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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Transport and Infrastructure Project


  
1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
02/04/2005   
PROJ ID:
P000435
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Transport and Infrastructure Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 78.4  88.5
Country:
Cape Verde
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 12.5  17.4
Sector, Major Sect.:
Central government administration, Roads & highways, Ports waterways and shipping,
Law and justice and public administration; Transportation; Transportation
Cofinancing (US $M)
 51.5  61.3
L/C Number:
C2466      
   
Board Approval (FY)
  93
Partners involved
Federal Republic of Germany, Kingdom of the Netherlands, African Development Fund, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, OPEC 
Closing Date
06/30/1998 06/30/2004
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Peter Nigel Freeman
Roy Gilbert Alain A. Barbu OEDSG

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
a) To promote international competitiveness through port modernization, reorganization of the shipping industry and development of offshore information industries; (note that the information industries portion was dropped at the mid-term review due to unforeseen global technological changes. As this was not done formally by amending the Development Credit Agreement it is still considered part of the objectives to be evaluated by OED).

b) To foster national economic integration by streamlining transport sector investment planning and achieving a more balanced and cost effective allocation of resources;
c) To prevent further erosion of the capital stock in the road network by setting up a road maintenance organization;
d) To support the promotion of the local contracting industry through the execution of a four year road maintenance program;
e) To promote economic growth and alleviate poverty in Fogo Island through rehabilitation of its only port; and
f) A longer term objective was to build capacity in the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

b. Components
a) Port Investments; including port modernization and crane procurement. (Appraisal: US$30m; Actual: 42.8m);
b) Reorganization of shipping; a framework for private sector led modernization including technical assistance and promotional activities. (Appraisal: US$0.7m; Actual: 1.1m);
c) Highway sector improvements; private sector works (including spot improvements and periodic maintenance) execution and supervision. (Appraisal: US$33.3m; Actual: 38.4m);
d) Teleport development; legislation and pre-investment activities. (Appraisal: US$0.4m; Actual: 0.2m); and,
e) Preparation facility; consulting services. (Appraisal: US$ 1.2m; Actual: 0.4m).

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
An IDA supplementary credit of US$5 million was approved by the Board on January 3, 2001 to finance the rehabilitation of a section of the Santiago Island ring road. This was agreed after the government had to divert funds intended for this component to essential emergency rehabilitation elsewhere. The entire project took no less than six years longer than expected to reach completion, involving four time extensions. This was partly due to an overly optimistic assessment of government capacity to tackle a program of this magnitude in the time frame envisaged, but also to specific problems with the contract of the supervision consultant and the bankruptcy of an appointed contractor. Further reasons for the overall delays included the addition of some new items in the first years of implementation, (albeit with the Bank's consent) and unforeseen climatic conditions leading to the necessity for emergency rehabilitation which impacted the availability of counterpart funding from the government's side.


3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

International Competitiveness (Substantially achieved). Five ports were modernized for both international shipping and inter-island transport, human capacity was improved and supporting roads rehabilitated. New regulations and maritime legislation were also introduced to liberalize overseas shipping. No indicators were devised to measure the change in competitiveness, however. At the least, trade statistics before and after could have been provided. Port management improvements were sought initially through a contract-plan between the National Port Authority (ENAPOR) and the Government. This was not successful. By the end of the project, however, private participation in port operations had been accepted in principle, although this had yet to be implemented. At mid term review the offshore information industries portion was dropped because it would not have the intended outcome due to recent technological changes.

National Integration: (Achieved). An action plan to reorganize shipping was implemented. Government involvement in international shipping was stopped and the private sector took over this function. Roll-on, roll off facilities now provided at the inter-island ports have improved freight handling. By the end of the project inter-island shipping was apparently being run more efficiently by the private sector, although there are no measures of costs or productivity to support this claim. Roads and port facilities were also improved and a master plan for construction and maintenance of the road network accepted.
Road Maintenance Organization: (Substantially achieved). A new Road Institute was established to manage the road network. A Road Fund has also been set up, but is inadequately resourced. There is, however, a proposed follow-on project to ensure sufficient fees are collected from users. Until this happens the adequacy of road maintenance will remain problematical.
Development of a Local Contracting Industry through a Four Year Road Maintenance Program: (Achieved). Private contractors and "length men" (individuals responsible for maintaining a local stretch of road) now carry out most road construction, rehabilitation and maintenance. Local contractor capability has been substantially increased; the number of local contractors was only 8 in 1991, but had increased to 73 by 2004.
Improvement of economy of Fogo Island through port rehabilitation: (Achieved). Cargo handling has increased by 50% since the beginning of the project. This obviously improved the economy, but the presumption that this assisted in poverty alleviation, while probably true is unsupported by hard evidence.
Build Capacity in the Ministry of Transport & Communications (MoT): (Achieved). A separate planning unit was established and eventually integrated back into the MoT. Greater capacity was also established in both the Road Institute and ENAPOR, but this is not quantified. The Road code was revised and a database of licences and titles created; maritime legislation was also brought up-to-date.


4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

Although not originally foreseen, the modernization of Sao Pedro Airport, on the island of Sao Vicente, has been successfully implemented on lines recommended by IDA;
  • The existence of a modern port on each island has improved the regularity of inter-island connections and has provided for better planning of activities in the national shipping sector.

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

The Road Fund created is insufficiently resourced; it should have received 50% of the fuel levy from the outset, but on p15 of the ICR there is an indication that this is only now being implemented;
  • Private participation in port operations has yet to be implemented;
  • The project duration, complexity and especially resource needs were inadequately assessed at appraisal, while indicators to measure performance were not put in place and risk assessment was inadequate.
  • 6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
    Outcome:
    SatisfactorySatisfactory
    Institutional Dev.:
    SubstantialSubstantial
    Sustainability:
    LikelyLikely
    Bank Performance:
    SatisfactorySatisfactory
    Borrower Perf.:
    SatisfactorySatisfactory
    Quality of ICR:
    Satisfactory

    7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

    A long period of project implementation can be beneficial when sector policy development has to be internalized and implemented.
    • When there are frequent changes in Bank team leadership, the quality of the transition (in terms of briefings and accurate file records) from one leader to the next becomes especially critical.
    • Where the project objectives are concerned with improving competitiveness or building capacity, it is essential to enure that progress can be measured through appropriate indicators.

    8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

              Why?  To ascertain whether private participation in port operations was successfully implemented and whether the road fund was strengthened with additional user fee income to enable it to operate on a commercial basis.

    9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

    In general this ICR is satisfactory, but marginally so. It would have been substantially improved with a more careful explanation of certain key aspects. For example, regarding cost structure, some data in Table 4, Annex 3 is not consistent with the data reported in the text. Moreover, surprisingly little explanation is provided for the six year project delay, which is one of the longest delays in Bank records. From date of effectiveness to closing took 11 years! There is also a reference on p3 of the ICR to "unforeseen climatic conditions necessitating emergency rehabilitation" - but this is not further elaborated upon in the report. While the physical output indicators are well covered, the are no indicators for measuring improvements in competitiveness, capacity, poverty alleviation or productivity.

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