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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Post Conflict Soc Re


  
1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
09/17/2003   
PROJ ID:
P045644
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Post Conflict Soc Re
Project Costs(US $M)
 5.9  4.7
Country:
Angola
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 5  4.7
Sector, Major Sect.:
General agriculture fishing and forestry sector, Sub-national government administration, General education sector, Other social services, General water/sanitation/flood protection sector,
Agriculture fishing and forestry; Law and justice and public administration; Education; Health and other social services; Water sanitation and flood protection
Cofinancing (US $M)
 0  0
L/C Number:
C3059; CQ003      
   
Board Approval (FY)
  98
Partners involved
None 
Closing Date
09/30/2001 01/30/2003
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Kavita Mathur
Roy Gilbert Alain A. Barbu OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The overall objective of the project was to test, in a limited number of target areas, a program to support war-affected rural communities in their efforts to reintegrate displaced persons and revitalize community-level economic and social activities.

The project also aimed at strengthening the Borrower's capacity to plan and implement a population reintegration support strategy (see component (i) below).

b. Components
The project consisted of two components:
(i) Technical assistance to support the formulation of a Reintegration Strategy (actual cost US$ 0.10 million). This would provide a comprehensive and consistent framework across sectors and provinces for planning and implementing the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of all war-affected segments of the population. The formulation of the Strategy was expected to be based on needs assessments in the provinces most affected by the war, a social analysis of the most affected populations, an evaluation of ongoing reintegration activities for demobilized combatants, and an inventory of external assistance to reintegration activities.

(ii) Municipio Recovery Program (MRP) and Technical Assistance and operating costs of the Post Conflict Social Recovery Project Unit (PCSRPU) (actual cost US$ 5.1 million). This component would test an approach and a delivery mechanism to provide reintegration support to communities affected by the war. Under this component, grants would be provided to reestablish household livelihood and to rehabilitate (to minimum standards) basic community social and economic infrastructure (eg. roads, water, schools, health posts, rural markets, irrigation works). The MRP would test the impact and effectiveness of providing communities with an integrated package of support within a targeted area, as opposed to project by project approach. The delivery mechanism to be tested entailed the use of NGOs as Implementing Organizations (IOs) to help communities design, sequence and implement MRP activities.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
The project closed sixteen months after the original closing date for the following reasons: (a) suspension of the project during the first nine months of 1999 due to renewed violence, and (b) delays in the conclusion of some studies for the Reintegeration Strategy.


3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project piloted a program to support the reintegration of war-affected rural communities and revitalization of communities with modest results. In Caala (Huambo province), 13,402 families were resettled to their village of origin. In Chongoroi (Benguela province), the project provided assistance to 60% of the targeted families in the areas of displacement. However, none of the families were resettled. In Guango Alto, 336 out of 3,000 families were resettled to a temporary resettlement site. The project assisted in construction of two schools and provision of 62 waterposts. Seedbanks and livestock credit were established. According to the ICR, about 18,579 hectares are being cultivated.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

A comprehensive strategy for supporting the reintegration of displaced people was developed. An implementation plan for the strategy was also prepared. However, it is unclear when it will be funded.
  • Resettlement costs for three different population sizes was developed for future operations as a part of the Government Strategy.

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

Unsatisfactory quality at entry resulting from lack of clarity regarding whether the project should support communities in their area of origin or the areas of dislocation or temporary resettlement sites. In Huambo, the project supported the communities in their areas of origin. However, in the other provinces the project created disincentives to resettlement by supporting communities in areas of dislocation (Benguela) and temporary resettlement sites (Kwanza Norte Province).
  • Even though hostilities had resumed by the time the project was taken to the Board, insufficient mitigation measures were adopted.
  • Capacity building activities in pilot municipalities were implemented in an ad hoc and uncoordinated manner.
  • The three implementing agencies did not use consistent systems for collecting and submitting data for monitoring and evaluation in spite of the detailed indicators listed in a Supplemental Letter to the Development Credit Agreement and the PAD's own mention (page 8) that M&E would be a critical feature of the success of a LIL.
  • 6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
    Outcome:
    SatisfactoryModerately Unsatisfactory OED rates outcome as moderately unsatisfactory when the project is expected to achieve its relevant objectives but with major shortcomings. The shortcomings noted in section 5 are major.
    Institutional Dev.:
    ModestModest
    Sustainability:
    LikelyNon-evaluableSustainability is rated as non-evaluable at this stage as some factors support a likely rating and others support an unlikely rating and there is not enough evidence to make a conclusive judgement.
    Bank Performance:
    SatisfactoryUnsatisfactoryUnsatisfactory quality at entry (see section 5 above). Successive Task Managers took different and inconsistent approaches. Furthermore, at US$ 1.5 million, the Bank staff costs were very high, equivalent to 32% of the total project cost.
    Borrower Perf.:
    SatisfactorySatisfactory
    Quality of ICR:
    Satisfactory

    7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

    Resettlement is a gradual process. The project experience shows that initially male members would commute back and forth between their areas of origin and areas of dislocation. Once the basis of families “livelihood” is established, the entire family would move.
    • The primary need identified by resettling families is food security. While the goal is for communities to attain food security through community-based agricultural production, it is crucial that returning families have access to adequate food rations as they await the harvest of their first crop.
    • Emphasis needs to be placed on the special needs of the very large number of female-headed households and orphaned children.
    • Close coordination is required with other externally supported initiatives and line ministries to improve access to health, education and other basic services.
    • The roles and responsibilities of NGOs, communities and local governments need to be clearly defined and fostered through meaningful capacity building, close collaboration among actors, and mentoring. Careful screening of NGOs is crucial to ensure cost effective project implementation. It may be more effective to contract the services of several NGOs in their particular areas of specialization, rather than choosing a single NGO per municipality. In addition, up-front training is required to ensure that implementing NGOs have a clear understanding of financial management and reporting requirements to ensure timely disbursement.

    8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

              Why?  To feed into OED's post conflict update study.

    9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

    The quality of the ICR is satisfactory. There is some inconsistency in the total cost figures presented in Annex 2. At appraisal the Government commitment was estimated at US$ 0.5 million and beneficiary. The ICR assessment would have been made more complete if it had fully reported outcomes according to the agreed performance indicators or at least indicated why data was not available.

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