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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Asmp


  
1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
05/30/2002   
PROJ ID:
P002801
Appraisal
Actual
Project Name:
Asmp
Project Costs(US $M)
 25.7  21.0
Country:
Tanzania
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 24.5  20.4
Sector, Major Sect.:
Agency Reform,
Agriculture
Cofinancing (US $M)
   
L/C Number:
C2537      
   
Board Approval (FY)
  94
Partners involved
 
Closing Date
06/30/1999 06/30/2001
         
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
John English
Ridley Nelson Alain A. Barbu OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The primary objective of the project was to strengthen the institutional capacity to formulate and implement the Government's agricultural development policies, strategies and programs.

b. Components
The project had three components:

  • rationalization of government functions in the agricultural sector and strengthening of management systems of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) (US$ 7.9 million);
  • strengthening of institutional capacity to formulate and implement agricultural policies (US$ 7.1 million); and
  • improvement of the agricultural information systems and services required to facilitate an effective functioning of the Government and the private sector in a market oriented economy (US$ 10.7 million).

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
The appraisal cost estimate was US$ 27.2 million. At completion expenditure was US$ 21.04 million, although credit closing had been delayed for two years. The reasons for the reduced expenditures were the declining value of the Tanzanian Shilling, the high value of the SDR against the dollar during implementation, and the increased use of in-country and in-service training, as opposed to overseas training..


3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The overall objective of the project has been achieved. The MOA has restructured itself around three major tasks - policy formulation and planning; development and provision of services in partnership with the private sector; and regulation and inspection. This has entailed the divestiture of many agricultural parastatals, spinning off services of a commercial nature to the private sector, and staff reduction within MOA.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

The following were the outcomes of the three components: 1. Rationalization-
  • the priority functions of the MOA were defined and non-core functions slotted for privatization or establishment of joint undertakings;
  • based on this division, a new organizational structure for MOA was derived and approved in January, 1998 by the Civil Service department;
  • a staff inventory was completed and a staffing plan drawn up. On this basis, 7800 staff were retrenched and 7,906 redeployed to the Regional Administration and local government;
  • the design and implementation of improved internal operating systems for MOA and an MIS were completed;
  • guidelines to facilitate the formation of joint ventures and cost sharing mechanisms for some of the activities identified for joint ventures were developed and implemented;
  • the Public Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) was assisted in determining the most suitable divestiture strategies by preparation of 177 profiles of parastatals for divestiture; and
  • the spinning-off of about 85% of the 48 identified non-core activities was completed.

2. Strengthening institutional capacity: The major efforts were in training and enhancing activities in policy analysis/formulation:
  • A total of 155 staff undertook inservice training for a total of 400 staff weeks. Areas covered included; research methodology and techniques of report writing; commodity policy review; agricultural policy planning; and macro-policy analysis. 23 staff undertook long-term overseas training, of whomm 18 remained with MOA at completion, and 53 staff received short-term overseas training, 14 of whom have now left MOA.
  • A total of 16 policy and strategic studies were prepared, such as an Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and studies on agricultural taxation, livestock development, the rationalization of the regulatory functions of MOA, and cooperative development policy. These efforts were supported by a number of studies undertaken as part of special training assignm,ents.

3. Agricultural information systems. A working system for agricultural data collection, processing and dissemination to end-users in the public and private sectors was established. During the project a national sample survey was undertaken in 1994/95, with annual follow up surveys. A rapid appraisal survey approach was developed and implemented in 1999/2000. This enabled costs to be cut by about 80%. In the course of these activities an effective collaborative relationship with the National Bureau of Statistics was established.
Market information and crop monitoring activities have also been strengthened. Information on food commodities and prices is collected and released regularly, and the data collection capacity of the Early Warning System under MOA has been improved.

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

No significant shortcomings are reported in the ICR (see section 9).

6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
Outcome:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Institutional Dev.:
SubstantialSubstantial
Sustainability:
LikelyLikely
Bank Performance:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Borrower Perf.:
SatisfactorySatisfactory
Quality of ICR:
Satisfactory

7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

1. Overarching national reforms are likely to be fundamental to sector reforms. For example, in this case, delay in the implementation of a national civil service reform delayed the implementation of reforms formulated under the project, while the Government's adoption of its Decentralization Program significantly helped the restructuring of MOA.
2. A simple project design with well focussed objectives, relatively few components and with implementation arrangements that define the role of each party is likely to enjoy smooth implementation experience and satisfactory performance.
3. The reforming agency should heve some incentive to perform. In this case savings made by the ministry were not ploughed back into its operations and this dampened enthusiasm.

8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

          Why?   There are gaps in the coverage of the ICR that could be covered by an audit (see Section 9).


The country has been relatively underaudited and the subsector has also not been the object of recent OED attention.


9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is only marginally satisfactory.
  • The overall discussion of the measures taken within MOA is clear and adequately supported. However, there is no discussion of the results outside of the ministry structure, or from the perspective of those it was intended to benefit. For example, the results for the hived-off activities are not discussed. Have those activities improved, stayed the same or collapsed? Are farmers getting better prices or services as a result of the reforms? If the services previously provided by the parastatals etc. have collapsed after being hived off, then this outcome might raise major questions about the efficacy of the overall effort.
  • The report would also have been greatly strengthened if it had included a small beneficiary assessment designed to elicit the views of a sample of the clients of the ministry or of the hived-off activities. This could have been built into the ICR at minimal cost through the use of a local university or other research group.
  • A major problem is that the report needs editing. On the first page about 20 lines are repeated, there are errors in tables, and numerous cases where the text is difficult to read because of missing or extraneous words and other errors.

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