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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Emergency Early Recovery Project

1. Project Data:   
ICR Review Date Posted:
Project Name:
Emergency Early Recovery Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 50.0  55.11
Congo Democratic Republic
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 50.0  55.11
Sector, Major Sect.:
Central government administration, Law and justice, Health, Other social services, Roads and highways,
Law and justice and public administration; Law and justice and public administration; Health and other social services; Health and other social services; Transportation
Cofinancing (US $M)
L/C Number:
Board Approval (FY)
Partners involved
Closing Date
01/31/2004 01/31/2005
Evaluator: Panel Reviewer: Division Manager: Division:  
Lei Liu
Roy Gilbert Alain A. Barbu IEGSG

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The objectives of the Project as stated in the Grant Agreement are to assist the Recipient in: (i) strengthening its institutional capacity, and (ii) addressing urgent needs and piloting implementation solutions for said needs.

No revisions were made to the project objectives.

b. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of Adjustment Loans):
Part A: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building
1. Building institutional capacity for Project implementation (US$9 million at appraisal, US$12.0 million actual cost). Activities included:
(a) setting up Bureau Central de Coordination (BCECO) for the Project implementation and management;
(b) capacity building programs and activities for selected staff in key ministries and public entities; and
(c) preparing civil and engineering works for the restoration of infrastructure.
2. Supporting good governance and macro-economic management in relation to the implementation of the Program's activities (US$12 million at appraisal, US$6.4 million actual cost):
(a) capacity building training for selected staff of the Recipient's administrative units in charge of fiscal' and customs' administration and the Central Bank;
(b) technical advisory services and acquisition of goods, including software and computer equipment, to strengthen capacity in the MOF for public resource management through 1)conducting a community survey to assess and analyze living and infrastructure conditions in the Recipient's territory; (ii) developing adequate frameworks for coordination of Donor assistance and public investment planning and preparing new procurement legislation.
(c) technical advisory services to promote private sector development through i) capacity building activities and public campaign for the implementation of the new mining law, reviewing the legal validity of previously signed investment agreements in the mining sector, and establishing an inter-ministerial committee to review land rights in relation to mining activities; ii) establishing a single investment registration window for prospective investors; iii) adopting a regulatory framework for improving the telecommunications system; and iv) assessing the legal system to improve adjudication of commercial disputes.
(d) to support the participatory process throughout the Recipient's territory through technical advisory services for the economic and policy reforms carried out by the Recipient.
Part B : Assistance to Urgent Living Conditions Needs and Implementation of Pilot Solutions
1. To implement the Recipient's HIV/AIDS program (US$8 million at appraisal, US$12 million actual cost). Specifically, (i) social mobilization activities to induce sexual behavioral changes, (ii) blood supply and blood transfusion security improvement activities, and (iii) screening and treatment activities for sexually transmitted diseases and opportunistic infections.
2. To establish a pilot financing mechanism for the development of community-driven development activities in rural areas (US$3 million at appraisal, US$5.4 million actual cost), specifically, (i) to rehabilitate local infrastructure such as, inter alia, rural roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, sanitation and water management systems, and (ii) basic social services.
3. To support the transport sector (US$15 million at appraisal, US$19.3 million actual cost). Specifically, (i) rehabilitation works on about 80 kilometers of the Matadi-Kinshasa road, (ii) technical assistance for: (A) institutional strengthening of the Recipient's road agency for carrying out the monitoring and supervision of the road rehabilitation work, (B) building capacity in selected institutions in the transport sector for the preparation of an investment program, and (C) to prepare a maintenance program and regulatory framework for the transport sector.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
The total project cost was financed by the IDA grant (SDR 40 million). The project was closed on 01/31/05, one year behind the schedule. The ICR mentioned that the project appraisal had underestimated the cost and time required to re-open the Matadi-Kinshasa road.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

The project objectives were and remain very relevant to the country's development strategies considering the very precarious situation prevailing in the country at the project inception. They supported the government's interim actions as identified, i.e., to seek macro-economic stability, to rebuild good governance, and to fucus on a list of priority activities. The objectives were in line with IDA's 2001 Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) to DRC, which aimed at stabilization, recovery and development in DRC. The project design addressed short-term capacity building needs of the client and the Bank (creating a donor assistance coordination agency) while at the same time tackled structural issues for long-term economic stability and development. The urgent needs assistance component served both as a demonstration of the Bank's quick response to the country and a tester of the country's operational environment.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) :

Objective 1: Institutional strengthening and capacity building. Rating: substantial. BCECO, a Congolese institution under the Ministry of Finance but with its own administrative and financial autonomy, was created and has been successfully managing close to $1 billion of donor assistance. Various studies and audits on SOEs, commercial banks, financial sector and mining sector were conducted and became the backbone of the subsequent Bank assistance to DRC, including the Economic Recovery Credit (ERC), the Emergency MultiSector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (EMRRP), and the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (PSDCP). A series of training as well as equipment were provided to key ministries and agencies. Institutions were established as a result of the project, such as the Duty and Taxes Office (OFIDA) and the mining register, and they significantly contributed to the improved governance capacity in DRC. The ICR tells that international audits have fully endorsed BCECO accounts.
However, by the end of the project, the adoption of a new procurement legislation was still not realized as planned.
Objective 2: assistance to urgent living conditions needs and implementation of pilot solutions. Rating: substantial. The HIV/AIDS activities under this component were very successful. The social marketing of condoms subcomponent achieved more than it planned to do, with both the sales and distribution of condoms significantly exceeding targets specified in Technical Annex and the contract signed with the partner institution. The project supported 322 blood transfusion structures across the country, with 100% of quality blood transferring (against the target of 85%), the proportion of voluntary blood donation across the country increased substantially. The goals for Diagnostic and Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases subcomponent were also far exceeded (more than 276,000 persons treated against a target of 900, among others). The Matadi - Kinshasa Road was successfully rehabilitated and the traffic between Matadi and Kinshasa improved tremendously, bringing supply and economic recovery to the capital city of Kinshasa. Kiyimbi bridge, which was not originally planned in the project and connects two densely inhabited areas of Kinshasa, was reconstructed as opportunity allowed, expediting traffic as well economic activities.

5. Efficiency:

The economic rate of return and financial rate of return of project investments were not estimated in the ICR and in the Technical Annex, due to the emergency recovery nature of this project. It is difficult to collect good data to judge the cost-effectiveness of this kind of project.
6. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

The ICR includes an annex on key performance indicators/log frame matrix which showed to what extent the planned activities under each component were achieved. Most of these indicators are output-oriented instead of outcome-oriented, probably due to the emergency nature of the project. However, the HIV/AIDS subcomponent of the project did have a monitoring and evaluation element incorporated. It appeared that data were collected during the implementation and an outcome indicators table was presented for the HIV/AIDS subcomponent.
7. Other (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Impacts--Positive & Negative):


8. Ratings:
ICR Review
Reason for Disagreement/Comments
Institutional Dev.: 
Bank Perf.: 
Borrower Perf.: 
Highly SatisfactorySatisfactoryThe ICR assessment/data points to a satisfactory borrower performance in a very challenging environment (that prevented the outstanding performance needed for a highly satisfactory rating).
Quality of ICR: 

- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- ICR rating values flagged with ' * ' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

9. Lessons:

1. Early involvement of the Bank in a post-conflict situation where risks have been carefully measured can bring significant benefits for the Bank and its clients in terms of re-engaging the post-conflict country and contributing to the peace-keeping process. A flexible yet programmatic approach works very well in this kind of situation as it allows the project to seize opportunities when they arise while at the same time effectively mitigate risks when uncertainties are high.

2. A ring-fenced approach has both its positive and negative effects. In the context of this project, it reduced the risks of fund misuses and leakages while allowed a quick disbursement. On the negative side, it allowed less competencies transfer towards the line ministries and agencies involved in the project, therefore undermining the capacity building goals the project intended to achieve.
3. A locally-based TTL expedites communications with clients and greatly contributes to a smooth project implementation, this is especially true in a context such as DRC.

10. Assessment Recommended?  Yes

          Why?  To verify the ratings and to gain valuable lessons learned for future post-conflict projects.

11. Comments on Quality of ICR:

Overall the ICR is of satisfactory quality. The author is candid on the project achievements and on the shortcomings (for example, the ICR mentioned that the project design put the focus of capacity building on BCECO rather than on the various line ministries, which might have undermined the sustainability of the desired institutional development).

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