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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Basic Education Sector Project

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Burkina Faso
Project Name:
Basic Education Sector Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 96.20  103.41
L/C Number:
C3597, C4473
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 32.60  30.87
Sector Board:
Cofinancing (US $M)
 63.60  72.54
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Netherlands, HIPC-Transfers from IDA Grants, Bilateral Agencies (Unidentified) Foreign Multilateral Institutions (Unidentified)
Board Approval Date
Closing Date
12/31/2006 06/30/2011
Primary education (36%), Tertiary education (20%), Adult literacy/non-formal education (20%), General public administration sector (14%), Health (10%)
Education for all (25% - P) Gender (25% - P) Rural services and infrastructure (24% - P) HIV/AIDS (13% - S) Child health (13% - S)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Susan Ann Caceres
George T. K. Pitman Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
According to the Project Appraisal Document (page 2), the project was to provide support for the Government's Basic Education Ten-Year Program that was designed to be implemented in three phases the first of which covered the period 2001-2005. The main development objective of Phase I of the Basic Education Ten-Year Program was to lay the foundation for accelerating the development of basic education, while ensuring adequate quality and financial sustainability. Further, to prepare for a shift from project to programmatic support, the Bank's assistance would also aim to build the capacity of the Ministry of Basic Education (MEBA) with particular attention to the areas of financial management, budgeting, procurement, monitoring, evaluation and donor coordination.

    The Project Development Objectives stated in the Development Grant Agreement (Schedule 2, no page specified) were:
        "to assist the Borrower in its efforts to implement the Program, which includes (i) improving the access to, and quality of, basic education; (ii) strengthening the education sector's financial sustainability; and (iii) enhancing the financial management, budgeting, procurement, monitoring, evaluation and donor coordination of Ministry of Basic Education (MEBA)".

    The Project Appraisal Document (p.26) indicated that the objective is:
        "to lay the foundation for accelerating the development of basic education, while ensuring adequate quality and financial sustainability.”

    For this review, the objectives stated in the Development Grant Agreement will be used, since it is more concisely stated and monitorable

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

c. Components:
The project had three components. There are two appraisal values. The first figure is the total project cost for the component and the second value noted below is the amount financed by IDA. The actual costs by component only refer to the Bank’s contribution because the breakdown of cofinancing is not given in the ICR.

1. Improving Access to Basic Education (appraisal for total project cost US$ 23.60 million, appraisal IDA US$18.40 million; actual IDA US$18.84 million) contains four sub components:

    • Construction/rehabilitation of primary schools to finance equipment, school facilities, staffing and other critical inputs for the rebuilding of classrooms, with particular emphasis upon rural areas.
    • To encourage girls education through the construction of classrooms and latrines, provision of teaching materials, teacher training, and micro-nutrients. Supplemental services such as tutoring programs, remedial courses, information campaigns to sensitize the population to the benefits of girls' education, and supporting mothers' associations.
    • Adult literacy programs to finance literacy projects, strengthening the capacity of literacy providers, establishing village libraries, and promoting the development of local newspapers.
    • Special needs education for out-of school children and reform the out-of-school children centers and develop regulations for the centers.
2. Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Basic Education (appraisal for total project cost US$ 23.60 million, appraisal IDA US$9.50 million; actual IDA US$5.16 million) contains seven sub components:
    • Curriculum reform which includes new curriculum development to introduce mother-tongue instruction with a transition to French, emphasizing reading, writing, and critical thinking.
    • Pre-service and in-service training to be provided at the five Teacher Training Colleges and upgrading of skills of existing teachers.
    • Pedagogical materials to increase the availability of textbooks, school materials, and teacher guides.
    • Nutrition, health, and HIV/AIDs activities to reduce nutritional deficiencies and parasite load of 350,000 primary school students in the 20 targeted provinces.
    • School-based quality initiatives to support pedagogical improvement initiatives in 100 schools in 20 provinces.
    • Evaluation of learning outcomes to be undertaken through central and school -level assessment of students' learning and to help teachers use in-class testing to better monitor and support the learning process of individual students through training on curriculum-based assessments of learning and update existing standardized tests in French, mathematics, science, and national languages.
    • Early childhood development to strengthen existing community initiatives on Early Childhood Development programs and emphasize nutrition, health, psycho-social development, and family literacy and management of the centers.
3. Improving Management and Building Capacity (appraisal for total project cost US$ 8.00 million, appraisal IDA US$4.70 million; actual IDA US$6.69 million) contains five subcomponents:
    • Organization and Method Studies which includes the review of alternative models for the devolution of powers from the central level to all levels below, assessment of the costs and the benefits of each model, and recommendations. Conduct studies to improve system efficiency and effectiveness.
    • System Development included assessments to improve the operation and management of the Ministry of Education, including the creation of an Education Management Information System (EMIS), a human resource management system, a textbook management system, and an asset management system.
    • Training for management, administrative, and professional staff in the Ministry to build capacity to decentralize functions.
    • Upgrading of Material Resources to provide office space, furniture and equipment for the Ministry.
    • Unit-based Capacity Building Operations as tailor-made training, and capacity development for key units in the Ministry.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project Cost: Original project costs were US$ 96.20 million. In 2008 a US$ 15.00 million additional financing credit was provided. However, the project spent only US$103.41 million (87% of the budget) because of slow implementation.
Financing: The original credit of US$ 32.60 million was approved on January 22, 2002. In 2008 the government requested additional financing to offset the rising cost of food after devastating floods. The additional funding was to address school-based quality improvements and teacher support initiatives. On December 2008, an additional financing in the amount of US$ 15.00 million became effective. A total of US$16.00 million was cancelled from both credits at closure.

There were several cofinanciers: Canadian International Development Association (CIDA), the Netherlands, IDA Grants under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, Bilateral Agencies (Unidentified), and Foreign Multilateral Institutions (Unidentified). At appraisal these financiers were to contribute US$63.60 million equivalent. By project closure their total contribution amounted to US$72.39 million equivalent (ICR page 25-26).

Borrower Contribution: For the first phase of the financing, it was estimated that the government would contribute US$16.40 million for the program. The government's actual contributions were not noted in the ICR, but the project team reported that the government provided US$148,000 equivalent to the required 20% of the operating cost of the project.

Dates: The project was extended three times. The first extension from December 31, 2006 to June 30, 2008 was provided to allow more time for institutional capacity development activities. The project was then extended to March 31, 2011 to give the government more time to utilize the resources provided in the additional financing agreement. The final extension was provided to allow more time for the project to wrap-up its activities. The project closed on June 30, 2011, four and a half years after the original closing date.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

    Project objectives were relevant to addressing the weaknesses of Burkina Faso’s education sector: more resources were devoted to urban than rural areas on average and access to basic education was low and unequal, education quality was poor, capacity for management and supervision was weak, and the inspectorate system was poorly staffed, lacked resources to travel and school inspectors did not have decision-making authority. The project supported the government's Basic Education Ten-year Program which sought to improve these weaknesses in the education sector.

    The objectives were relevant to the 2000 Country Assistance Strategy that highlighted the need to contribute to poverty reduction through human development of formal and non-formal basic education. The objectives continued to be substantially relevant to the Bank's current Country Assistance Strategy (2010-2012), which noted concerns with the country's low level of literacy and the challenge of ensuring education quality is improved as access is increased.

b. Relevance of Design:
The results chain of project activities and components were logical and well-related to two of the three objectives; however, activities relevant to strengthening the education sector's financial sustainability were absent. The project design emphasized improving education quality by upgrading the conditions for learning, as well as efforts to improve access and build the management capacity at various levels of the system. The Results Framework was aligned with the government's overall education program, rather than the project activities, and so the contribution of the project’s inputs could not be adequately measured or related to expected project outcomes. The design involved a sector-wide approach with pooled funding.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

The objective "to assist the Borrower in its efforts to implement the Program, which includes (i) improving the access to, and quality of, basic education; (ii) strengthening the education sector's financial sustainability; and (iii) enhancing the financial management, budgeting, procurement, monitoring, evaluation and donor coordination of Ministry of Basic Education " contains four outcomes whose achievements are discussed below.
This project contributed to an overall program in which the Bank was one of many donors. Thus, it is not possible to attribute attainment of objectives solely to the efforts of the Bank project. In addition, it should be noted that many of the targets noted below were formally revised upward during the project, given that targets were expected to be attained when the project closed in 2006. The project was extended until June 30, 2011 and revised targets were introduced in 2006 and formalized in the 2008 restructuring.

    To improve the access to basic education: Substantial


      • 31, 492 new classrooms were built, which exceeded the 2005 target of 30,000; and 2,944 classrooms were rebuilt equivalent to 93% of the 2005 target number (3,180). The ICR reports that these classrooms where located in poor areas (ICR p. 14) but stated neither the proportionate increase in the national supply of public classrooms that was attained, nor the baseline.
      • 51 at-school teacher residences were built.
      • 46,299 public teachers were hired to work in classrooms, which exceeded the planned number of 30,000. The ICR (page 16) reports two factors that explain why more teachers could be recruited. First, a presidential decree of 2001 ended the automatic admission of teachers into government services. As a result, teachers would have a lower initial salary than those in the traditional public service. This lead to a 32 percent reduction in the unit cost of primary education and the ability to recruit more teachers within the budget. Second, cost-effective measures such as multi-grade teaching was also implemented.
      • 10,792 public multigrade teaching classrooms were established, which did not achieve the target of 12,000.
    There is no discussion in the ICR of any outputs or results of other planned measures to improve access that included: adult literacy program, supplemental services to encourage girls’ participation, and special needs education for out-of-school children.

      • Primary school gross enrollment rate was expected to increased from 0.90 million students (42%) in 2001 to 1.28 million (or 56%) in 2005. By 2011 the gross enrollment rate had increased to 2.56 million (79.4%). This met the revised target of 78%, which was revised upward from 56% at restructuring in 2008.
      • Gross primary enrollment rate at first grade in the 20 poorest provinces was 47% in 2005 and 70% in 2011. This exceeded the original target of 61% and the revised target of 60% set in 2008.
      • The project has helped to address gender inequalities in the student population and, to some extent, the teaching profession as well (ICR p. 17). Before the launch of the program, there were large gender inequalities in the rural areas. The gross enrollment rate for girls in rural areas was only 21% and fell as low as 1.7% in the Sahel region. Girl’s participation was particularly low from the poorest families. As of 2011, data indicate that girls represent 47.3% of all those enrolling in primary schools across Burkina Faso. Moreover, Gross Enrollment Rate results for the twenty poorest provinces (including the poorest rural areas) have also risen to near parity (combined Gross Enrollment Rate for all 20 poorest rural areas stands at 70% while for girls, it is at 69.6% in 2010). One unanticipated outcome in this regard, worthy of note, is the rise in the number of women entering the teaching profession, a phenomenon that has led to greater equality between teaching staff.
    The ICR (p. 13) noted that after law 013-2007/AN was enacted in 2007 mandating free compulsory primary education, there was an immediate spike in enrollment in 2008, but after that point growth slowed. The ICR (page 14) also noted that in 2001 there was a presidential decree that limited repetition, only allowing it at the end of the second, fourth, and sixth years of primary schooling.

    To improve the quality of basic education: Substantial
      • 40,000 pre-service teachers were trained to receive the minimum qualification/certification, which exceeded the planned number of 35,000. This indicator was added during restructuring. The ICR did not report on the effectiveness of the training and whether teachers had applied the training in their classroom.
      • 1,900,000 children benefited from a school feeding program, which exceeded the target of 1,200,000 students. This indicator was added during restructuring.
      • 13,794,555 textbooks were purchased, which exceeded the target of 8,000,000 textbooks. This indicator was added during restructuring. (Source: Rapports annuels sur les distributions des manuels scolaires de la DAMSE/MEBA) The Task Team confirmed that the number reported in the ICR (19 million) was not correct.
      • The textbook-to-student ratio in mathematics and reading improved to 1:1 from 1:5 or 1:6.
      • A system for learning assessment at the primary level was established. Even though a learning assessment system was established, the ICR did not report the results or trends.
      • Double shift schools decreased from 1,190 in 2001 to 460 in 2011, narrowly missing the target of 400. This indicator was added during restructuring.
    The ICR (p. 31-32) notes the lack of any implementation of some of the planned interventions to improve the quality of basic education (i.e. development of curricula and training curricula in preschool, provision of books for pre-school through the reprinting of booklets for preschool, support the pedagogical and management, and support outreach programs in health and HIV/AIDS in schools) to improve quality. However, in the region's reply to the draft ICR review, it reported: (1) new preschool curriculum in the areas of art and culture, citizenship, social and gender, child rights, environmental, and road safety, sexual infection/AIDS, health/hygiene was completed by 2010-2011; (2) 2, 774 school staff (teachers, inspectors, and administrators) were trained in the curricula and pedagogical methods; (3) outreach programs in health and HIV/AIDS were undertaken from 2009-2011 with 1, 300 kits with sensitization materials to prevent HIV/AIDS were distributed to schools; (4) five information campaigns to encourage HIV testing were organized from 2009-2011 with 900 students and teachers tested; 323,286 preschool booklets for various subjects were acquired between 2005-2011.

      • 54.4% of students completed primary education in 2011 (as a percentage of the relevant age group), which met the target of 51% and increased from 2001 baseline (40.9%). The ICR did not indicate whether this target was revised during restructuring, but during the region's reply to the draft ICR review, it stated that this target was not revised and indicated that the completion rate was measured by attendance and not by a test.
      • The repetition rate decreased from 13.3% in 2005 to 7.25% in 2011, which exceeded the target of 10%. The ICR did not indicate whether this target was revised during restructuring. In the region's reply to the draft ICR review, it stated that this target was not revised.
    However, repetition and completion rates were positively affected by a presidential decree in 2001 that limited repetition at the end of the second, fourth, and sixth year of primary schooling (ICR, p.13). Even so, the ICR indicates that this law combined with the efforts of the project (i.e. building schools closer to student’s homes, latrines, training teachers) strongly contributed to the change.

    To strengthen the education sector's financial sustainability: Modest

    According to the PAD, financial sustainability was to be measured by an increase in the recurrent budget allocation to basic education excluding salaries.

    Recurrent budget allocated to basic education excluding salaries increased from 18% in 2005 to 30% in 2011, which achieved the target of 30%.

    The policy reforms (i.e. recruitment of teachers by regional level rather than into government service, and the use of multi-grades teaching) contributed to allowing the percentage of national recurrent budget to rise to the target of 30% (ICR, page16). While resources to the sector have increased, there is doubt that the government could continue such funding levels sustainably if donors pulled their support (ICR, p. 35).

    To enhance the financial management, budgeting, procurement, monitoring, evaluation and donor coordination of Ministry of Basic Education (MEBA): Modest


      • The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework was produced. The ICR did not state the time frame of the Expenditure Framework.
      • An Annual Work Program is prepared regularly - but the ICR did not state the years for which the Program was prepared.
      • A Financial Report is published annually.
    There is no discussion in the ICR of any outputs or results of other measures to improve management that included upgrading material resources/space for the Ministry, training, system development, and unit-based capacity building.

    The ICR (page 12) reports that despite efforts, financial and procurement management remained weak because of high staff turnover.

5. Efficiency:

Efficiency: Modest
Project efficiency was modest. Disbursement and implementation was slow, which resulted in the cancellation of US$16 million, even though the project was extended by 4.5 years to utilize these funds. The ICR reports that some project resources were wasted, which could have been avoided with better planning, and so the value for money was not optimized (ICR, p. 16).

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?
Point Value
ICR estimate:

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

The project had substantial relevance of the objectives, while relevance of design was modest. Achievement of two objectives was substantial, while there was modest attainment with the other two. Efficiency is rated modest.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

The government has exhibited commitment to basic education. However, significant risks to sustaining the development outcome relate to government's low institutional capacity and financial resources. While the Government has increased its budgetary allocations to the education sector from 15% in 2002 to 22% in 2010 (which is higher than the average for Sub Sahara African countries), the Government is reliant on donor assistance. Institutional capacity in the Ministry remains low despite the activities of this project. Limited capacity was a major reason for the implementation difficulties encountered during the project and continues to pose challenges to the development outcome.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
Appraisal undertook a thorough analysis of the needs of the Basic Education sub-sector that was independently reviewed by four external peer reviewers whose input was incorporated into the final project design. A procurement capacity assessment was conducted for the central level and for a sample of provincial procurement committees. A plan was developed to address weaknesses and build more capacity, but the ICR indicates that the assessment and plan may have miscalculated and provided overly optimistic conclusions (ICR, page 8). A capacity assessment was also conducted of the Ministry, but, as the ICR suggests, this assessment may not have adequately accounted for the new role of the Ministry in a sectorwide approach with donor harmonization (ICR, page 19). In addition, the multitude of subcomponents and activities in the design was too ambitious, making the project too complex for the limited capacity of the Ministry, a problem exacerbated by the multiplicity of donor technical inputs. Inadequacies in the Results Framework were evident, but it was consistent with the practices at the time to collect program data.

The Bank led an effort with other donors to harmonize programs to reduce transaction costs for the government and a pooled fund was established for the project. A protocol for donor harmonization was signed, but there were ambiguities in the wording related to procurement procedures, which later created different understandings related to use of Bank procedures among donors. The misunderstanding about the pooled funding and the mandatory requirements of the Bank’s procurement policy should have been clarified with cofinanciers during appraisal. One donor reported (ICR, p. 49), " this collaboration could have been even more beneficial if the World Bank as one of the partners have demonstrated more transparency and been more open and available".

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:
The Bank augmented its focus on output indicators in 2006 to provide a better link between project activities, outputs and outcomes. Additionally, the Bank sent a specialist to support the implementing agency in the use of procurement system and software. The Bank conducted regular supervision missions and held a joint Mid-term Review with the other donors.

In 2007 a Bank procurement review found that the pooled funding arrangement was not aligned with Bank procedures so the Bank withdrew from the fund following reviews at the Vice Presidential level. While this decision was politically sensitive, it permitted the government not to lose the funds. This was seen by other donors to violate the spirit of the Paris Declaration and return to a piecemeal approach to development (ICR, page 49). Donors felt that the Bank should have been able to find a middle ground approach and not withdraw from the pooled fund and "blindly follow internal Bank rules" (ICR, page 49). Donors viewed the value of the Bank's participation in the pooled fund as its ability to build capacity in fiduciary aspects, which then became unavailable.

There were several weaknesses in the Bank's performance including: (1) waiting to downgrade performance (despite evidence of slow implementation), (2) providing an additional financing credit while disbursements were lagging, (3) not responding to letters written by the government, and (4) not providing sufficient assistance, support and training for the Ministry to build its capacity to manage the education system with decentralized levels and to build a better understanding Bank procurement and financial procedures. As reported by the ICR (page 20), “The Bank had identified procurement and financial management capacity as a substantial risk and recommended training. Unfortunately, the training did not take place until after the project closed. In addition, there is no indication that Bank supervision was proactive in ensuring the training that happened.”

Quality of Supervision Rating: Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:
Government demonstrated a commitment to education and improving the sector, specifically it intensified its effort to improve the basic education enrollment rate and improve adult literacy. It prepared a Ten-year Plan for Basic Education with specific objectives, implementation arrangements, and time frames. It also implemented three presidential decrees to make the education system more efficient. The government carried out also structural, administrative, and institutional changes to implement reform.

However, there were several weaknesses in performance. The government did not adhere to some of the conditions in the agreement it made with the Bank related to building central, provincial, and community level procurement capacity (e.g. hiring of short-term consultants to assist with project procurement). It also implemented the training and institutional changes for the Additional Financing Agreement at a very slow pace. All of these negatively impacted project implementation and slowed the pace of disbursements.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:
The Ministry of Basic Education was the Implementing Agency. Project implementation staff were rotated to other positions, which resulted in problems in procurement and financial management. As a result, the Ministry did not comply with Bank procurement requirements. When the Bank withdrew from the pooled fund, the Ministry was slow to put together an implementation team, and so disbursements did not resume until 15 months later and this led to US$16 million being unutilized

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
The original indicators and results framework were developed to measure the basic education program and the government's program matrix. The measures for quality were input and output indicators, rather than a measure of student learning. Key performance indicators contained baseline and targets (PAD p. 2).

b. M&E Implementation:
The original indicators and results framework were revised in 2006 to measure project objectives and attribute outcomes more directly to the project. The revised key indicators did not reflect all project objectives, nor activities. Data were not collected related to: adult literacy program, supplemental services to encourage girls’ participation, special needs education for out-of-school children, curriculum reform, school-based quality initiatives to support pedagogical improvements, ECD, upgrading material resources/space for the Ministry, Unit-based capacity building. The project team indicated that some of these areas were not implemented or were implemented by other donors. The updated Results Framework lacked outcome measures for any of the objectives.

The project established a Management Information System and this data collection has progressively improved. School data were collected and published annually. A learning assessment was established during the project and utilized by the Ministry to analyze student learning. However, the ICR did not report the results or trends, as well as describe how often the Ministry collected this information and how it used the data. Studies were conducted (i.e., teachers' time on task, teacher training, and disparities in access to education) and used during policy discussion which resulted in revisions to strategies.

a. M&E Utilization:
The Ministry and donors utilized the data produced in statistical yearbooks. Data were also used to plan for school facilities, as well as make adjustments in project activities.

M&E Quality Rating: Modest

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
The project was classified as Category B for under OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment. The PAD indicates that environmental guidelines would be produced during construction, but the ICR did not report how the guidelines were implemented. The project team reported that the government complied with environmental procedures, which it monitored during supervisory missions. The Bank team also said that no safeguard issues emerged. According to the ICR, safeguard compliance is rated satisfactory (ICR, p. 12).

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
The Bank and other donors had concerns with the Ministry’s financial management and procurement capacity. Financial management was weak because of: (1) high staff turnover related to intergovernmental staff rotation and (2) project design changes which were not clearly understood. While audits were conducted, some were late and qualified. Qualifications related to weaknesses in the procurement process, lack of inventory of fixed assets, and delays in accounting for advances.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:

12. Ratings:

IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Bank Performance:
Moderately Unsatisfactory
There were major shortcomings in supervision and significant weaknesses at entry. Based on Harmonized Guidelines, the outcome determines the overall rating. 
Borrower Performance:
Quality of ICR:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
The ICR included the following lessons:
      • When the Bank promotes a new policy such as donor harmonization or pooled funding, the implications of this policy must be anticipated at all levels within the Bank and for governments. The Bank will need to provide more support for governments to adjust to new roles. As well, the Bank must better equip operational staff for the new realities of working with pooled funding and donor harmonization. In this situation there was a gap between the Bank vision and practice in the field.
      • Pooled funding should be used only when Borrowers have the capacity to implement and manage the funding using country systems that are attuned to donor policies and fiduciary safeguard requirements. Arrangements need to be clearly stated, otherwise the intended benefits may not occur.

14. Assessment Recommended?


15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR provided a candid assessment of the implementation weaknesses, particularly related to the Bank and Borrower/Implementing Agency. The ICR did not describe the continued relevance of the objectives to current conditions and CAS in the country. The ICR also did not provide adequate assessment of the relevance of the project design, only describing the relevance of the original indicators. In addition, it did not provide adequate discussion of how the Bank monitored the environment safeguards.

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

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