|1. Project Data:
ICR Review Date Posted:
|West Bank & Gaza|
|Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project II
Project Costs(US $M)
Loan/Credit (US $M)
Cofinancing (US $M)
|France, Netherlands, KfW, SIDA and DANIDA
Board Approval Date
|General water sanitation and flood protection sector (35%), Power (23%), Roads and highways (18%), Other social services (12%), General public administration sector (12%)|
|Urban services and housing for the poor (25% - P)
Other social protection and risk management (25% - P)
Municipal finance (24% - P)
Pollution management and environmental health (13% - S)
Social safety nets (13% - S)|
||ICR Review Coordinator:
||Robert Mark Lacey
|2. Project Objectives and Components:|
a. Objectives: As per the Trust Fund Grant Agreement, Schedule 1, the project's development objectives were to:
(a) provide assistance for mitigating further deterioration in the delivery of essential municipal services in the West Bank and Gaza;
(b) create temporary job opportunities at the local level; and
(c) promote pilot initiatives that foster collaboration among local governments and NGOs and promote municipal cost recovery.
The appraisal document, in this case the technical annex to the trust fund grant, formulated the project objectives as follows:
(i) help mitigate further deterioration in the delivery of essential municipal services, including solid waste collection, street lighting, provision of water, wastewater and electricity services (where such services are provided by municipalities), and street cleaning, among other services, through rehabilitation of damaged or deteriorating infrastructure and the provision of non-wage budgetary support for direct service cost inputs;
(ii) create temporary job opportunities at the local level through the launching of labor-intensive employment generation schemes, proportionally allocated on the basis of a combined unemployment/poverty index; and
(iii) pilot innovative initiatives that foster Local Government-NGO collaboration in response to urgent community needs and assist municipalities in recovering costs for the provision of services.
This ICR review uses the statement of objectives in the Trust Fund Grant Agreement because it is more monitorable.
b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
c. Components:(i) Emergency municipal services assistance grants (appraisal cost US$29.7 million; actual cost for Bank financed portion US$ 8 million, actual cost for the remaining project component not available) including rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and facilities, supply of necessary equipment, and financing of non-wage recurrent costs of municipal services over a two year period. Priority areas were for water and wastewater services, solid waste, road rehabilitation and maintenance, and electricity.
(ii) Labor-intensive employment generation (appraisal cost US$6.1 million; actual cost for Bank financed portion US$3.1 million, actual cost for the remaining project component not available) including labor-intensive sub-projects--with a minimum of 50% labor content--identified and implemented by municipalities in collaboration with local community groups.
(iii) Municipal Development and Lending Fund innovation window (appraisal cost US$1.2 million; actual cost for Bank financed portion US$ 1.2 million, actual cost for the remaining project component not available) including piloting pre-paid metering systems in three municipalities, and piloting local government/NGO collaboration for emergency and other joint programming purposes, such as public awareness campaigns to promote conservation, public health, environmental management.
(iv) Project management costs (appraisal cost US$3.2 million; actual cost for Bank financed portion US$0.7 million, actual cost for the remaining project component not available) based upon a Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF) management fee and technical assistance to establish three regional extension services.
d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and DatesProject Cost and Financing. According to the technical annex to the Trust Fund Grant the total project cost at appraisal was $40.2 million, of which $10 million was to be provided through a Bank grant and the remaining to be provided by other donors. In July 2009 the Bank provided additional funding of US$3.0 million for further rehabilitation in Gaza of infrastructure that had been damaged in Israeli air attacks of December 2008.
At appraisal, the French Development Agency ($16.57 million actual) and the Government of the Netherlands ($6.17 million actual) had committed to contribute to the project costs. During project implementation, additional donor funding was provided through German Development Bank (KfW) in the amount of $20.71, Swedish SIDA in the amount of $8.62 million, and Danish DANIDA in the amount of $5.22 million. This additional funding has contributed to the revised total project cost of $70.28 million. ICR does not provide data on actual financing provided by these donors for each project component.
Borrower contribution. There was no Borrower contribution planned and none materialized.
Dates. The project's original closing date was June 2009, but it was extended first to December 2009 to enable the completion of the parking meter pilot, and for the second time to June 2011 to enable the implementation of the additional US$3 million funding for Gaza.
|3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:|
a. Relevance of Objectives:Relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. Objective (a) of mitigating further deterioration of municipal services is highly relevant to the priorities of the current Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) 2011-2013 that allocates 17% of its budget to strengthening local governance and service provision. It is also highly relevant to the Bank's 2008-2010 Interim Strategy for West Bank Gaza (IS-WBG 2008-2010), that treats municipal services as one of its two main pillars, assistance for which is coordinated through a special Municipal Sector Working Group of donors.
Objective (b) creating temporary job opportunities is relevant to the Bank’s 2008-2010 Interim Strategy that links the acute unemployment issue with high poverty levels and outlines the Palestinian Authority's response as "to provide for the rapidly growing population by increasing social transfers and becoming the employer of last resort (ISN p.8). The objective to create job opportunities remain modestly relevant to the 2011-2013 Development Plan which now focuses upon permanent job creation.
Objective (c) of fostering local government collaboration with NGOs, and promoting municipal cost recovery is highly relevant to the priority that the 2011-2013 National Development Plan gives to service provision by both municipalities and NGOs. It is also highly relevant to the Bank’s Interim Strategy with its focus on cost recovery from local services.
The project objectives were based upon a realistic assessment of the volatile country conditions of West Bank Gaza arising from unpredictable closures, military activities and the intifada. The ICR candidly acknowledges that project appraisal in 2006 was at a time of acute crisis.
b. Relevance of Design:Relevance of project design is rated Substantial. The development objectives were clear and measurable. The activities included in the project components were consistent with the objectives. Thus grants for the emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure would be expected to bring municipal services back on line and prevent their further deterioration, as intended. Project financed sub-projects were specifically designed to use labor inputs intensively to achieve the second objective of creating temporary job opportunities. Activities planned under the Municipal Development and Lending Fund innovation window could be linked to the municipal cost recovery objective. Pilot sub-projects were included in the components to foster collaboration between local government and NGOs, as reflected in the the project objective.
|4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :|
1. Mitigating further deterioration in the delivery of municipal services. Modest.
Outputs (physical output targets were not set at appraisal because the project was designed to be demand driven):
Water supply and sanitation:
- 3.9km of water networks rehabilitated.
- 903 water meters installed.
- 1.69km of wastewater networks rehabilitated.
- 447 solid waste containers installed.
- 2 tractors and 3 trailers installed.
Electricity: 9km of electrical networks rehabilitated.
- 72.5km paved
- 10km sidewalks constructed or rehabilitated.
- 4.6km of street lighting networks rehabilitated.
- 2,973 street lighting units installed.
- 809 lm of culverts and drainage rehabilitated.
- 240 lm hand rails constructed or rehabilitated.
- 630 lm of retaining walls constructed.
- street roller asphalt cutter, excavator, and concrete mixer installed.
Budgetary support to purchase spare parts, pay for dumping site fees, service tools, labor insurance, vehicles insurance, and fuel to maintain basic services.
- 3,958 m2 of public buildings constructed or rehabilitated.
- 1,430 m2 of public facilities constructed or rehabilitated.
Outcomes: Through the project, 132 municipalities where 70 percent of the West Bank and Gaza's population live benefited from project assistance. 81 percent of respondents to a beneficiary survey of residents of participating municipalities reported that they were satisfied with the level of services received, against the target of 70 percent.
While the large share of the satisfied beneficiaries indicates that the municipal services are at an acceptable level for them, the level of achievement in "mitigating further deterioration of municipal services" is unclear for the following reasons. First, the technical annex prepared at appraisal does not provide quantified evidence that the level of municipal services that it aimed to halt although it describes the deteriorating municipal services as one of the key sector issues. Second, the ICR does not provide quantified evidence that the level of municipal services had not deteriorated further. Third, the ICR reports only the Bank's financing which represented less than one fifth of the project’s total costs. Fourth, there is no baseline of beneficiary satisfaction, and the evidence from the beneficiary survey is based on interviews with 614 of the project’s 2.8 million beneficiaries. While it is not clear how the 614 were chosen, the ICR provides the demographic breakdown of respondents and the split between West Bank and Gaza, indicating that the respondents are representative across the territory.
2. Creating temporary job opportunities. Substantial.
Outputs: 69.58 percent labor content for project financed works was achieved against the target of 50 percent. This result was achieved through creation of temporary job opportunities at the local level through labor intensive employment generation schemes, proportionally allocated on the basis of the Municipal Development Fund unemployment index. The sub-projects were identified and implemented by Municipalities in coordination with locally-based community groups. Sub-projects varied by sector, and included agriculture, NGO-based services, and other labor intensive activities.
Outcome: Temporary job opportunities were created for the beneficiaries in the municipal area. 167,000 person days of employment exceeding the project’s target of 140,000 person days, in addition to the 3,304 person days of indirect temporary employment.
3. Fostering local government/NGO collaboration and promoting municipal cost recovery. Modest
Pilots for local Government NGO collaboration for emergency and other joint programming purposes were carried out to deliver municipal services more effectively. Ten pilots were implemented out of the 33 proposals, including a community center developed in one municipality in Gaza; women’s training center constructed in Ajanta municipality in the southern West Bank; and a park and community center developed in Bait Shout municipality, also in the southern West Bank. The total number of beneficiaries from the NGO subprojects was 22,180 in the West Bank and 18,387 in Gaza. However, the sub-component on Municipal Development Fund Innovation Window suffered from lack of clarity on linkages to the emergency program, ownership and implementation mechanisms.
Prepaid electric metering systems which was planned to be implemented for improving municipal service cost recovery was replaced by a parking meter scheme.
While positive outcomes were observed with regard to social development and benefits for women in certain NGO pilot activities, the municipal/NGO collaboration ceased once the facilities were handed over to NGOs for operation and therefore the objective of fostering local government/NGO collaboration was not fully achieved. No data are provided on the revenues derived from the parking meters and the actual number of meters installed is unknown. It is unclear if there has been any cost recovery to date. The meters have been installed, but the ICR refers to "issues of enforcement".
The project was prepared under emergency recovery assistance procedures (OP/BP 8.50); there were time limitations and limited availability of economic data that prevented an economic analysis at appraisal, other than the description of potential areas of economic benefits.
Cost efficiency analysis done for the disbursements related to maintenance of specific segments in the water, electricity, and sewer networks revealed that these were more cost efficient than the alternative of reinvesting in new networks. Similarly, for the non-capital expenditures associated with road rehabilitation, solid waste management, and public facilities it was verified that Municipal Development and Lending Fund's procurement and execution system met cost efficiency standards.
At closure, the ICR estimates economic rates of return of of 25.8%, 37.8% and 14.8% respectively for investments of US$1.5 million in roads, US$0.14 million in solid waste and US$0.52 in municipal buildings. However, these refer only to the Bank financed portion, the total of which amounts to 4% of final project costs. The ICR does not report on the efficiency of the remaining 96% of the project resources spent.
Overall efficiency is rated Modest.
a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated