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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Bf Urban Environment

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
Bf Urban Environment
Project Costs(US $M)
 49.7  67.8
Burkina Faso
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 37.0  56.9
Sector, Major Sect.:
Central government administration, Sub-national government administration, Housing finance and real estate markets, Other social services, General water sanitation and flood protection sector,
Law and justice and public administration; Law and justice and public administration; Finance; Health and other social services; Water sanitation and flood protection
Cofinancing (US $M)
 4.9  3.4
L/C Number:
Board Approval (FY)
Partners involved
Agence Française de Développement (AFD) 
Closing Date
06/30/2000 06/30/2005
Evaluator: Panel Reviewer: Division Manager: Division:  
Nilakshi M. De Silva
Peter Nigel Freeman Alain A. Barbu IEGSG

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
To strengthen the administration of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso in pursuance of the Borrower's decentralization and environmental policies through: (i) improving urban living conditions by executing priority urban works on primary infrastructure; (ii) developing urban services directly benefitting the low income groups; (iii) promoting the active participation of the urban population in urban service development; and (iv) promoting sustainability of the urban environment by supporting the government's decentralization program and the setting up of new laws, regulations and practices that would result in better land management, investment programming and local resource mobilization.

b. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of Adjustment Loans):
Component 1: Restoration of the primary infrastructure networks (appraisal estimate US$31.2 million, supplemental estimate US$22 million, total estimate US$53.2 million; actual cost US$ 46.9 million) including (i) rehabilitation of priority drainage networks; (ii) rehabilitation and improvement of the primary urban road networks (24.75 km in Ouagadougou and 13.25 km in Bobo-Dioulasso); (iii) development of piped sewerage and on-site sanitation including support to small enterprises; (iv) waste management including closing or upgrading existing landfills, construction of new landfills and support to private enterprises; and (v) improvement to the toxic and industrial solid waste management system.

Component 2: Capacity building (appraisal estimate US$7.6 million;actual cost US$17.6 million) including (i) improving the local financial resource mobilization system; (ii) improving the institutional, legal and regulatory framework for urban management at the national and local levels; (iii) technical assistance, training and monitoring program; (iv) enhancement of sound community participation practices; and (v) housing development including the implementation of a Guarantee Fund to increase incentives for the Caisses Populaires d'Epargne (cooperative credit unions) to lend more for housing.
Component 3: Operating Expenses (appraisal estimate US$0.9 million; actual cost US$3.4 million).

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
A supplemental credit of US$22 million was approved in March 2002, bringing the total project cost estimate to US$72 million. The 42% increase in cost estimates is due to unexpected increases in the unit cost for civil works - which is due in turn to the strained capacity of the construction industry and higher technical requirement especially in the construction of landfills. Final costs are 93% of the revised cost estimate and 96.5% of the revised IDA loan amount was disbursed. IDA provided 84% of final costs (compared to 75% estimated at appraisal), Government, municipalities and the communities provided 11% (compared to 15% at appraisal) and cofinancing provided 5% (compared to 10% at appraisal). The closing date was extended in 2002 by 48 months to June 30, 2004 and the project closed a further 12 months later, on June 30, 2005 ( 60 months behind the original closing date). Delays were due to the extreme slowness by the Borrower in handling administrative procedures and the processing of the larger contracts because of attempted interference in the evaluation process from the evaluation and awarding committees. This was symptomatic of a lack of capacity.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

The overall objective to improve urban living conditions is highly relevant in terms of the CAS 2005, which focuses on the need to provide improved access to basic services, including increased access to clean water and sanitation particularly in urban areas. Other project objectives are also supported by the CAS which supports decentralized urban development, private sector investment and growth. Project components were well designed to support these objectives. Insufficient assessment, however, was made of the risks inherent in this project.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

(i) improve urban living conditions: Achieved. With the construction and rehabilitation of 40.43km of roads (compared to appraisal target of 38 km), the project has improved accessibility for almost 800,000 (52%) residents in these two urban areas. Traffic on these roads has increased by between 20% to 25% per year. Compared to 6% before the project, 40% of Ouagadougou is covered by adequate sanitation. All 119 primary schools in the two cities have sanitary facilities, compared to none at project appraisal. 57,160 on-site sanitation facilities have been constructed and collective sanitation for industry (including pre-treatment), collective domestic sanitation and individual solutions have been implemented for most of the city under the Strategic Sanitation Action Plan developed under the project. Rehabilitation of three main drainage canals has reduced erosion and about 280,000 residents are no longer exposed to periodic flooding and less exposed to mosquitos. The banks of the rehabilitated drainage have also been improved and are being used for recreational and small business activities. Solid waste collection has increased from 40% to 55% in Ouagadougou and from 25% to 50% in Bobo-Dioulasso. There are however, some shortcomings. The sanitation coverage of Ouagadougou has fallen slightly short of the 50% target set at appraisal, and only 60% of the sanitary facilities in schools are properly maintained.
(ii) develop urban services directly benefitting the low income groups: Partially Achieved. Community-based, demand-driven tertiary infrastructure services - relating mainly to water and sanitation, but also health facilities, access roads, public lighting, school fencing and green spaces - have been implemented in under-served, low income settlements in both cities, which is estimated to have benefited 27% of the population. Road construction and rehabilitation under the project has opened up access between poor neighborhoods and the economic centers of the cities, and has also provided opportunities for informal and small scale income generating activities such as roadside shops. Also, of the 415 housing loans made under the Guarantee Fund set up under the project, some have also reached the poor. However, the ICR does not provide any discussion of how improvements in urban services in general, such as privatization of solid waste management, have affected low income groups.
(iii) promote the active participation of the urban population in urban service development: Achieved. A total of 126 micro-projects have been completed in the two cities, with local community contribution of 11% of investment costs and local government contribution of 12%. Local participation units have been established in local administrations charged with identifying and implementing tertiary, demand-driven infrastructure in under-served settlements and local management committees have been created to organize local populations in selection of projects and to assure funds for maintenance - 70% of which continue to function. Units in charge of aggregating demand-driven projects have been incorporated into municipal technical services in the two cities and funding allocated in municipal budgets to cover operating costs. Finally, communities have continued to contribute to the counterpart fund accounts for projects they have identified - a number of which are waiting for government or donor contributions to commence implementation.
(iv) promote the sustainability of the urban environment: Achieved. The project has supported the government's decentralization program by supporting the preparation of decentralization laws, which were approved by the parliament in 1998 and which guides the decentralization process in the country. Also, the financial resources of both cities has improved substantially during the project period: between 1996 and 2004, local resources have increased on average by 23% per year in Ouagadougou, and by 11% per year in Bobo-Dioulasso. The project's contribution to improved local resource mobilization has mainly been through its support to the development of a residential tax database, with an interface to ONEA (water and sanitation public utility) and the electricity company to assure accuracy of the declaration. 70,000 households in Ouagadougou and 37,000 in Bobo-Dioulasso have so far been registered. Collection is improving, especially after the Directorate of Tax took on both the billing and collection activities - between 2004 and 2005, collection has doubled. Also an urban information system based on street addressing map and database has also been established to facilitate urban management. Other project achievements include the development and implementation of the Strategic Sanitation Action Plan in Ouagadougou, which has become the only city in Sub-Saharan Africa to have developed a sustainable arrangement for developing demand-based sanitation services; the depollution fund for industry, which has been established with financing from ONEA, to provides seed money for pollution control and pre-treatment facilities; the privatization of solid waste collection and transfer and landfill management. A major shortcoming however is the lack of trained personnel in the municipalities to manage the privatization contracts, which can undermine the sustainability of the urban environment in future. Also, while 1,296 persons have received training under the project, the ICR does not provide compelling evidence of how this has resulted in strengthened urban management capacity, particularly in terms of planning, programming and monitoring, at the city and government levels.

5. Efficiency:

Final project costs substantially exceeded appraisal targets which would have the effect of reducing the ERR. A supplemental credit of almost 50% of the original project costs was needed to complete project activities. While the ICR calculates that an average ERR of 33% was achieved for the road construction and rehabilitation component this only comprised about 28% of final project costs.
6. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

The design of the M&E framework was inadequate as it was process-oriented and only outputs were monitored. In addition neither baselines nor targets were identified at appraisal, making it difficult to assess the project's contribution to improving living conditions in these two cities.
7. Other (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Impacts--Positive & Negative):

All construction of new infrastructure was on unoccupied, publicly owned land and did not result in any involuntary resettlement.

8. Ratings:
ICR Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Institutional Dev.: 
HighSubstantialThe project has made a significant contribution towards decentralization and privatization of urban services. However, it is less clear whether the project has contributed to strengthened local government capacity to manage these changes for improved urban service delivery. ICR also raises concerns about the privatization process by noting that municipalities are yet to master their role as delegated contract managers.
Bank Perf.: 
Borrower Perf.: 
SatisfactorySatisfactoryThe delays due to administrative slowness due to lack of capacity are, however, noted.
Quality of ICR: 

- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- ICR rating values flagged with ' * ' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

9. Lessons:

The ICR identifies several lessons of this project experience:
  • Continuity is key to long term development impact. This project is the third urban intervention in Burkina Faso which built on lessons of previous projects. Continuity in Bank technical assistance and investment lending allowed a persistent policy dialogue and a consistent set of activities for improved service delivery and municipal development.
  • Reforming and improving local tax systems requires a long term commitment that can exceed the lifetime of the project. Using a step-wise approach and focusing on institutional strengthening is essential at the beginning - and goals at the outcome level can only be expected in increments over a longer period.
  • Privatization of urban services should be implemented by clearly defined steps and needs to be continuously supported. The project's relative success in privatizing solid waste management is due to a progressive approach and support to capacity building, production of specifications, contract management and enforcement of regulations. It also relied on local private contractors.
  • It is possible to generate demand for sanitation via information campaigns. The project was able to substantially expand the sanitation coverage by using information campaigns for demand generation, supported by an appropriate tariff structure.

10. Assessment Recommended?  Yes

          Why?  To better understand the impact of project supported improvements in urban service delivery, particularly decentralization and privatization of services, on the urban poor.

11. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is clearly written and provides a detailed reporting of project outputs as well as a good discussion of project performance. However, there are several shortcomings; the project cost breakdown provided in Annex 2 deviates substantially from the text (particularly regarding the component allocation of the supplemental credit) and there is no an explanation for the 130% increase in the cost of component 2. Also an English translation of the Borrower's comments would have improved the ICR.

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