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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Saint Lucia Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Program


  
1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
05/04/2004   
PROJ ID:
P070430
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Saint Lucia Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Program
Project Costs(US $M)
 7.68  7.68
Country:
St. Lucia
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 6.04  6.04
Sector, Major Sect.:
Central government administration, Other social services, Power, General transportation sector, General water/sanitation/flood protection sector,
Law and justice and public administration; Health and other social services; Energy and mining; Transportation; Water sanitation and flood protection
Cofinancing (US $M)
 0  0
L/C Number:
C3151; L4419      
   
Board Approval (FY)
  99
Partners involved
 
Closing Date
01/31/2002 10/31/2003
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Ronald S. Parker
John R. Heath Alain A. Barbu OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
This project was part of the first phase of an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) operation in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent, and the Grenadines. The program aimed to support the physical and institutional efforts of the five member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to strengthen disaster recovery capacity and emergency preparedness management. The development objectives of the project in St. Lucia were: 1) To strengthen key economic and social infrastructure and facilities with the aim of minimizing damage caused by future natural disasters and reducing the disruption of economic activity in the event of disaster emergencies (pre-disaster works); 2) To reconstruct and rehabilitate key social and economic infrastructure following disasters to allow quick recovery and minimize disruption of economic activity (post-disaster works); and, 3) To strengthen the country’s institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies in an efficient and effective manner.

b. Components
There were six components (appraisal cost estimates in parentheses): 1. Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works (US$ 5.94 million). Strengthen public infrastructure and retrofit public buildings to be used as shelters

2. Strengthening the Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP [US$ 0.86 million]). Technical assistance for mobilizing support from businesses and industries, emergency planning and mitigation activities, emergency communications system, purchase of disaster equipment and stocks of emergency supplies, and support for ODP management.
3. Strengthening the Early Warning System (US$ 0.44 million) of the National Meteorological Service (NMS): Equipment purchase, technical assistance, training in meteorology and related subjects, and assistance with equipment maintenance.
4. Community Based Disaster Management (US$ 0.11 million). The existing Disaster Committees were to be provided training and emergency equipment, and supplies to be stored in a safe place.
5. Institution Building (US$ 0.24 million). An assessment of public buildings to develop mitigation/retrofitting measures and/or an insurance strategy to minimize risk at a reasonable cost. Review existing building codes and land use planning. Recommend improvements in the insurance sector. Support for the preparation of a hazard and vulnerability map for St. Lucia for disaster preparedness and mitigation purposes. Pursue adoption of a national building code and its effective enforcement.
6. Project Management (US$ 0.61 million) Technical assistance, office equipment, workshops and audits.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
The participating nations had a low level of preparedness, a lack of identified mitigating measures and a limited disaster response capability. As a result, the Bank opted to set up a regional facility to address disaster risks rather than a series of emergency operations with individual countries.The first phase of the program (APL1) was to support the immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure in St. Kitts and Nevis and disaster mitigation works and institutional strengthening in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and Dominica. The second phase (APL2) was to support these same activities in Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. APL3 was to focus on additional physical investments identified through hazard mapping analysis, and was to provide further long term institutional strengthening. Funding for this phase was eventually allocated to APL2. As a result APL3 did not materialize as originally expected. APL4 was to provide contingency funding for any eligible OECS member in case of a severe natural disaster during the six year program period. Funding for this phase remains available until the completion of APL2, expected for January 31, 2006.


3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

Objective 1, Strengthening Key Economic Infrastructure: Key economic and social infrastructure and facilities were strengthened to minimize damage and economic disruption from future natural disasters. There were important flood control, bridge strengthening, and flood mitigation works; and schools were retrofitted as emergency shelters. A large amount of emergency equipment is now available for use in future disasters.
Objective 2, Reconstruction/Rehabilitation: Not achieved. The reason this project is rated satisfactory in spite of having an objective which was not achieved, is that the objective is not relevant. This is best explained by its history: the project was originally approved as a multi-country APL. When this approach proved administratively unworkable, and each country began to operate independently, the St. Lucia project inherited an objective that was originally intended to apply the St. Kitts and Nevis (which had recently been devastated by Hurricane Georges). Since this hurricane had not caused significant damage in St. Lucia, It makes no sense to downgrade this project for not doing reconstruction that was not needed in the first place.
Objective 3: Strengthen Institutional Capacity: The country’s institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies were strengthened. A seven member National Hazard Mitigation Council (NHMC) was established and a Disaster Preparedness and Response Act was passed in 2000. Other initiatives included: (i) revision of the National Disaster Emergency Management Plan; (ii) strengthening the liaison with the private sector to implement the Plan; (iii) proposing a National Building Code and preparing an action plan and legislation for implementation; (iv) strengthening a hazard analysis and vulnerability mapping group; (v) implementing new procedures at the National Meteorological Service; (vi) and strengthening the preparedness of communities through NEMO-sponsored training.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

A National Emergency Management Advisory Committee (NEMAC) has been created with a wide representation (community organizations, professional associations, and business/industry representatives). The National Disaster Emergency Plan was developed in parallel with the private sector, and, as a result, a private sector disaster emergency plan was also produced. An inventory of public buildings was completed, providing a basis for the analysis of the vulnerabilities of government assets, which could be incorporated in a possible follow-up project. Building codes have been developed and public consultations held.

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

Although this project was processed as an emergency loan, there was no immediate emergency situation in St. Lucia at the time of preparation, and the appropriateness of using the ERL instrument was not justified. The Project Coordinating Unit was very slow to begin functioning which led to procurement and disbursement delays. Certain flood prevention works (bridge construction, drainage, embankment works) were not undertaken after the feasibility study and environmental assessment because of their high cost--an indication that some components of the original project were overly ambitious and costly. The EIA and designs for a drainage scheme for the Airport Flood Protection Works were delayed. Only 15 emergency and sanitary facilities were installed in schools (reduced from the appraisal estimate of 23).

6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Institutional Dev.:
SubstantialSubstantial
Sustainability:
LikelyLikely
Bank Performance:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Borrower Perf.:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Quality of ICR:
Satisfactory

7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

1. Processing loans and/or credits for different (in this case, OECS) countries as separate projects, even if they are part of a broader program, may be preferable to integrating them into one horizontal APL.
2. Reconstruction components often require careful assessment and a longer-term effort that generally extends the implementation period beyond the normal three years stipulated for Bank-assisted emergency operations (ERLs). Since there was no emergency at the time in St. Lucia, the project could have been planned more deliberately as a standard investment loan, which would have enabled better preparation of procurement and institutional arrangements.
3. The implementation capacity of post-disaster Project Coordinating Units is slow to develop in most cases. In projects lacking a critical mass of work it is difficult for governments to allocate enough of their scarce qualified manpower to such units.
4. TORs for consulting engineers need to specify government budget constraints to avoid over-designed infrastructure that will be unaffordable and therefore impossible to implement.
5. Gabion works for slope stabilization and riverbank protection proved to be an effective, easy and labor-intensive way to implement mitigation works.

8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

          Why?  The OECS program is of great interest to the ongoing OED Natural Disaster and Emergency Recovery study. PPARs on the component projects would lead to a small island states case study that would inform the broader review of Bank experience.

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is of satisfactory quality overall. It does a nice job of balancing lesson learning with accountability. The report would have benefited from a more explicit tying of project results to the original objectives, however.

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