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(The full report is available below)
This country case study, part of the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) A Review of the 1991 World Bank Forest Strategy and Its Implementation, evaluates Bank operations in Cameroon for their consistency with the strategy. The strategic aspects of those operations are judged here on their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, institutional development, and sustainability.
The forests and biodiversity of Cameroon constitute a significant portion of the Congo Basin. The Congo Basin accounts for about 80 percent of the remaining moist forests in Africa and 20 percent of the world's tropical moist forest -- second in size only to the Amazon. The Bank's 1991 Forest Strategy listed all the countries of the Congo Basin (except Equatorial Guinea) among the 20 countries with threatened tropical moist forests, implying that these countries deserved special attention in its programs. Since that time, the timber sector in Cameroon has significantly increased its logging activities and made Cameroon the leading exporter of tropical timber in Africa. Although the Bank has undertaken little direct forest investment over the past decade, forest sector issues have been part of the Bank financed Structural Adjustment Program since 1989.
Forests and Forest Policy in Cameroon
As in many other developing countries, there are few reliable sources of statistical information about forest loss in Cameroon, but estimates of annual deforestation range from 0.4 to 1.0 percent. The causes of deforestation are similarly uncertain. While small-holder slash and burn agriculture and fuelwood demand are widely believed to be responsible for about 90 percent of the deforestation, these factors are often secondary effects of tropical timber harvesting that degrades forest cover and contributes to associated declines in biodiversity. The four dynamic mechanisms of forest resource degradation and deforestation described in the 1991 Bank strategy -- shortened fallow cycles, direct conversion, logging, and fuelwood demand -- are all applicable to the Cameroon case. Whatever the primary cause, however, the current levels of deforestation and biodiversity degradation are not efficient, equitable, or sustainable.
Cameroon's forest sector experience is strongly linked to events in agriculture and the overall political economy. The low productivity of the agricultural system, combined with increased food demand, has made the expansion of the cultivated area a leading cause of deforestation. Bank-supported, policy led attempts by the government of Cameroon to intensify agricultural production were largely unsuccessful, primarily because of poor institutional development at both the grassroots and the central levels and an inappropriate macroeconomic framework (particularly prior to the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc).
The fundamental objective of the forest policy reform in Cameroon was to establish a transparent, equitable, and sustainable management system for forest resources. The outcome of the reform process was limited, for four reasons. First, the government of Cameroon lacked genuine commitment and the capacity to carry out the reform. Second, key actors in the reform process (particularly foreign logging companies and the parliament) chose to oppose it. Third, partners such as the World Bank failed to devise an implementation strategy compatible with the underlying dynamics of political and socioeconomic changes in Cameroon. Finally, while Cameroon's forest policy is well codified in documents, it is poorly implemented.
Although the reforms have led to increased tax revenues and increased the share of GDP attributable to the forest sector, the structural underpinnings of the sector have been little affected. Government agencies in the sector continue to be weak. The international logging companies that dominate the sector continue to have a free hand in the development and use of the forest resources of Cameroon. Local communities were left out of the reform process, despite the declared objective to include them in forest resource management.
The Bank's Performance
During the 1980-99 period, direct World Bank involvement in the forest sector of Cameroon consisted of a plantation project in 1982, ongoing policy-based lending that started in 1989, and a Global Environment Facility (GEF) biodiversity project approved in 1995. Indirect lending has consisted primarily of a declining number of agriculture projects directed at the primary export crops of Cameroon, including cocoa and other tree crop plantations. The forest policy advice of the Bank to the government of Cameroon was formulated with the 1987 Tropical Forestry Action Plan, the 1989 review of the agriculture sector, and Country Assistance Strategies in 1994 and 1996.
Among the things that the Bank helped achieve in Cameroon are the following: (1) forest sector issues are now at the center of the policy debate; (2) a multisectoral approach has been adopted to the extent that forest policy reform has been a key feature of the Country Assistance Strategy process and the Structural Adjustment Program; (3) Bank interventions have focused on areas recommended by the 1991 Forest Strategy -- policy and institutional reforms; and (4) cocoa and coffee marketing have been liberalized. With respect to international cooperation, the Bank and the rest of the donor community played a significant role in the outcome of the Yaoundé Declaration, which commits the governments of the Congo Basin to sustainable forest management.
However, the Bank did not attempt all the right and relevant things prescribed by the 1991 strategy. In particular, the Bank abandoned rural development in Cameroon and thereby missed an opportunity to promote the participation of rural people in resource expansion and intensification. In the 1992-99 period, because of lack of government commitment and weak capacity, the Bank shifted its lending approaching Cameroon from agriculture to multisector1 activities and to public sector management based on adjustment lending.
Over time, poverty increased as the economy declined. The government of Cameroon bears the primary responsibility for this outcome. It failed to consistently articulate a vision of socioeconomic development compatible with poverty reduction and environmental sustainability, and going beyond the diverse private interests in society. When it proclaimed a vision that would satisfy the World Bank and other partners, it failed to back up such declarations with credible actions that would rally all stakeholders around the policy objective, specify and enforce jurisdictional boundaries among government agencies, and marshal the resources (including building up the necessary capacity) to do the job.
The Bank made several strategic mistakes in Cameroon. First, it relied too heavily on the executive branch of the government to deliver on the promised reforms. Second, in both agriculture and forests, the Bank neglected the creation and dissemination of knowledge and information that was crucial for policymaking and implementation. Reliable information, when available to all the key players, reduces transaction costs associated with policymaking. Third, the Bank rightly recognized institutional weaknesses in Cameroon, but preferred to rely heavily on technical assistance to deal with the issue. Failure to develop local institutions undermined the sustainability of any achievements. Finally, the Bank had good intentions in trying to promote the interest of local communities, but it did little to gather their views and to design mechanisms that would ensure that those views were taken into consideration. The Bank should have made a truly participatory approach a cornerstone of the policy-based lending program.
Overall, the interventions of the Bank inside and outside the forest sector in Cameroon were relevant to its strategic objectives, but they were neither efficacious nor efficient. Because of weak institutional development, the achievements are unlikely to be sustained. The Bank should focus its future reform efforts in Cameroon on the collection and dissemination of relevant and reliable information, working with a larger set of stakeholders, and using more Cameroonian expertise to gain local perspective and build capacity. The success of such an approach hinges on government commitment and the cooperation of other donor countries, including those with timber interests in Cameroon.
Endnote
1 Projects classified as multisector relate to economic management, while public sector management involves institutional development and public enterprise reform.
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