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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - TA For Agriculture

1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
Project Name:
TA For Agriculture
Project Costs(US $M)
 13.31  12.32
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 6.60  5.90
Sector, Major Sect.:
Irrigation & Drainage,
Cofinancing (US $M)
 6.05  6.05
L/C Number:
Board Approval (FY)
Partners involved
Closing Date
06/30/1999 12/31/2000
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Nalini B. Kumar
Roy Gilbert Alain A. Barbu OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The project was to assist the Government of Jordan in the implementation of agricultural policy adjustments and to improve services to farmers and livestock producers. It was originally a part of a hybrid operation called the agricultural sector adjustment loan (ASAL). However, it was separated from that loan in 1993 and treated as a parallel operation that would support the ASAL reforms.

b. Components
Project objectives remained unchanged over the life of the project though the technical assistance and training content of the project was reduced to a critical minimum because of government unwillingness to borrow for these. The revised project components were:

(a) Water Measurement and Management in the Jordan Valley and Support for Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) (US $ 6 million, 52.63 % of total );
(b) Groundwater Basin Monitoring and Control and Support for Water Authority of Jordan (US 3.6 million, 31.57 % of total);
(c) Capacity Building for Agricultural Research (US $ 0.9 million, 7.89 % of total);
(d) Technical support for Agricultural Extension (US $ 0.2 million, 1.75 % of total);
(e) Technical support for the Ministry of Agriculture in Monitoring and Evaluation of the impacts of the adjustment program (US $ 0.7 million, 6.14 % of total).

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
As appraised total project cost was US $ 13.31 million of which the Bank share was US $ 6.60 million, GTZ US $ 2.20 million, KfW US $ 3.08 million and Government US $ 1.43 million. The actual cost and financing data is not available in the ICR and there are no reasons given for why it was not made available.The project was extended twice from its original closing date of June 30, 1999 and closed on December 31, 2000.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project was largely successful in achieving its objectives. Water Measurement improved in the Jordan Valley (i.e. Northeast Ghor, 18km Extension and Zarqa Triangle). The project also contributed towards significantly improving conveyance efficiency in the Jordan Valley. Support to the Basin Protection Units and metering of wells helped improve groundwater management. Agricultural research was strengthened with the establishment of MIS, improved information sharing and training of staff. An agricultural extension strategy was prepared and staff were trained. However, only a start was made towards improving monitoring and evaluation capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

(i) Rehabilitation of the farm irrigation turn-outs in three areas of the Jordan Valley helped reduce unaccounted and unauthorized water losses and improved water distribution efficiency. Installation of the farm turn-outs within each farmer's farm helped ensure accountability and sustainability;
(ii) Improved groundwater monitoring and control;
(iii) Establishment of a Management Information System linking 6 regional agricultural centers to the National Center for Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer considerably strengthened information sharing in research;
(iv) A national extension policy and strategy was formulated and extension methodologies were piloted at the community level in two project areas;

5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

The performance of the Monitoring and Evaluation component was weak.

6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
Institutional Dev.:
Bank Performance:
Borrower Perf.:
Quality of ICR:

7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

From the ICR:(i) Government internal clearance requirements for amounts below the prior review threshold (agreed with the Bank) can cause unnecessary procurement delays slowing down project implementation. Under the project, several off-the-shelf small equipment procurements which were not subject to prior-review were routinely cleared with the Government and sent to IBRD for no-objection, resulting in needless delays and transactions costs. Largely because of these delays, the project closing date had to be extended twice. (ii) Separating investment projects from adjustment operations rather than going for a hybrid, as originally envisaged, has advantages because it allows one operation not to hold up the other, given that investment operations have generally longer implementation time horizons.
From OED: The short-run impact of adjustment reforms is often negative on the poor. Intermediate safety net measures may be required to make the transition process less painful to them.

8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

          Why?  (i) Further examination of the project could provide interesting lessons on how monitoring and evaluation can track the effects of adjustment on vulnerable farming systems and the way research and extension capacity in the government can be strengthened to support poor farmers affected by adjustment. (ii) The audit could be a useful input for the review of structural adjustments ongoing in OED.

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is satisfactory although the supervision data could have been presented more clearly.

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