Independent Evaluation - Home > Search

Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Avian Influenza Control & Human Pandemic Preparedness & Response Project

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
Avian Influenza Control & Human Pandemic Preparedness & Response Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 10.4  8.23
L/C Number:
C4179, CH228
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 8.6  6.11
Sector Board:
Agriculture and Rural Development
Cofinancing (US $M)
 1.4  1.09
Japan Ministry of Finance PHRD grant
Board Approval Date
Closing Date
08/31/2009 06/30/2011
General public administration sector (41%), Health (34%), Agricultural extension and research (20%), Other social services (5%)
Rural services and infrastructure (29% - P) Other communicable diseases (29% - P) Pollution management and environmental health (14% - S) Health system performance (14% - S) Participation and civic engagement (14% - S)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Coordinator: Group:
Stephen Hutton
Alain A. Barbu Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:
The project development objective as expressed in the Project Appraisal Document (page 8) is to "minimize the threat posed to humans and the poultry industry in Georgia by HPAI [highly pathogenic avian influenza] and other zoonoses in domestic poultry, and to prepare for, control, and respond to influenza pandemics and other infectious disease emergencies in humans."

The objective in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1) is to "assist the Recipient in minimizing the threat posed to humans and to the poultry industry by the HPAI infection and other zoonoses in domestic poultry industry, and preparing for, controlling, and responding to influenza pandemics, and other infectious disease emergencies in humans."

Following standard practice, the project is evaluated against the objectives in the Financing Agreement.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

c. Components:

1. Animal health (appraisal estimate $USD 5.18 million, actual $2.75 million).
This component was to strengthen preparedness and response capacity for avian influenza outbreaks in poultry by:
a) Reviewing and strengthening regulatory and legal standards governing animal diseases and veterinary services, providing technical assistance to support development of an operational national avian influenza outbreak response plan, and establishing and financing a fund to compensate farmers for poultry culled to contain avian influenza outbreaks.
b) Improving disease response capacity through training of veterinarians and farmers and purchase of equipment and supplies, improving animal disease diagnostic capacity by providing training, equipment and consumable items to upgrade the capacity of border inspection posts and regional laboratories, and strengthening animal disease information systems by supporting epidemiological studies and providing GIS and database programs.

During implementation, the government decided that it would fund compensation as needed out of its own budget, rather than contributing its own or project financing into a dedicated fund that may not be needed. Regulatory, legal standard, and veterinary service reviews and national animal health program planning were dropped as they were funded by other donors.

2. Human health (appraisal estimate $USD 4.32 million, actual $4.95 million)
This component was to increase the capacity to respond to avian influenza outbreaks in humans and to enhance preparedness for an influenza pandemic by:
a) Providing technical assistance to support creation of an influenza pandemic action plan.
b) Strengthening influenza surveillance and diagnostic systems through upgrading a laboratory to Biosecurity Level 3 (BSL 3) and upgrading a regional diagnostic laboratory and providing a mobile laboratory, and by providing technical assistance and training for improving the health management information system.
c) Increasing health system response capacity through development policy guidelines on social distancing, expansion of cold storage facilities that store vaccines and other medical products, purchasing antiviral drugs, and technical assistance for medical services planning.

During implementation, it was decided that a BSL 3 laboratory was not required or economically justified and that it would be acceptable to send samples to international laboratories for retesting, and so this activity was dropped. Additional human health activities were added, including revision of clinical guidelines for influenza, development of a blood products strategy and plan, and improvements in clinical waste management.

3. Public awareness and information (appraisal estimate $USD 0.9 million, actual $0.53 million)
Improve awareness of and knowledge about avian influenza in government, private sector and civil society organizations, and in the general public, through advocacy, a public information campaign, and training of media spokespersons.

Most planned communication activities were implemented by other donors, and so were dropped from the project.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
The project was to be financed by a US$3.5 million IDA grant, a $3.5 million IDA loan, a $1.6 million grant from the (Bank managed) Avian and Human Influenza Facility (AHIF), a $1.4 million grant from the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund (PHRD), and a borrower contribution of $0.4 million. Actual financing was $2.54. million from IDA grant, $1.78 million from IDA loan, $1.54 million from the AHIF, $1.05 from the PHRD, and $1.77 from the borrower. The main reasons that the full amount of project funds were not spent were that the government made a decision not to create a compensation fund (and no outbreaks occurred during the project and so there was no need for compensation payments), that the BSL 3 laboratory was seen as unnecessary and was dropped, and that some activities were financed by other donors and so project funds were not needed.

The project was extended twice, for a total of 22 months, to allow time for completion of activities that had not been undertaken due to delays in procurement. The first extension was from August 31, 2009 to February 2011 and the second extended further to June 30, 2011, when the project closed.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:
The project was responding to a global emergency, rather than being motivated by existing Bank strategies for Georgia. The objectives were fully consistent with the objectives of the Avian and Human Influenza Facility, a multi-donor financing mechanism established to assist developing countries in meeting financing gaps in minimizing the risks from avian influenza and a possible human influenza pandemic. The objectives were also consistent with the National Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan developed by the government and a Strategic Action plan developed for the government by the WHO.

Avian influenza poses a risk to the poultry sector and to human health. Georgia was considered to be at extreme risk due to its location on major pathways for migratory birds and its shared borders with Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan, all of which had outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza prior to project approval. Sales of poultry products had dropped by as much as 90 percent in January 2006 following public awareness of outbreaks in Turkey and speculation about the possible spread to Georgia. An case of avian influenza in wild swans was detected in February 2006, which motivated the government's request for support from the Bank. The poultry sector of roughly 10.6 million birds contributed roughly 1.2% of GDP in 2004, and was a significant source of income for poor rural households (90 % of poultry were owned by households). Thus, avian influenza posed a significant threat, and project objectives were relevant at appraisal and remained relevant as of project closure, as avian influenza continued to pose a risk.

The appraisal document notes that institutional arrangements for disease control were well established in Georgia prior to appraisal, with a surveillance system (including sample collection and reporting) that had tracked human influenza in place since 2004. A national avian influenza plan was produced by the government prior to project approval, but more detailed operational plans were still needed. A program of upgrades for human and veterinary laboratories financed by USAID was already in progress, as were support programs from FAO and WHO. However, some gaps remained in animal surveillance, staff training, communications and awareness, the enabling environment, and other areas (appraisal document page 5).

The objective could have been more relevant if it included zoonotic diseases beyond those that affect poultry. Georgia suffered serious outbreaks of African Swine Fever (a zoonotic disease found in pigs) in 2007 which was not covered under the poultry-oriented objective, though the project was able to provide some urgent technical assistance to assess the outbreak, and a separate FAO project was able to provide the needed support.

The Relevance of Objectives are rated Substantial.

b. Relevance of Design:
The project was generally well designed, and followed the broad template of the global program on avian influenza, incorporating animal health, human health, and communication components. The project did not aim to provide a comprehensive solution for avian influenza, but rather it aimed to fill gaps in the existing disease control system as part of a larger response coordinated with other donor programs.

The activities supported were relevant and would all contribute to the project objectives. Regulatory improvements would ensure that government has the necessary legal powers to control disease outbreaks. Outbreak response plans would provide a framework for coordinating response activities and planning for a potential epidemic. A compensation mechanism for birds destroyed by culling would help to encourage poultry farmers to report outbreaks, and so to allow them to be contained. Strengthening disease surveillance and diagnostic systems would allow outbreaks to be controlled and patterns to be monitored. Increasing health system response capacity would assist in mitigating a pandemic or infectious disease outbreak in humans should it occur. Awareness and information campaigns would help to encourage necessary political engagement, to improve overall government coordination of avian influenza response, and to encourage the public to take adopt appropriate behaviors that would reduce the chance of disease transmission to humans.

However, it was not clear that a BSL 3 laboratory was required for a small country such as Georgia, and this activity was dropped during implementation. The project design did not include much to improve biosecurity, and this was not covered by other donor efforts. Some equipment and supplies were not included in the project design as they were financed separately under the ongoing Primary Healthcare Project and Structural Reform Support Project.

Relevance of design is rated Substantial.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

Little evidence is available on project outcomes and impacts. Significant support (including technical assistance, equipment, and laboratory needs) was provided by other donors, so it is difficult to attribute changes in outcomes to the project.

Objective 1: Minimize the threat posed to humans and the poultry industry by highly pathogenic avian influenza infection and other zoonoses in domestic poultry: Modest
  • 30 veterinary service staff were trained on food safety and risk analysis topics.
  • An operational action and contingency plan for avian influenza response was created and approved. Desktop simulation exercises and training programs were carried out as part of preparation of the plan.
  • A compensation mechanism for culled birds was designed, but the government did not approve the compensation manual or establish a legal framework or policy for compensation, and the planned compensation fund was not financed. No compensation payments needed to be made as there were no avian influenza outbreaks and so no culling was required.
  • A monitoring plan for epidemiological surveillance was developed including baselines, passive and active surveillance programs, and data collection and analysis.
  • Some emergency supplies for outbreak control (disinfectant, protective clothing, rapid diagnostic test kits) were purchased and made available to veterinary staff, as were other equipment and 8 vehicles.
  • Border inspection post upgrades were designed but were not constructed.
  • Veterinary service offices were constructed or rehabilitated. Post mortem rooms were added to the central and three regional veterinary laboratories, and training and equipment was provided. A planned BSL 3 veterinary laboratory was not constructed.
  • An integrated animal disease surveillance and information system was established, linking together 10 regional centers, but was not fully operational as of project closure.
  • Emergency call centers were established in high risk areas, allowing farmers to report outbreaks more easily.
  • The mobility and outbreak response capacity of veterinary services was increased through purchase of 30 vehicles.
  • The project contributed to development of an avian influenza website and preparation and distribution of educational materials for poultry farmers and traders, veterinary services staff, and others in high risk regions. The communication materials and a public relations campaign were aimed at changing personal behaviors and so decreasing the chance of disease transmission from animals to people or between people.
  • No outbreaks of avian influenza occurred in Georgia during the project, but this cannot be attributed to the project.
  • Little evidence is available on the effectiveness of animal disease surveillance systems. The Bank team reports that the surveillance system is functioning effectively, but that it has not been integrated with the human health surveillance system. The ICR reports (page 10) that vehicles contributed to improving response time.
  • Equipment was provided to regional laboratories, increasing the number of tests per day that could be carried out from 30-60 at regional laboratories and from 60 to 240 at the central laboratory. However, veterinary laboratories do not appear to be providing reliable diagnostic tests. In an assessment of capacity conducted in 2010, the laboratories were only able to correctly diagnose 15.5% to 51% of samples. This accuracy is not a sufficient basis on which to make decisions about culling operations.
  • There was no impact on border security as planned upgrades were not constructed.
  • No evidence is available on the impact of communications campaigns, as the planned survey was not conducted.

Objective 2. Prepare for, control, and respond to influenza pandemics and other infectious disease emergencies in humans: Substantial
  • An operational influenza preparedness plan was prepared, and 27 hospital managers, 33 journalists and spokespersons were trained on the plan. Simulation exercises were carried out.
  • 40 medical personnel were trained in use of ventilators at regional hospitals.
  • Over 700 people were trained on influenza pandemic communication methods, including during the 2009-10 influenza pandemic.
  • Upgrading of a human health laboratory to BSL 3 was not completed, as a decision was made that it was not necessary. Equipment that had been intended to be purchased for the central reference laboratory was not procured.
  • 7 ambulances were procured and distributed to regional referral centers.
  • Strategy and management planning for the central reference laboratory was upgraded. 4,500 medical staff were trained on sample collection. Sentinel sites where samples were collected from patients were established at 6 primary health centers.
  • A strategy for blood and blood products was developed, including development of clinical guidelines and protocols for avian influenza and other infectious diseases.
  • Some support was provided for health information systems, but most of this came through the Health Care Sector Development Project or other donors. The specific contribution of the avian influenza project were not clear.
  • The project supported purchase and distribution of 14,000 doses of seasonal influenza.
  • 9,000 doses of the antiviral drug Tamiflu were purchased.
  • The project purchased roughly 500,000 pairs of protective gloves and 1.25 million masks, which were added to a stockpile to be used in case of infectious disease emergency.
  • Intensive care units were upgraded with ventilators and other equipment across 48 health facilities.
  • The M&E system did not track outcomes, so it is very difficult to assess the impact of the project.
  • Sentinel sites provide weekly reports to the national center for disease control.
  • The 2009-10 influenza pandemic provided some evidence that outputs contributed to the objectives. Discussions with the project team indicated that the human health surveillance system successfully detected the pandemic. Doses of Tamiflu and protective clothing were distributed to hospitals and used during the pandemic. Patients with severe cases were treated using respirators. Isolation measures and legal powers developed under the project were enforced during the pandemic for infected patients.
  • The ICR reports that the fatality rate for severe cases requiring hospitalization were "2.5% and 3.75%", and that the government response was timely and exemplary.
  • The ICR suggests (page 11) that the lack of panic during the 2009 pandemic indicated that the communications program was successful.

5. Efficiency:

Though the project may have contributed significant economic benefits, conventional economic analysis cannot provide much evidence of economic efficiency because of the inherent uncertainties in the underlying probability of disease outbreaks and the quantitative efficacy of project activities on those probabilities.

An economic analysis conducted at appraisal estimates the economic benefits of the project by assuming that the project reduces the probability of outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry, and thus reduces economic losses from the poultry sector. The analysis assumes that the annual probability of a catastrophic outbreak is 10%, increasing by 1% per year, up to 25% per annum by 2020. While it is very difficult to estimate the probability, this probability seems high - especially given that in retrospect no outbreaks have occurred. [A catastrophic outbreak is assumed to reduce the market price of poultry products by 60%, and to destroy 40% of the capital value of the entire poultry sector.] The analysis assumes that the project will reduce the likelihood of outbreaks by 1/5. Given these assumptions, the analysis estimates that the project would yield a net present value of $149 million and an economic rate of return of 70.8%. The analysis does not include any benefits from reduced likelihood of human infection or from improved preparedness for pandemics or infectious diseases, which would be difficult to capture.

A separate economic analysis conducted at closure did not attempt to conduct an ex post analysis (which would have been difficult, as no outbreaks occurred), but rather takes forward-looking approach similar to that of the appraisal analysis. It considers on avoided direct losses to the poultry industry by reduced likelihood of outbreaks, but most benefits come from reduced transmission to humans (and so reduced cost of hospitalization, and workdays lost due to morbidity) and a reduction in mortality in humans. The analysis assumes that with or without the project, outbreaks of avian influenza would occur every 5 years, starting in 2011. The project is assumed to reduce the severity of outbreaks from 5% of poultry dying in an outbreak to 4% of poultry lost from disease and culling. It also assumes that the project would reduce the proportion of the population infected by a pandemic from 5% to 2%, and that mortality among hospitalized cases would be reduced from 3% to 1.5%. Based on these assumptions, the analysis estimates an overall economic rate of return of 50% and an NPV of $22.9 million. The difference between the appraisal and closure estimates demonstrate that the results are highly sensitive to modeling assumptions.

The project avoided inefficient use of resources by dropping some activities that were not needed. During implementation, it was decided that BSL 3 laboratories were not justified on a cost benefit basis. Existing BSL 2 labs and equipment were sufficient for achieving a basic diagnosis, and samples could be sent to a UK reference laboratory for confirmation. A BSL 3 laboratory was also being constructed by other donors, and so additional BSL 3 labs from this project could be redundant.

There is no clear evidence of inefficient use of resources. While some activities could not be carried out during the project, activities that were conducted were completed and facilities and equipment were in use. When some activities were dropped, the decision was made to cancel those parts of the IDA loan and grant rather than to try to use the funds on activities that might not be necessary to achieve project objectives. This way the funds could be preserved for other projects. However, efficiency was reduced by significant implementation delays, which required extending the emergency project by almost 2 years.

Project efficiency is rated Substantial.

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?
Point Value
ICR estimate:

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated

6. Outcome:

The project objectives responded to a real need, as Georgia faced a high risk from avian influenza, and the relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. While the project design did not provide a comprehensive solution to avian influenza, it was coordinated with other donor programs and filled particular gaps that were needed and the activities would all support the objectives, so relevance of design is rated Substantial. There is little evidence on the achievement of project objectives. The lack of outbreaks of avian influenza cannot be attributed to the project, and there is evidence that veterinary diagnostic capacity was not sufficient, so the efficacy of minimizing the threat to humans and the poultry industry from avian influenza is rated Modest. There is some evidence that project activities helped in the response to the 2009-10 influenza pandemic, so the efficacy of the project in preparing for and responding to influenza pandemics and infectious disease emergencies is rated Substantial. Economic analysis is difficult due to uncertainties in the underlying parameters, but it is plausible that the project had significant benefits and there is no evidence of inefficient use of resources, so project efficiency is rated Substantial. Together these lead to an overall outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

Sustainability of capacity increases supported by the project will require ongoing training, simulation exercises, and public education. This will require ongoing funding. Reforms in the health sector aimed at privatizing medical services and decentralization mean that it is expected that the health ministry budget will be decreased over time, and this could threaten sustainability.

The government has committed to fund compensation for culling if needed, and it has the budgetary and financial capacity to do so (as demonstrated by the response to other emergencies, such as severe hailstorms in 2012.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:
The project was prepared as an emergency operation under OP 8.50 and followed the broad outline of the Global Program on Avian Influenza template. The project design was largely focused on long term institutional capacity building, and the ICR reports (page 1) that there were other IDA-financed and donor-financed projects under implementation at the time of appraisal which helped to finance some immediate needs for avian influenza response. However there were still emergency needs for vehicles, disinfectant, rapid test kits, and outbreak containment training, so there was some justification for use of an emergency instrument.

The ICR reports (page 4) that the preparation and design involved efficient and effective collaboration among stakeholders including WHO, FAO, and other donors. The extent to which stakeholders in Georgia (such as poultry producers) were included was not clear, but it is difficult to do widespread consultation during preparation of an emergency project.

The results framework was weak, and did not provide sufficient information to assess the impact of the project or to contribute to project management.

Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:
The Bank team conducted seven supervision missions, including technical expertise from both animal health and human sectors. The ICR reports that collaboration with other donors and projects remained effective throughout the project.

The Bank demonstrated flexibility in adjusting the project activities as needs changed. With avian influenza outbreaks failing to occur and a decline in the perceived risk of avian influenza, the project was shifted to contribute more to other infectious diseases and public health system priorities linked to epidemics. The Bank recognized that BSL 3 laboratories were not needed and was supportive of dropping them. The Bank supported coordination across sectors by appointing separate co-TTLs with sectoral expertise for both animal health and human health activities.

The weaknesses of the M&E system were not addressed during implementation, and the Bank could have done more to encourage the animal health implementing agency to conduct project reporting.

Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:
The government demonstrated significant commitment to project objectives, creating an inter-ministerial taskforce and a national avian influenza plan prior to project approval. The task force was actively involved in project design. The ICR notes (page 5) that the principal ministries (health and agriculture) sustained interest in the project throughout implementation. Counterpart funding was adequate and was provided in a timely fashion. However, near the end of the project, project management deteriorated as both the agriculture and health ministries implemented major internal institutional and organizational reforms, changing organizational structure, financing, and staffing. This led to delays in the crucial period before project closure and meant that some activities could not be completed.

The government decided they did not want to tie up financial resources in a compensation fund, and so dropped the planned compensation . They committed to providing compensation if outbreaks occurred, and have the financial capability to do so, but did not adopt the draft legal framework necessary for carrying out compensation.

Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:
The project was implemented by project coordination units within the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture. The ICR reports (page 16) that implementing agencies demonstrated strong commitment to achieving objectives across all components.

Overall project coordination was to be provided by a team comprising the component coordinators and representatives from the finance ministry and the Prime Minister's office, but it was affected by political disruptions and failed to meet during some periods of implementation, which led to delays in decision making and meant that implementation was not always well coordinated between the components.

There were significant delays throughout implementation, mostly because of problems with procurement and the complexity of technical equipment being procured. Ongoing organizational reforms and restructuring in ministries and implementing agencies and associated staffing changes also contributed to delays. Due to delays, several activities were not implemented despite 22 months of extensions, including the upgrading of border control stations and full implementation of the animal disease information system.

While the human health component project unit produced progress reports semi-annually, the animal health project unit did not produce any progress reports.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:
The ICR notes (page 6) that inadequate attention was given to M&E design during project appraisal. The M&E design included 43 indicators, most of which tracked completion of very specific outputs. The results framework did little to assess the impact of the project even on intermediate outcomes. Indicators in the design that would assess project impact ("% change in the AI case fatality") would have been very complex to measure and were not tracked. Indicators were largely binary in nature (activity not complete; activity completed) and did not provide the ability to meaningfully track progress over time.

b. M&E Implementation:
M&E activities were carried out by both implementing agencies. However, the animal health component did not keep up to date M&E records or produce project reports.

The system recorded whether particular outputs were completed, but many of these outputs were produced under support from other donors and not by the project.

A planned survey to assess the impact of the communication campaign was not completed.

a. M&E Utilization:
M&E data was collected for reporting purposes only, there is no indication in the ICR that it was used to inform project management or implementation.

M&E Quality Rating: Negligible

11. Other Issues:

a. Safeguards:
The project was categorized ‘B’ under OP4.01 Environmental Assessment. No other safeguards were triggered. Environmental management plans were prepared for construction of postmortem rooms at veterinary laboratories, and covered arrangements for safe operation of the facilities including disposal of laboratory biological waste and waste water, and guidelines for personnel safety and biological security. The ICR reports that construction works were generally conducted in compliance with the plans.

It is not clear from the ICR whether environmental management plans were prepared stipulating good practice in culling poultry and safe disposal of associated carcasses, as had been the norm in many other avian influenza control projects.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:
There were significant delays in procurement for all three components, leading to implementation delays and the failure to complete some activities. The ICR reports (page 5) that procurement was hampered by unrealistic demands by the Bank that did not match the limited capacity of local providers of medical equipment. The Bank team reported that initial bid specifications for technical equipment were overly narrow, and specifications needed to be redesigned, which took time. Several bids had to be retendered.

Audit reports were delivered on time and were unqualified. No other financial management issues were reported.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
The ICR notes (page 14) that during implementation, the project noted flaws in the health service system, and that research and regulations put in place under the project contributed to improvements in hospital waste management, hospital acquired infections, and blood collection and transfusion safety. It also suggests that pandemic emergency preparedness planning has increased preparedness for other emergencies such as floods.

d. Other:

12. Ratings:

IEG Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:
Bank Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:
Moderately Satisfactory
Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of ICR:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:
The ICR notes that:
  • Flexibility in the design and implementation of an emergency project is important. With less time for design and with the chance that project priorities may change as events unfold, the design cannot be set up to envision all possible needs.
  • Developing multi-sectoral contingency plans is an important aspect of disaster preparedness. Such plans can enable a more effective and better coordinated response.

IEG also notes that:
  • Monitoring and evaluation systems that only track completion of outputs will not be effective in assessing project impact.
  • Biosecurity Level 3 laboratories may not be needed or justified on a cost-effective basis for small countries.

14. Assessment Recommended?


15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR was well written and clear, but did not provide much evidence on achievement of outcomes, in part because the results framework for the project was largely focused on production of outputs, and because no additional evidence was collected beyond those indicators. The ICR could have been clearer in identifying which outputs were produced under this project, and which were due to projects funded by the government or other donors. Confusingly, the ICR refers to the 2007 outbreaks of African Swine Fever as being "African Swine Flu".

a. Quality of ICR Rating: Satisfactory

© 2012 The World Bank Group, All Rights Reserved. Terms and Conditions