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Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - Integrated Roads Project

1. Project Data:   
ES Date Posted:
Project Name:
Integrated Roads Project
Project Costs(US $M)
 871.1  868.0
Loan/Credit (US $M)
 180.4  166.7
Sector, Major Sect.:
Cofinancing (US $M)
 576.3  641.3
L/C Number:
Board Approval (FY)
Partners involved
UNDP, AfDF, EEC, DANIDA, Germany, Italy, FINNIDA, ODA(UK), NORAD, USAID, The Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Saudi Fund, Kuwait Fund 
Closing Date
06/30/1998 06/30/1999
Prepared by: Reviewed by: Group Manager: Group:  
Binyam Reja
Ridley Nelson Ridley Nelson OEDST

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives
The main objectives of the First Integrated Roads Project (IRP-I) as outlined in the SAR are to strengthen the capability of the Ministry of Communication and Works (MCW) to manage road maintenance programs, and to execute, with financing from several donors, an integrated package of road rehabilitation and upgrading investment program.

b. Components
The project comprised the following components:

  1. Institutional support to strengthen road management capacity of the MCW, Regional Engineer's Office, training institutes and private sector contracting industry;
  2. Rehabilitation and improvement program of about 4,600 km of trunk roads, 3000 km of regional roads in agriculturally productive areas, and other related structures and bridges;
  3. Road maintenance support to MCW including establishment of privately operated plant pools and development of local construction capacity to undertake road works; and
  4. Management assistance to Air Tanzania Corporation and the National Transport Corporation.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates
The project was approved in May 31, 1990, and closed in June 30, 1999, a year later than originally scheduled.

  • The total cost of the project at completion was US$868 million versus US$871 million estimated at appraisal.
  • The project was parallel financed by 16 donors including IDA.
  • The IDA credit amount was US$166.7 million at completion versus US$180.4 at appraisal.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

Physical Achievements
  • The project substantially failed to achieve its objective to improve the conditions of the road network.
  • By 1999, the share of roads in good condition increased only by 4 percentage points to 30% of the road network, compared to the appraisal targets to bring 60% and 80% of the road network to good condition by respectively mid-1996 and mid-2000.
  • About 683 km (versus 910 km) of gravel roads were constructed with cost overruns ranging between 65% and 244%.
  • Of the 683 km of gravel roads constructed, 300 km of roads were lost and 266 km of roads deteriorated within the first 13 months of construction.
  • Six out of the seven contract packages for the Emergency Works for Dar es Salaam Roads were done. Poor surveys and designs and frequent changes in scope of works resulted in poor quality of work and cost overruns. Some of the roads have disintegrated. Institutional Development Achievements
    • Modest progress was done towards achieving the institutional development objectives.
    • A modest private sector construction industry has been created.
    • Significant number of high level manpower has been trained at home and abroad.
    • Road maintenance administration has been decentralized to 20 regions.
    • A Road Fund was established and can potentially provide 70% of the required road maintenance funding
    • The National Road Agency (TANROADS) is expected to be established in July 2000 and fully operational by June 2002.
    • The capacity to manage projects and administer contracts remains deficient.

  • 4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

    The significant outcomes of this project are the development of the private contracting industry, and the training of skilled manpower.

    5. Significant Shortcomings (include non-compliance with safeguard features):

    The major shortcomings of the project include:
  • Poor design and survey of civil works
  • Cost overruns and poor quality of work
  • Corrupt practices of the implementing agency
  • Poor performance and conflict of interest in the role of the Resident Engineer
  • Poor financial management procedures
  • Gross violations of IDA's procurement guidelines
  • Deficient donor coordination
  • 6. Ratings:ICROED ReviewReason for Disagreement/Comments
    UnsatisfactoryHighly Unsatisfactory
        • The project substantially failed to achieve its major objectives with efficiency and efficacy to bring the road network into a maintainable condition and improve sector performance.
        • Road works that were completed are already disintegrating because of poor quality of work.
        • The capacity to manage contracts and projects remains deficient with sector agencies.
    Institutional Dev.:
        • The poor quality of design and work is resulting in many of the rehabilitated roads disintegrating shortly after completion of work.
        • The ability and sustainability of the Road Fund to provide maintenance funding has yet to be tested and has a turbulent history.
        • Poor macroeconomic conditions in the country may result in the inability of the Road Fund to collect and allocate enough resources for road maintenance.
        • The borrower's institutional capacity to manage projects and contracts remains deficient.
    Bank Performance:
    DeficientHighly Unsatisfactory
        • The appraisal of the project was deficient
        • Although supervision improved towards the end of the project, it was highly unsatisfactory for most of the project's implementation.
        • Bank management could have been more proactive early on to ensure adequate supervision is provided for this complex and large project.
    Borrower Perf.:
    DeficientHighly Unsatisfactory
        • The implementing agency's corrupt practices contributed substantially to failure of the project.
        • Borrower performance was very poor in instituting policy and institutional reforms.
        • The borrower failed to comply with Bank's procurement guidelines and made changes to contracts without making a thorough assessment and without seeking the Bank's "no-objection".
    Quality of ICR:

    7. Lessons of Broad Applicablity:

    The ICR identifies the following lessons that have broad applicability:
    1. Corrupt practices can significantly impact project implementation practices
    2. The lessons of experience from previous operations should be taken into account in the design of follow-on projects
    3. A Supervision team should have a professional mix of the major fields of project activities such as engineering and institutional reforms.
    4. Technical documentation for implementation of civil works should be updated before actual commencement of construction works

    8. Audit Recommended?  Yes

              Why?  To examine in more detail the financial management aspects of the project and to draw further lessons about how it might have been handled differently.

    9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

    The ICR is comprehensive, but we assess the evidence as presented as warranting a highly unsatisfactory outcome rating rather than merely unsatisfactory.
    • It provides a thorough and candid account of the project implementation experience and results.
    • It provides a critical assessment of Bank performance throughout the project cycle and identifies useful lessons.
    • The ICR mission aide-memoire is noteworthy and provides a lucid summary of the views of the different stakeholders consulted.
    • The borrower contribution to the ICR is equally good, but could have been more critical in its assessment of the outcome of project and borrower performance.

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