new construction was expected. At appraisal, an Environmental Impact Assessment, Social Impact Assessment and Resettlement Action Plan were prepared for all roads.
A full time environmental specialist within Road Agency Formation Unit/Uganda National Roads Authority was responsible for monitoring the activities on the road projects in liaison with the National Environmental Management Authority. The ICR (p. 14) notes that no adverse environmental degradation matters were reported and the performance was rated satisfactory.

During project implementation, Road Agency Formation Unit/Uganda National Roads Authority had a sociologist and two land acquisition specialists responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan. The ICR (p. 14) notes that the reporting on the implementation progress of Resettlement Action Plan was a challenge. This challenge was addressed through the training of the Uganda National Roads Authority staff and their consultants in management of land acquisition and through on-the-spot guidance during supervision missions to enhance their skills. According to the Project Team, five staff from Uganda National Roads Authority successfully completed training in the Management of Land Acquisition Resettlement and Rehabilitation, offered by BRAC University, Bangladesh in partnership with the World Bank in May 2011. The training was aimed at improving Uganda National Roads Authority’s monitoring and reporting on the implementation of Resettlement Action Plans. The ICR further reports (p.14) that the Uganda National Roads Authority have provided the RAP Implementation Completion Reports for all the upgraded roads and the reports are satisfactory. However, the RAP completion report for the Kampala-Gayaza-Zirobwe stretch (p. 2) reports that "A number of complaints were raised and resolved to expedite acquisition of the right of way as the contractor was already on site. However, many complaints are still pending and are to be settled under injurious affection". According to the ICR, the Implementing Agency "did not handle, in a timely manner, cases of delayed compensation of project-affected persons, leading to delayed site handover, which resulted in delays in completion of the civil works contracts. (page 13).

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
Financial Management: The ICR (p. 13) reports that the quality of the financial management reports were generally acceptable. Satisfactory audit reports were received on a timely basis and were reviewed by the Bank. The project was first implemented by the Road Agency Formation Unit, which did not have an internal audit unit within its structure as it was not a statutory body but an organ of the Ministry of Works and Transport. An internal audit unit was established as part of the Uganda National Roads Authority's structure.
Procurement: There was a weakness in Uganda National Roads Authority’s procurement capacity. The Uganda National Roads Authority did not have qualified procurement and technical staff leading to long procurement cycles of up to 32 and 42 months between pre-qualification and contract signature, and inadequate attention to contract management. After a long dialogue the Directorate of Procurement was created and the procurement functions were split into: (i) works and services and (ii) goods.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
None reported

d. Other:



12. Ratings:

ICR
IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
 
Risk to Development Outcome:
Moderate
Moderate
 
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
 
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
 
Quality of ICR:
 
Satisfactory
 
NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
Adapted from the ICR (pp. 22-23):
  • Restructuring an agency at the same time as implementing a project is challenging and may cause project implementation delays due to lack or weak capacity/skills unless appropriate measures are taken. The development of human capital to an acceptable and stable stage is a long term process. The transition from Road Agency Formation Unit to Uganda National Roads Authority resulted in delays as some of the mechanisms and fiduciary controls were temporarily affected in transition. Initially, the Uganda National Roads Authority capacity was weak due to delays in staff recruitment and inadequate training of the staff (p. 11).
  • Baseline data for performance indicators should be provided at the appraisal stage for appropriate monitoring and evaluation of the development objectives. At appraisal, the baseline data for the outcome indicators were not provided. These were provided in the fourth Implementation Status Report in August 2005. This limited the assessment capacity of the project (p. 16).

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The quality of the ICR is satisfactory. The ICR provides a detailed and thorough discussion of project's outputs and outcomes. It covers all pertinent issues and provides information and analysis required to assess the project. The ICR overall was concisely written and consistent with guidelines.However, there is insufficient evidence on compliance with the resettlement safeguard and the Bank's procurement policies. Given the significant number of project affected persons, the ICR should have provided more detailed information on the basis of readily available information from the RAP completion reports, and provided a fuller explanation of how pending compensation cases would be resolved.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

(ICRR-Rev6INV-Jun-2011)
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